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ABSTRACT 
 
This study illustrates the link between foreign policy, public diplomacy and the media, 
with reference to the South African Government’s refusal in 2009 and 2011 to issue 
visas to the Dalai Lama. The research question is: How do the South African media 
frame foreign policy and how do administrators react to this actuality? As there 
seems to be a void in South African international political communications, this is 
where this study purports to contribute. The aim is to investigate how the media 
frames foreign policy, specifically regarding the case study. Therefore, the media, 
human rights and foreign policies, and the diplomatic practices of the South African 
government are studied. The objective is not necessarily to prove or disprove the 
causal effect of media and public opinion on foreign policy but rather to illustrate the 
interaction between these elements in the case of the South African government’s 
denial of visas to the Dalai Lama. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Writing about constructing a post-apartheid foreign policy, Nelson Mandela on the 
eve of the 1994 general elections, stated that human rights would be “the light that 
guides South Africa’s foreign policy” (DFA, 1993).1 This set the tone for South 
Africa’s foreign policy in the aftermath of apartheid.  
 
Special attention was paid to Southern Africa, believing that South Africa could not 
remain “an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty”2 and that greater involvement in 
the region could help promote growth and development in both South and Southern 
Africa. Active internationalism, primarily through multilateral institutions, was another 
feature of post-apartheid foreign policy. In particular African-based institutions and 
organisations with a ‘South’ orientation were seen as proper vehicles for the 
promotion of a reformist agenda reflecting South Africa’s interests in democratic 
practice and development (DFA, 1993).  
 
Since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) Government identified the 
promotion of human rights as a primary focus of its foreign policy (DFA, 2005). The 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) spelt out South Africa's foreign policy 
principles.3 These are a commitment to: 
 
• the promotion of human rights;  
• the promotion of democracy;  
• justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;  
                                                 
1 Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first post-apartheid democratic president and served only 
one term, from 1994 until 1999. 
2 The phrase, island of prosperity in a sea of poverty, not attributed to anyone in particular, is used in 
reference to a number of situations, including with regard to South Africa in relation to its neighbours. 
3 The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), established in 1927, was renamed the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in 2009. 
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• international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for conflict 
resolution;  
• the interests of Africa in world affairs; and  
• economic development through regional and international cooperation in an 
interdependent world (DFA, 2005). 
 
Despite these lofty ideals, South Africa’s approach to human rights in its foreign 
policy, stemming from, for example, the stance the country adopted on human rights 
abuses by the government of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; South African 
positions as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) from 2007 to 2008 and again from 2011 to 2012, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC), and the decision to twice decline a visa to the 14th Dalai 
Lama to visit South Africa, put the country’s commitment to a human rights-based 
foreign policy in question (SAIIA, 2009).4  
 
In answer to a 2007 parliamentary question as to whether the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, would give a similar commitment to 
human rights in foreign affairs, the Minister confirmed that there had been “no 
change in the fundamental underpinnings of our foreign policy since the advent of 
our democracy in 1994” and that “our stand on human rights is still the same” (DFA 
2007).5 This being the case, the South African Government can therefore be held 
accountable in terms of this stated position (SAIIA, 2009). 
 
One of the instruments employed by the South African Government to conduct its 
foreign policy is diplomacy (DFA, 2011). Most government’s today embrace public 
diplomacy, at least publicly, as a particular type and practice of diplomacy (Melissen, 
2011). One of the instruments used to conduct public diplomacy is the media, 
referred to as the “centralised mass-media approach” to public diplomacy (Nye, 
2012). Governments need to correct daily misrepresentations of their policies and try 
to convey a longer-term strategic message (Nye, 2012). This study will scrutinise the 
South African government’s efforts to explain its policy with regard to the non-
                                                 
4 "Dalai" is a Mongolian word meaning "ocean" and "Lama" is a Tibetan term corresponding to the 
Indian word "guru" or teacher (Chökyi 1996).   
5 Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma served as South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 2009 
(http://www.inspiringwomen.co.za/) 
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approval of a visa to the Dalai Lama, also in terms of its wider foreign policy 
objectives.  
 
The main strength of the mass-media approach is its audience reach, ability to 
generate public awareness and set the agenda (Nye, 2012). There is thus a link 
between foreign policy, public diplomacy and the media. How a government goes 
about conducting relations with the media can result in either good or tense dealings 
with the media. 
 
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) explained in its 
Annual Report 2011/12 that the purpose of the Public Diplomacy Branch was to 
communicate South Africa’s role and position in international relations in the 
domestic and international arenas (DIRCO, 2012: 92). Its strategic objective was to 
provide public diplomacy direction nationally and internationally. The department 
also sought to strengthen its public engagements through the various public 
diplomacy platforms it coordinated nationally and internationally (DIRCO, 2012: 92).  
 
The broader focus was on promoting South Africa’s image. DIRCO, in its public 
diplomacy activities, focused on the media, non-governmental organisations and civil 
society through media statements, interviews with political principals and conducting 
regular outreach and public participation programmes throughout the country. 
Outreach programmes provided political principals with opportunities to articulate 
and clarify South Africa’s foreign policy. Particular attention was paid to the use of 
social media to convey South Africa’s foreign policy positions (DIRCO, 2012: 92). 
 
The link between foreign policy, public diplomacy and the media in South Africa is 
clearly illustrated in the decision of the South African Government to refuse a visa to 
the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, the exiled leader of Chinese-occupied Tibet, on 
two occasions.6 Around March 2009, the South African Government refused a visa 
to the Dalai Lama. A similar decision followed in October 2011. There was wide local 
and international media coverage, mostly critical of the decisions of the South 
African Government not to grant visas to the Dalai Lama, especially in view of the 
                                                 
6 Reference to the Dalai Lama in this study, refers to the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso.  
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fact  that the Dalai Lama is globally recognised as a human rights campaigner and 
has been in exile since the Tibetan uprising in 1959 (Asian History, 2009).  
 
Media reaction was amplified by the context of the refusals. In 2009, the Dalai Lama 
was invited to attend a peace conference linked to the 2010 Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, which South Africa was to 
host in June 2010. The conference was scheduled to be held in Johannesburg in 
March 2009 (Pretoria News Weekend, 21/3/2009). The second visa refusal followed 
an invitation to attend the 80th birthday celebrations of anti-apartheid activist and 
Nobel Laureate Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu in October 2011 (Pretoria 
News, 30/8/2011).  
 
Against the aforesaid, the aim of this study is to illustrate the link between foreign 
policy, public diplomacy and the media, with specific reference to the South African 
Government’s refusal on these occasions to issue visas to the Dalai Lama to visit the 
country. The aim is not necessarily to prove or disprove the causal effect of media 
opinion on foreign policy, but to investigate how the media frames and analyses 
South African foreign policy and very specifically regarding the matter investigated in 
the case study. Any cause and effect discovered in the course of the study would be 
incidental. While government policies would be studied as a point of departure, as a 
specific example of the interaction between government and the media, this incident 
serves as a case study especially as such a wide field of study would have to be 
limited to a certain point of focus.  
 
The 14th Dalai Lama is considered both the Head of State and the spiritual leader of 
Tibet. Born in 1935 to a farming family in Amdo, north-eastern Tibet, he was 
recognised as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama at the age of two. Dalai 
Lamas are believed to be enlightened beings who have postponed their own nirvana 
and chosen to take rebirth in order to serve humanity (Dalailama, undated). By the 
time he was recognised as the 14th Dalai Lama, the Chinese had control of Amdo 
(Tenzin, undated). A regent was appointed while the Dalai Lama was still a minor. 
However, in 1950, at 16 years old, he was forced to assume full political power 
during a crisis precipitated by the Chinese Communist invasion (Tenzin, undated). 
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In 1954, he was invited to Beijing where he and his party met Chinese leaders intent 
on convincing them they would be better off under Chinese rule (Tenzin, undated). In 
1959, the Tibetans rebelled, the Chinese repressed the uprising and the Dalai Lama 
fled to neighbouring India. He established a democratic government-in-exile to work 
for the freedom of Tibet and the welfare of Tibetan refugees. Three United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly resolutions were passed in 1959, 1961 and 1965 
respectively, condemning China for "violations of the fundamental human rights of 
the Tibetan people". In August 1991, after the violent repression of political 
demonstrations in Lhasa, the UN again passed a resolution, criticising Chinese 
policies in Tibet and calling on the Chinese "to fully respect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the Tibetan people" (Tibet Society, 2013). 
 
The Dalai Lama has travelled the world, seeking support for the Tibetan cause and 
sharing his belief in kindness and compassion, as the ultimate solution to personal 
and political conflict (Tenzin, undated). Since his first visit to the West in 1973, he 
has met many world leaders, members of European royalty and civic and religious 
leaders, including His Holiness Pope John Paul II. The Dalai Lama has addressed 
the United States (US) Congress, the European Parliament and innumerable 
university, inter-faith and civic gatherings (Tibet Society, 2013).  
 
From a Tibetan perspective, Tibet successfully avoided undue foreign influence and 
acted as a fully independent state from 1911 to 1950 (Tenzin, 1996). The turning 
point in its history came in 1949, when the People's Liberation Army of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) first crossed into Tibet. The Chinese Government, in 1951, 
imposed a "17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" on the Tibetan 
Government. Signed under duress, Tibetans feel the agreement lacks validity under 
international law (Tenzin, 1996).  
 
By 1959, popular uprisings culminated in massive demonstrations in Lhasa (Tenzin, 
1996). By the time China crushed the uprising, the Dalai Lama had fled to India, 
where he resides with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. In 1963, the Dalai Lama 
promulgated a constitution for a democratic Tibet. Tibetans consider their country to 
be an independent state under illegal occupation and they believe that neither 
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China's military invasion nor the continuing occupation by the People’s Liberation 
Army had transferred the sovereignty of Tibet to China (Tenzin, 1996).  
 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
In compiling this literature review a wide range of sources was studied, bearing in 
mind all the aspects considered in the study, namely issues of foreign policy, 
diplomacy, public diplomacy and communication. This was done to ensure extensive 
coverage of the theme, even across disciplines and subjects. The major aim was to 
establish whether there was a niche for a study of this kind. The finding was that the 
two disciplines of foreign policy and/or public diplomacy have seldom been combined 
in a study in the South African context. Much more has been written by international 
scholars on foreign policy theory, as it is an established study field.  
 
Holsti (1991: 195-198), for example, proposed the following models founded on 
problems in the foreign policy milieu: foreign policy reduced to the problems related 
to the security dilemma; the policy maker as an achiever of goals; and foreign policy 
based on the perspective of problem solving. States then are faced with four 
problems: autonomy, prosperity, security and regime maintenance. There is also a 
fifth, state creation, for many developing states. 
 
The use of soft power as a foreign policy alternative, suggests that when a state can 
get others to admire its ideals and want what it wants, it does not have to use sticks 
and carrots to move them in its direction (Nye, 2004). Seduction, therefore, 
according to Nye (2004), is more effective than coercion, and values like democracy, 
human rights and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.  
 
Palmer (2006: 1) attempted to determine why states did what they did in their 
dealings with others and considered foreign policy in terms of portfolios; adopted a 
general perspective of foreign policy designed to all states at all times; and assumed 
that states pursued two goals through their foreign policies – to protect things that 
they value and try to alter things in the international system they dislike.   
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Another scholar, Lentner (1974: 113), classified the means of foreign policy as 
political, diplomatic, informational, economic and military.  Informational means being 
those communications that occurred between the official sender of one state to the 
population, or a segment of the population, in another state. The difference in the 
receiving side of the communication distinguished informational means from 
diplomatic means. Informational means included the use of mass media – 
newspapers, radio and television.  
 
Political communication scholars have developed two major approaches to 
understanding the government-media nexus in foreign policy. These approaches are 
hegemony and indexing (Entman, 2004). Indexing theorists maintain that when elites 
disagree about foreign policy, the media reflect the discord in ways that affect foreign 
policy; this means the role of the media, though limited, transcends mere 
transmission of propaganda, as proposed by the hegemony theorists.  
 
King & Wells (2009: 16) propose that with regard to the government-media nexus 
three expounding approaches can study the institutions, actors and processes that 
decide the winners, losers and discourses of contemporary politics: the hegemony, 
indexing and cascade models. The hegemony model holds that ruling elites work 
persistently to ensure consent to the established political order and its main ideology 
through the creation and dissemination of meanings and values. They endeavour to 
construct political and cultural accord through influence rather than compulsion 
(using “cultural workers”, especially the media) to replicate, signify and restore their 
emergent world view and its perspective on any issue or event (King & Wells 2009: 
17). The indexing model also highlighs the constrained character of political 
discourse, but puts elite differences at its core. According to its supporters, political 
elites often differ about public policies and their execution. When such 
disagreements occur, media outlets supply the vehicle to convey the conflicting 
views. The greater the dissension, the more these disagreements are presented in 
news reports. Thus the media calibrate or index their reporting to the level of 
‘dissensus’ (King & Wells 2009: 18). The cascade model examines the information 
flow of political narratives as the spread from centres of power to the rest of society 
(King & Wells 2009: 18 & 19). It tries to clarify how it ‘cascades’ descending through 
the different levels of the information system – from government elites, to news 
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organisations, by way of  media news frames, to the general public. It is especially in 
synch with the struggle for narrative dominance, or frame contests, between the 
government’s frame of events or issues and the rival perspectives of political 
opponents.  
 
Since 1994, an abundance of writings on South Africa in the international political 
context emerged. It can be said that for the ANC the struggle for an apartheid-free 
South Africa was in many ways a struggle for human rights (Alden & Aran, 2003: 8).  
It was therefore no coincidence that human rights were ‘canonised’ as a corner stone 
of foreign policy. There was thus a logical symmetry between the ethical and 
normative constructs of the new domestic policies and the idealist foundations of its 
foreign policies. The new South Africa hence sought to play an activist role in 
international affairs.   
 
Broderick, Burford and Freer (2001: 5) also considered South Africa’s foreign policy 
dilemmas during the first decade after apartheid; they concurred that the defence 
and assertion of human rights featured prominently in debates in the early 
declaration of South Africa’s future foreign policy. This had to be seen especially 
against the background of the “new South Africa” being partly the creation of a 
massive human rights campaign.7 The ethical dimension to South Africa’s foreign 
policy aspirations would, however, create problems regarding the country’s relations 
with so-called “rogue states” such as Cuba, Iraq and Iran.   
 
Landsberg (undated) analysed South Africa’s policy agenda for the African continent 
to establish whether South Africa had been successful in meeting the stated goals of 
the African Agenda over the first 15 years after apartheid and what the challenges 
were for the next decade. He explained that the African Agenda was based on the 
understanding that socio-economic development could not take place without 
political peace and stability and that these were prerequisites for socio-economic 
development.   
 
                                                 
7 The term “new South Africa” is generally referred to as post-apartheid South Africa and is not 
ascribed to any one particular person. 
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Nel & Van der Westhuizen (2003: 9) investigated how far South Africa's post-
apartheid foreign policy could serve as a model for the rest of the continent and 
asked how much democracy there had been in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign 
policy. He described the government’s attitude to governing as "guardianship," 
meaning that the government acted alongside the perceived interests of the people, 
rather than allowing politics by the people (Nel, 2003: 34). It was concluded that 
South African citizens had good reason to have a sense of “powerlessness and 
impotence" regarding their government's foreign policy making (Nel, 2003: 169). 
Internationalisation and trans-nationalisation of foreign policy were cited as inhibiting 
factors, but it was argued that "the singular failure of the South African state ... to 
adequately provide avenues for democratic participation in policy making has 
exacerbated the sense of powerlessness and impotence” (Nel, 2003: 169). 
 
Van Wyk (2004: 105) also considered South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy 
and explained the constructivist approach: that state identities were constructed not 
made.   
 
Much has also been published about communication. Internationally, Jowett and 
O’Donnell (2006: 7) wrote about propaganda and defined it as the deliberate, 
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour 
to achieve a response that furthered the desired intent of the propagandist. It was 
explained that propaganda was deliberate in that it was wilful, intentional and 
predetermined. It was systematic as it was precise and methodical and carried out 
with organised regularity. Propaganda was also an attempt at directive 
communication with a prior objective (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006: 8). It further 
attempted to shape perceptions through language and images.   
 
Van Schoor (1977: 1) contended that the basis of human communication was the 
imparting and deciphering of messages, from which the communication structure 
could be deducted. The source deliberately sent a message (Van Schoor, 1977: 13-
26). The message needed to be given a sensory observable stature, which was 
referred to as the encoding of the message. Such a code of signs institutionalised in 
a community was a medium of communication. Communication did not end at the 
delivery of the message and encoding thereof by the communicator.  The message 
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first had to be received and interpreted by the receiver. He decoded the message 
and could become so actively involved in the process, that he reacted by sending a 
new message of his own.  The receiver then became the new source (Van Schoor, 
1977: 13-26). 
 
International academics have also written about political communications. Entman 
(2004: 2), for example, suggested that in practice the relationship between governing 
elites and news organisations was less distant and more cooperative than the ideal 
envisioned, especially in foreign affairs. He explained that the question was really 
one of degree: Just how close is the association? Does it become cosier in some 
conditions than in others? How exactly is this relationship reflected in the news? 
What are the effects on foreign policy and democratic accountability?   
 
O’Heffernan (1991: 89) contended that the media’s role as a check on official 
governmental information provided them with power, based both on fear and 
usefulness.  According to policy-makers, the media helped to keep other agencies 
honest or provided information which indicated when they were not honest. Policy 
makers admitted that it hurt when the same reporting zeal was applied to their own 
outputs.  Media was needed as an output to communicate with and influence other 
nations and segments of the foreign policy community.   
 
Miller (2007: 3) quoted commentators expressing concern about the dangers of a 
media-dictated foreign policy, as it increased the pressure on politicians to react 
promptly to news accounts that were incomplete by nature, without context and often 
inaccurate. He noted that realist critics had decried the “CNN (Cable News Network) 
effect” calling for elite control of foreign policy (Miller, 2007: 11-12).8 The foreign 
policy community did, however, become more sensitive to the notion of humanitarian 
intervention and called for a more ethical foreign policy.  As a result, there had been 
greater appreciation among policy makers and advisers regarding the beneficial role 
of the news media. Notwithstanding these developments, the established tone within 
                                                 
8 The CNN Effect refers to where television's instantly transmitted images fire public opinion, 
demanding instant responses from government officials, almost immediately shaping and reshaping 
foreign policy (Strobel 1996). 
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foreign policy circles tended to revolve around concern about the damaging impact 
of coverage on sound policy making.   
 
It is, therefore, clear that international and local academics writing about 
communications, and even international academics writing about political 
communications have produced a significant body of work. There is, however, a void 
in the area of South African international political communications. This is where this 
study purports to make a contribution. Although the media reported extensively on 
South Africa’s refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama, according to the Sabinet database 
during the conduct of this research, no academic dissertations or theses had been 
completed on the matter.9   
 
3.  Importance of the research and the research question 
 
The South African Government’s refusal of the Dalai Lama’s visa applications is 
important for several reasons. In the first instance, it contradicts the South African 
Government’s stated human rights-based foreign policy. The South African 
Government, like other governments, is often criticised for taking certain policy 
positions. South Africa’s 2007 decision to join Russia and China to veto the UNSC 
resolution to condemn Chinese oppression in Myanmar, while serving as a non-
permanent member of the UNSC, serves as one example.10  
 
Secondly, it raises questions about the conduct of South Africa’s diplomacy. John 
Herskowitz writing for Reuters (10/10/2011) said that Africa's biggest economy had 
already shown that it cast “a tiny foreign policy shadow” and the “diplomatic debacle” 
over a visa for the Dalai Lama had likely further diminished its stature by showing 
how easily it could be “bullied”, citing the Chinese influence on South Africa. Daily 
Maverick (3/1/2011), an independent South African publication, concurred saying it 
was the Chinese influence on South Africa that was bemoaned when a delay in 
processing a visa application of the Dalai Lama caused him to cancel his trip. 
 
                                                 
9 Sabinet facilitates access to electronic information (Sabinet 2013). 
10 South Africa twice served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, from 2007 to 2008 and again 
from 2011 to 2012 (Cilliers et al. 2010).  
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Thirdly, it raises questions about certain constitutional guarantees in South Africa.  
Prof Loyiso Nongxa, Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, expressed dismay in 2011, saying South Africans had a moral 
obligation to provide a platform for all voices to be heard, including the voice of the 
Dalai Lama (News24, 4/10/2011). The university condemned the state for again not 
granting a visa for this “stalwart of peace” to enter the country. He argued that the 
state's deliberate indecision ridiculed the values pertaining to freedom of speech, 
expression and movement enshrined in the Constitution (Act 106 of 1996) (hereafter 
the Constitution) (News24, 4/10/2011). 
 
With regard to the role of the media in South Africa, the head of Journalism and 
Media Studies at Rhodes University, Prof Guy Berger, observed that, in practice, the 
South African media was prepared to "speak truth to power" and confront abuses 
(iol, 1/1/2010).  
 
Whereas post-apartheid South Africa enjoys unprecedented media freedom, 
espoused in the Constitution and legislation to this effect, the media’s response to 
the government’s foreign policy and actions often caused some tension between 
government and the media. The proposed Protection of Information Bill (PIB)/ 
Protection of State Information Bill (PSIB) and Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT), as 
well as the appointment of perceived as less-than-media-friendly Cabinet 
spokesperson/Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) Jimmy Manyi, contributed to an even more volatile 
relationship.11 At the end of Manyi’s tenure, political analyst Zamikhaya Maseti said 
that those who were behind his appointment should take the blame for the poor state 
of the GCIS and its hostile relationship with the media under his leadership (Mail & 
Guardian, 27/8/2012).   
 
The South African media is well-established and sophisticated, comprising print 
media (newspapers and magazines), broadcast media (radio and television) and 
electronic media (Internet) (Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa [OSISA], 2010: 
                                                 
11 Parliament passed the PSIB in April 2013 after three years of debate and redrafting, but opponents 
signalled a court challenge is still on the cards (Mail & Guardian 25/4/2013). 
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19).12 Though South Africa has a wide-ranging media and media-publishing sector, 
many South Africans in remote rural areas still do not have access to a diverse 
range of information.  
 
Finally, it raises questions about the relations between China and South Africa as 
China has been accused of “Dalai Lama Economics” (Mail & Guardian, 7/10/2011). 
China is a permanent member of the UNSC and one of South Africa’s largest trading 
partners (GCIS, 2012). It was speculated from the outset that the South African 
Government had bowed to pressure from China not to allow the Dalai Lama into 
South Africa (Pretoria News Weekend, 21/3/2009). South Africa initially denied that 
China had influenced its decision to bar the Dalai Lama from entering South Africa 
(Pretoria News, 23/3/2009), insisting that his presence (Pretoria News, 24/3/2009) 
would divert the attention of the country and the world from the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup and that he was welcome to visit South Africa, but not then.  
 
It was later conceded that South African interests would be better served by ensuring 
relations with China were not jeopardised (The Mercury, 24/3/2009). The South 
African Government was widely criticised for its decision and the media described it 
as a “disgrace” and an “embarrassment” concluding that the government believed 
that sticking to the spirit of the Constitution and abiding by a commitment to 
international human rights was less in South Africa’s interests than “kowtowing” to 
“dictators” and “big brothers” (Weekend Argus, 22/3/2009). 
 
The research question of a study presents the idea to be examined (Harber, 
undated: 28). Social scientists aim to explain what would cause something to 
happen, although the complexity of human behaviour impedes the development of 
causal explanations (Mill, 1874: 586). Researchers do however think in terms of 
“cause and effect” when setting up a problem for investigation. In this study, the aim 
is rather to establish whether something happens.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether media reporting has any effect on 
foreign policy, especially in the South African context. Therefore, the primary aim is 
                                                 
12 OSISA is an African institution committed to deepening democracy, protecting human rights and 
enhancing good governance in Southern Africa (OSISA, undated). 
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to illustrate the relationship between the media and a country’s foreign policy, as 
conducted through public diplomacy, with specific reference to South Africa. This 
study investigates South African foreign policy, how the media frames and analyses 
this policy and subsequently again tracking government reaction to these.   
 
As stated before, the aim is not necessarily to prove or disprove the causal effect of 
media opinion on foreign policy, but to investigate how the media frames and 
analyses South African foreign policy, and very specifically with regard to the matter 
investigated in the case study. Any cause and effect discovered in the course of the 
study would be incidental. 
 
In identifying a research question the aim was to pose a question whose answer 
contributes to the understanding of the discipline. The question has in mind the 
nexus of media power and foreign policy, where television's instantly transmitted 
images fire public opinion, demanding instant responses from government officials, 
almost immediately shaping and reshaping foreign policy, known as the CNN Effect 
(Strobel, 1996). This influence of media on foreign policy has thus become almost 
axiomatic, though also disputed by some, such as US diplomat George Kennan, 
asking: “If CNN determines foreign policy, why do we need administrators and 
legislators” (Strobel, 1996)?  
 
The research question posed is thus: How do the South African media frame foreign 
policy and how do administrators react to this actuality? The discourse between the 
South African media and government regarding South Africa’s foreign policy is 
clearly illustrated in the matter of the South African Government not granting a visa 
to the 14th Dalai Lama on two occasions, in 2009 and 2011 respectively. This serves 
as a study case of the interchanges between the media and the government on the 
matter. If any causal effect can be established from this investigation, it would be so 
indicated.    
 
4.  Theoretical and analytical framework 
 
There are various approaches to foreign policy analysis, including decision making, 
comparative foreign policy, rational actor theory, bureaucratic politics, organisational 
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processes, role theory, congitive approach, problem areas, political economic 
approaches, regime theory, implementation approach, and change as focus and 
identity studies. A combination of these approaches is used as the theoretical 
framework to enrich the study and ensure that it is multifaceted and does not 
become too linear in approach.  
 
However, the study predominantly accepts the constructivist approach as theoretical 
foundation in analysing the relationship between government entities and the media. 
Wendt (1999: 1) refers to two basic tenets of constructivism, namely that the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.  
 
Constructivism focuses on the power of ideas in defining actions and interactions; on 
the importance of identity in defining what actors want; on the cyclical relationship 
between an actor’s interests, identities and behaviour; and the social context in 
which the actor exists (Van Wyk et al, 2007: 24). Wendt (1999: 1) refers to two 
increasingly accepted basic outlooks of constructivism, namely that the structures of 
human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces; and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
these shared ideas rather than given by nature. 
 
The key tenet of constructivism is the belief that "international politics is shaped by 
persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities" (Snyder, 2004: 52). 
Adler (1997: 319) states that constructivism occupies a middle ground between 
rationalist and interpretative theories of international relations. 
 
Constructivism shares two broad assumptions with neo-realism, neo-liberalism and 
liberalism, i.e. commitments to explanation and rationality (Banchoff, 2008: Internet). 
First, constructivists seek primarily to explain, and not simply to interpret critique or 
transform the dynamics of international politics. Second, constructivists endorse 
assumptions of rationality. Like neo-realism, neo-liberalism and liberalism, it 
conceives of international and domestic actors in rational pursuit of interests within 
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constraints. Most constructivists view human rationality as a causal mechanism 
linking interests, constraints and action (Banchoff, 2008: Internet).  
 
Constructivists primarily seek to demonstrate how many core aspects of international 
relations are, contrary to the assumptions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, socially 
constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice 
and interaction (Jackson, 2006: 168). Rather than wrestle with the agent-structure 
dilemma, constructivists seek to transcend or account for it (Green, 2002: 62-63). 
The focal points would be rationality of agents, structures and culture as source of 
meanings.  
 
Constructivists shift away from objects (actors, structures) to processes 
(construction, creation), considering the thought processes through which agents 
construct structures and structures constitute agents. Answers follow from 
constructivists’ three premises: agents, structures and social processes. Agents are 
least problematic, possessing interests which the rational pursue, given their 
capabilities (Green, 2002: 62-63).  
 
Constructivists’ premise that social structures constitute actors’ identities, interests or 
capabilities, just as actors’ choices constitute patterned social structures (Green, 
2002: 62). The social, rather than material, structures in world politics possess two 
features: while structures in part consist of the distribution of material resources and 
capabilities, they alone own no explanatory power unless embedded in a system of 
meanings and values defining understandings and meanings; and the meanings 
conveyed in socially shared knowledge structure social relationships. Furthermore, 
both agents and structures exist by process. Process is the key to constructivist 
thought; rules are central to the process of social construction (Green, 2002: 62). 
 
Human rights concerns in South Africa’s foreign policy should not only be considered 
‘constitutional’ in the national sense (from South Africa’s Constitution), but also 
‘international’ (from international human rights instruments) (Titus 2009: 8). When 
South Africa is engaging on human rights at international forums, it is not so much in 
terms of its Constitution, but to what degree the country is giving effect to its 
international commitments (Titus 2009: 9).  
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Public concern over South Africa’s approach to human rights in its foreign policy 
stemmed from the position the country assumed on the crisis in Zimbabwe and 
positions it took as a member of the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights 
Council (Titus 2009: 11). The decision to twice deny a visa to the Dalai Lama is 
consistent with this trend. Analysts suggested that human rights were no longer a 
prominent consideration for South Africa’s foreign policy (Titus 2009: 11). However, 
as far as the South African government was concerned, the status quo on human 
rights and foreign policy was unmistakably established and human rights remained 
the accepted “light that guides our foreign affairs” (Titus 2009: 11-12). As with other 
claims of a shift in its human rights approach, the government through the ruling 
party insisted that the 2009 refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama did not mark the 
undermining of human rights. They thought this country was “more sensitive to 
human rights than many” (Cape Argus, 27/3/2009). 
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) expressed concern for the place occupied by human 
rights considerations in the country’s foreign policy (Titus 2009: 12). It was noted that 
supporters of human rights watched in elation as apartheid ended in South Africa, 
but many were dismayed as the country’s foreign policy later often aligned with 
global enemies of human rights.  HRW also emphasised the swing of post-apartheid 
South Africa towards arguments in favour of the defence of sovereignty. This is 
favoured by violators of human rights, and is a central challenge to the 
institutionalisation of human rights in foreign policy (Titus 2009: 12). 
 
Human rights do not focus on the promotion of a country’s material interests (Titus 
2009: 15). The promotion of human rights can even be in conflict with a country’s 
material interests. Countries that wish to promote human rights in other countries 
therefore consistently find themselves balancing interests and determining priorities. 
(Titus 2009: 15). In the case of South Africa denying the Dalai Lama a visa, 
presumably under pressure from China, it is clearly in conflict with its own ideational 
interest, as its domestic constituency is clearly in favour of granting him a visa based 
on human rights considerations. The government, however, considers it to be in the 
country’s material interest not to grant the visa, as trade and other relations with 
China might be harmed.  
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However, the Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) comes out in defence of interests 
over human rights in South Africa’s foreign policy pursuits, saying that it is naive to 
imagine that South Africa can have a selfless foreign policy based solely on human 
rights. The promotion of national interest is any government's moral duty to its 
citizens. It would not be surprising if South Africa wished to modify a purist human 
rights stand to stay on side with states with whom its trade, investment or defence 
links are particularly strong (HSF, 1996).13 
 
Foreign policy, while serving the national interests in the international system, also 
aids in creating and re-constructing the national collective identity. This is true for all 
states. Telhami and Barnett (2002: 7) noted that identity appears at different places 
in the causal chain. It can be an ideological device to justify self-interested politics, it 
can be part of the cultural terrain and thus conditions the possible and the actual, or 
it can provide a direct link to a discrete foreign policy preference or outcome.  
 
Rittberger (2001: 121) notes that norms can be invoked by actors within and outside 
states and be expressed by either of them as expressions of appropriate behaviour 
addressed to a state’s foreign policy decision makers. Especially prominent norms, 
such as the protection of human rights or the promotion of free trade, are widely 
shared both within states and at the level of international society.  
 
Interests, norms and identity are also considered when evaluating the media’s 
agenda. Herman and Chomsky's (1988: xi) "propaganda model" of the media 
postulates a set of five filters that act to screen the news and other material 
disseminated by the media. These filters result in a media that reflects elite 
viewpoints and interests and mobilises support for the special interests that dominate 
the state and private activity. These filters, according to Herman and Chomsky 
(1988:  xi), are:  
 
• the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of 
dominant mass-media firms;  
• advertising as the primary income source of mass media;  
                                                 
13 The HSF promotes liberal constitutional democracy through broadening public debate and research 
(HSF, undated). 
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• the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business 
and experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of 
power;  
• "flak" (negative responses to a media report) as a means of disciplining the 
media; and  
• (at that stage on the media agenda) "Anti-communism" as a national religion 
and control mechanism.  
 
With regard to media identity, Nicholas and Price (1998: 20-21) notes that media 
owners argue that ultimately it is the consumers who determine the nature of media 
products. However, he contends that the news organisation’s origins should be taken 
into account to understand its identity. Some were set up by individuals seeking 
political influence.  
 
A local media organisation has to identify with its region very strongly, while a 
national media organisation can upset the odd local community or two and still 
survive. A media organisation’s critical independence can be affected by its 
relationship with other organisations which need publicity. Hard economic facts may 
be difficult to determine, as they are often sensitive, but they have a very strong 
influence on identity through advertisement and other financing (Nicholas & Price, 
1998: 20-21).  
 
The method used in this study is to concentrate on one carefully selected case study 
to examine the issue at hand. Case studies are described as complex examples, 
which give an insight into the context of a problem, as well as illustrate the main 
point (Savin-Baden, 2003). Selecting cases is difficult, but the selection offers the 
opportunity to maximise what can be learned, knowing that time is limited (Stake, 
1995). Cases selected should be easy and willing subjects. A good instrumental 
case does not have to defend its typicality. Case studies must have boundaries.  The 
cases that are selected should serve to maximise what can be learned, in the time 
available for the study.  
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The case study selected for this study offers an example where government 
decisions drew strong reaction from the media, there was significant media coverage 
of various angles to the story, there were statements from government in reaction to 
the publicity and there was a final conclusion to the matter that facilitates a fully 
rounded analysis. There is thus enough evidence of interaction between media 
coverage and government reaction to make a study thereof feasible.  
 
Constructivism is selected as the main theoretical approach from which to conduct 
this study, as the findings of the study of the dealings between the South African 
Government and the media in this study, may result in the outcome of these leading 
to a newly constructed foreign policy stance. Issues of values and interests are also 
repeatedly highlighted in arguments in the disputes in both instances when the Dalai 
Lama’s visa was not granted.  
 
5.  Conceptual clarification 
 
Although Chapter Two provides a conceptual analysis, preliminary clarification is 
provided on certain concepts relevant to this study, namely foreign policy, diplomacy, 
public diplomacy, economic diplomacy and the media.  
 
Foreign policy can be defined as the sum of official external relations conducted by 
an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations (Hill, 2003: 3). The 
term “official” allows for inclusion of inputs from all parts of the governing 
mechanisms of the state, while also putting limitations to the international 
transactions being conducted; policy is the “sum” of these relations, so as not to see 
every particular action as a separate foreign policy; and it is “foreign” as the world is 
still more separated into distinctive communities than a homogenous entity (Hill, 
2003: 3).  
 
Foreign policy attempts to coordinate priorities between competing externally 
projected interests.  It should also project those values considered by society as 
being universal. All of this implies the underlying possibility of constructing and 
reconstructing policy considering the interests and values of the relevant society 
(Hill, 2003: 5).  
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Chief among a state’s foreign policy instruments is the activity of diplomacy 
(Berridge, 2001: 1). This refers to the “official channels of communication employed 
by the members of a system of states” (Berridge, 2001: 1). In this context, 
diplomacy’s chief purpose is to “enable states to secure the objectives of their 
foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law” (Berridge, 2001: 1). 
Diplomacy is a peaceful means of implementing national strategy through win-win 
approaches (Voskopoulos, undated).  
 
Since the international environment is anarchic, each state focuses its policy on 
sustaining its status quo or improving its position in a clearly hierarchical system in 
the form of a pyramid. The closer a state is to the top, the better its chances to 
achieve its goals. Consequently, diplomacy is more probable to bear fruit when a 
country is independent, autonomous and developed (Voskopoulos, undated).  
 
The diplomacy practised by powerful states may be different and has diametrically 
different goals from that of smaller states (Voskopoulos, undated). Bull (1977: 162) 
suggests diplomacy may be defined as the management of international relations by 
negotiation, typically through ambassadors or diplomats. Where diplomacy is 
concerned, constructivism mentions that “diplomacy is an agent for change” in 
international relations (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005: 55). Constructivist approaches can 
be used to understand the diplomatic process of negotiation (Bayne & Woolcock, 
2011: 25). A constructivist analysis of negotiation allows for persuasion based on 
argumentation or concepts of fairness, to change positions or preferences of the 
parties concerned.  
 
Public diplomacy, like constructivism, challenges the primacy of material power in 
achieving outcomes and offers an alternative model of practice that understands the 
normative or ideational structures underpinning audience identities (Byrne, 2012). In 
defining public diplomacy, Gregory (2008) suggests that it is “the means by which 
states, associations of states and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes and 
behaviour, build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to 
advance their interests and values”.  
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Public diplomacy has the capacity to bridge perceptual gaps that exist with some 
public audiences as a result of the normative or ideational structures from within 
which they operate and make sense of their world (Bruce, 2012). This puts the 
practice of public diplomacy squarely within the inter-subjective dimension of 
constructivism.  
 
Effective public diplomacy practitioners are engaged in this dimension to understand 
the identities, value positions and norms - both relevant to their own and to others’ 
ideational structures – to successfully engage and influence publics and achieve 
policy objectives (Bruce, 2012). By dealing in the very currencies of constructivism 
and engaging in this dimension, public diplomacy offers a vehicle for operationalising 
constructivist approaches. Public diplomacy manifests through an expansive range 
of instruments, ranging from information delivery such as opinion pieces in media, to 
educational or professional exchange through various modes, speeches and actions 
of high profile leaders or celebrities, journalistic tours, cultural engagement through 
arts, sport and literature, to the very policies that a nation employs that reflect its 
identity.  
 
The public diplomacy instrument chosen in any particular case will depend in each 
case upon the strategic objective, context relevant to the target audience, and 
organisational capacities or networks available to conduct or oversee the activity. 
Effective modern public diplomacy is widely accepted to represent a two-way street, 
which might solicit an interpretation and response from the receiver, but also 
encourage listening and genuine dialogue with publics (Byrne, 2012). 
 
Economic diplomacy is the process through which countries engage the outside 
world, to maximise their national gain in all the fields of activity, including trade, 
investment and other forms of economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy 
comparative advantage (Rana, undated). It has bilateral, regional and multilateral 
dimensions, each of which is important. No longer the monopoly of state entities, the 
official agents (the foreign and economic ministries, the diplomatic and commercial 
services, plus their promotional agencies) now engage in dynamic partnerships with 
an array of non-state actors. Such domestic collaboration is essential for effective 
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external outreach. In mirror fashion, the actions similarly address a wide field of 
foreign stakeholders.   
 
Whereas this study also treads on the terrain of the communication sciences, some 
terms relevant to these need to be considered. Communication as such is an urge 
for shared understanding (Van Schoor, 1982: 68). A number of actions need to be 
concluded starting with an outgoing statement, which is changed into a message-
carrying medium, which is then transformed into a clarification. This can be 
described as message traffic. It has to be repeated to confirm the significance of 
mutual understanding. Mutual understanding is a synthesis of all the parts of 
communication.  
 
Van Schoor (1977: 1) contends that the basis of human communication is the 
imparting and deciphering of messages, from which the communication structure can 
be deducted. The source deliberately sends a message (Van Schoor, 1977: 13-26) 
or the content of what needs to be conveyed. The message needs to be given a 
sensory observable stature, which is referred to as the encoding of the message. 
Such a code of signs institutionalised in a community is a medium of communication. 
Communication does not end at the delivery of the message and encoding thereof 
by the communicator. The message first has to be received and interpreted by the 
receiver. He decodes the message and can become so actively involved in the 
process, that he reacts by sending a new message of his own.  The receiver then 
becomes the new source.  
 
Constructivism is a concept with varying interpretations in different fields (Wong, 
2006). In communication, constructivism is a cognitive theory of human 
communication that describes how human perception influences the skilful 
production and interpretation of a variety of social influence messages (Delia, 
O’Keefe & O'Keefe, 1982). According to Burleson (2006: 108), constructivism seeks 
to explain individual differences in the ability to communicate skilfully: 
 
• It identifies what counts as skilful conduct with respect to several processes, 
including social perception (the ability to acquire, retain, manipulate and use 
information about the social world); message production (the ability to 
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generate verbal and nonverbal messages that efficiently and effectively 
accomplish various personal and social goals); and message reception (the 
ability to fully comprehend the meaning of others’ messages and, when 
appropriate, go beyond those messages to understand the source’s intentions 
and motives); 
• It explains why there are individual differences in these communication skills. 
That is, constructivism specifies the characteristics and qualities people must 
possess if they are to communicate in a skilful way; and 
• It clarifies the source or origin of individual differences in the characteristics 
that lead some people to be more skilful communicators than others.  
 
Constructivism maintains that the interpretive or perceptual processes of individuals 
play a central role in all communicative conduct (Burleson, 2006: 108). 
 
Mass media is any medium used to transmit mass communication.  
Telecommunications and technology author Tomi Ahonen (2008: Internet) coined the 
term "Seventh of the Mass Media" to explain why services on cellular phones need 
not be copies of internet or television content and described the evolution and 
convergence of mass media from print to recordings, cinema, radio, television, 
internet and cellular phones.   
 
For the purpose of this study, a distinction is made between the state-owned public 
media and privately-owned media in South Africa. In South Africa, state-owned 
media include the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and the 
Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) through its SAnews 
“news agency” and publications such as Vuk’uzenzele. The GCIS (2013) sets and 
influences adherence to standards for an effective government communication 
system; and drives coherent government messaging and proactively communicate 
with the public about government policies, plans programmes and achievements 
(GCIS, 2010).  
 
The purpose of GCIS (2010) is to lead government communication through 
submitting a National Communication Strategy (NSC) to Cabinet and ensuring 
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coherent messages, as well as open and extended channels of communication 
between government and the people, towards a shared vision. GCIS also provides 
communication and information services to the domestic and foreign media to 
improve their knowledge of government-related issues.  
 
With regard to international relations, GCIS’ Medium Term Strategic Framework 
(MTSF) (GCIS, 2009) states that it leads the international marketing of the country 
and provides overall guidance, ensuring that the country is marketed abroad through 
the International Marketing Council (IMC). It assists the IMC in the development of 
the country brand in line with government’s vision, and builds consensus among key 
stakeholders in support of the country’s marketing initiative. The NSC, which would 
probably encompass GCIS’ media policy, is not available for public consumption.  
 
There is one public broadcaster, the SABC, as well as a number of commercial radio 
stations and numerous community radio stations (OSISA, 2010: 24). There is no 
national commercial radio station in South Africa. Regional and city-wide stations 
mostly broadcast in English. Six of the SABC’s existing services were sold to private 
entities in 1996. These stations all have a regional profile (covering provinces rather 
than just cities). Television has been available in the country since 1976 (OSISA, 
2010: 24), with satellite television being available from the mid 1990s. Besides the 
public broadcaster, SABC, there are also a number of commercial broadcasters. Key 
issues facing the media industry include the role of the press in a fledgling 
democracy, illiteracy and the attraction and retention of advertising revenue.14  
 
In respect of privately owned media in South Africa, there are four major press 
groups in the country, namely Independent Newspapers, Nasionale Pers (Naspers), 
Caxton and Avusa (OSISA, 2010: 20). Radio has the greatest reach of any media in 
South Africa. South Africa has a large radio network, with private, public and 
community broadcasting (OSISA, 2010: 23).  
 
6.  Methodology 
                                                 
14 For the purpose of this study, a distinction between the concepts press and media is made. The 
press refers to newspapers. The media as an encompassing term refers to newspapers, radio, 
television and internet.  
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The method used is to concentrate on one carefully selected case study to examine 
the issue at hand. Case studies are complex examples, which provide insight into 
the context of a problem, as well as illustrate the main point (Savin-Baden, 2003). 
Feigin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991: 172) state that irrespective of the purpose, unit of 
analysis, or design, rigour is a central concern. They suggest that, while proponents 
of multiple case studies may argue for replication, using more than one case may 
dilute the importance and meaning of the single case. Case study can be seen to 
satisfy the three tenets of the qualitative method, which is used here, namely 
describing, understanding and explaining (Savin-Baden, 2003).  
 
Selecting cases is difficult, but offers the opportunity to maximise what can be 
learned, knowing that time is limited (Stake, 1995). Cases selected should be easy 
and willing subjects. A good instrumental case does not have to defend its typicality. 
Case studies must have boundaries. Selected cases should allow the researcher to 
maximise what can be learned, in the time available for the study. 
 
In this research, a single case study is used. It covers two related incidents over a 
period of two years. The chosen case study is the decision by the South African 
Government not to issue visas to the Dalai Lama in 2009 and 2011 respectively.  
This case study was chosen because it is an example of government decisions 
drawing strong reaction from the media; there was significant media coverage of 
various angles to the stories; there were statements from government in reaction to 
the publicity; and there was a final conclusion to the matter that facilitates a fully 
rounded analysis. There is thus enough evidence of interaction between media 
coverage and government reaction to make a study thereof feasible. This interaction 
will then be described to gather a better understanding of what transpired during 
these events to be able to explain the relationship between media coverage and 
government reaction, and perhaps policy decisions.  
 
According to Yin (1994: 21), the case study design must have five components, 
namely the research question, its proposition, its units of analysis, a determination of 
how the data is linked to the proposition and criteria to interpret the findings. Yin 
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(1994: 26) concluded that operationally defining the unit of analysis assists with 
replication and efforts at case comparison. 
 
The case study considers the research question, which is to investigate South 
African foreign policy; how the media frames and analyses this policy; and 
subsequently again tracks government reaction to these, directly. It looks at a 
specific aspect of South African foreign policy (the matter of issuing a visa to the 
Dalai Lama and the related questions of human rights and succumbing to economic 
pressure), how the media framed this specific issue and how government reacted to 
the media’s coverage of the matter.  
 
The assumption that there is a link between media coverage and foreign-policy 
decisions will be considered if such a connection is coincidentally discovered through 
the study. The unit of analysis will be media reports on the events under 
investigation and mostly from the Independent News & Media. The content of media 
coverage on the matter and the reaction of the South African Government to these 
will guide the interpretation of the findings. 
 
The purposes of case study research may be exploratory, descriptive, interpretive, 
experimental and/or explanatory (Fitzpatrick, 2006: 61). This study is mostly 
descriptive, tracking the interplay between media coverage and government reaction 
in the matter of the Dalai Lama visa disputes. It is also exploratory in that an effort 
will also be made to probe the nature of the interaction. It will also be interpretive as 
an attempt will be made to better understand the said relationship.  
 
Gathering information is mainly from primary and secondary sources, consisting of 
media coverage, Internet information and academic reference material. For the 
purpose of this study, a specific South African media source, Independent News & 
Media Plc, is used in tracking both government positions and media reactions. 
Analyst opinions and government reactions on the same are often also quoted in 
these media sources.  
 
Primary sources for this study include government policies, legislation, media 
statements issued by government through GCIS, and speeches by government 
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decision makers and diplomats. The daily publications the Pretoria News and The 
Star, as well as the Sunday Independent are used to focus on the Gauteng-
published Independent Newspapers. Gauteng-published media are the main source 
of information in this study. While it is the country's smallest province, it has the 
largest population and by far the highest population density of around 675 people per 
square kilometre (BrandSA, 2013).  
 
With only 1,4 per cent of South Africa's land area, the province contributes more than 
33 per cent to the national economy and a phenomenal 10 per cent to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the entire African continent (BrandSA, 2013). Pretoria, 
also in Gauteng, is the (administrative) capital of the country and hosts the seat of 
government (BrandSA, 2013). It can be assumed that as the Gauteng-published 
media are in the government’s immediate environment, the government itself pays 
most attention to these sources in considering its reaction to media reporting.  
 
Attention is given to news reports, feature articles, letters from influential readers, as 
well as editorials. Where possible and where a relevant differing or enriching view is 
found in any of the Independent publications from another province, these are also 
included in the study. Media sources other than Independent Media may be used 
when the content seems vital to the study.  
In total 286 news items were sourced. This includes news articles, editorials, 
opinion/analysis articles and cartoons. Of these 189 were quoted in this study. 
Pretoria News, The Star and Independent Online were the news sources most often 
quoted in the study. (See Figure 1: Main News sources used.) This is consistent with 
the choice of Independent Media publications as the main source of information in 
this study. These articles were analysed according to issue, events affecting the 
development of the narrative, voices quoted, outcome and inferences to be made 
from the overall depiction. 
 
Figure 1: Main news sources used 
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For the case study 113 articles were used and for other research (mostly in relation 
to proposed legislation affecting the government’s relations with the media) 76 news 
items were used. (See figure 2: Number of news articles used.) With regard to the 
case study the oldest article used is from Punch Magazine and dates back to 
10/12/1892. It relates to the Rhodes Colossus cartoon. The latest is from The New 
Age and is dated 30/11/2013. It recounts the outcome of the court action about the 
Dalai Lama’s visa application. The oldest other media article is from Mail & Guardian 
of 28/1/2008 and is about the regulation of press freedom. The latest article used 
about issues other than the case study is from The New Age, dated 20/9/2013, about 
a request to President Zuma not to sign the Protection of State Information Bill 
(PSIB) into law.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of news articles used 
28 
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In Cape Town, the Independent News & Media Plc group publishes a daily 'red-top' 
mass market tabloid, the Daily Voice, and mainstream titles in the morning (the Cape 
Times), the afternoon (the Cape Argus) and over weekends (the Weekend Argus 
Saturday and the Weekend Argus Sunday), as well as weekly community 
newspapers (Independent News & Media Plc, 2012). The group's flagship title, The 
Star, is published in Gauteng along with the Saturday Star in Johannesburg, the 
Pretoria News (which includes a weekend edition) in Pretoria, and the Diamond 
Fields Advertiser in Kimberley (Independent News & Media Plc, 2012). The Gauteng 
operation also publishes the Sunday Independent nationally and holds interests in 12 
free/community newspapers in Pretoria (Independent News & Media Plc, 2012).  
 
In KwaZulu-Natal, the Group publishes the Daily News, The Mercury, the Post, the 
Independent on Saturday, the Sunday Tribune, the daily Zulu language newspaper, 
the Isolezwe (which also has a Saturday and Sunday edition, the Isolezwe 
ngoMgqibelo and the Isolezwe ngeSonto respectively, as well as an interest in a 
number of free/community newspapers which are distributed in and around Durban 
(Independent News & Media Plc, 2012). The www.iol.co.za portal is one of South 
Africa's leading news, current affairs and classified sites and it, together with the 
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group's individual newspaper titles and other niche sites, comfortably delivers over 
2,1 million unique visitors per month (Independent News & Media Plc, 2012). 
 
 7.  Contribution of study 
 
Analytically, constructivism seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of 
international relations are socially constructed, that is, they are given their form by 
ongoing processes of social practice and interaction (Jackson, 2006: 168). The 
primary aim of this study is to analyse the relationship between the media and a 
country’s foreign policy, as conducted through public diplomacy, with specific 
reference to South Africa.  
 
This study investigates South African foreign policy, how the media frames and 
analyses this policy and subsequently again tracks government reaction to these. 
This is analysed against the background of the South African Government’s refusal 
of the visit of the Dalai Lama on two occasions. The role of the media in the state’s 
use of public diplomacy is also considered. Constructivism offers a sound analytical 
basis for this investigation in that it accepts the outcomes of these types of 
exchanges as the foundation for the construction of international relations. 
 
Theoretically, this study aims to contribute to the study of international political 
communications. Much has been written by international scholars on foreign policy 
theory, as it is an established study field. There is also an abundance of writings on 
South Africa in international political context. Much has also been published about 
communications, internationally and locally. International academics have also 
written about political communications.  
 
International and local academics writing about communications and even 
international academics writing about political communications have produced a 
significant body of work. There is, however, a void in the area of South African 
international political communications. This is where this study purports to make a 
contribution. As stated previously, the media wrote extensively about South Africa’s 
refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama, but according to the Sabinet database no theses 
have been done on the matter.  
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8.  Scope and limitations of study 
 
The study is limited to a specific case study and period, namely the proposed visits 
to South Africa by the Dalai Lama in 2009 and 2011 and the South African 
Government’s refusal to issue a visa on both occasions, against the background of 
the theoretical framework as discussed. The government was severely criticised for 
these decisions against the background of its own proclaimed foreign policy 
principles. These decisions had high-impact media coverage and diplomatic activity 
with a clear outcome to study. It thus offers ample material and substance as a case 
study. There is enough evidence of interaction between media coverage and 
government reaction to make a study thereof feasible. 
 
Murrow (2007: 48) observed that "no cash register ever rings when a mind is 
changed”. Thus, measuring success in public diplomacy is a challenge. As the 
impact of public diplomacy programmes can take decades to manifest, the 
investment in public diplomacy rarely results in dramatic, demonstrable change in 
the short term. In the current "culture of measurement,” the need to procure results 
cannot, however, be ignored. This is the scope of the problem for measuring the 
success of public diplomacy (CPD, 2012). Evaluating public diplomacy is thus 
difficult, but important (Banks, 2007: 7). 
 
The constructivist approach followed in this study sees international relations as 
socially constructed sets (Vogt, 2010). The basic observation of constructivism is 
that human relations are guided more by ideas than by material effects. Where 
realists assumed that states' identities and interests were fixed and relatively 
uncomplicated, constructivists consider how states perceive themselves and assume 
that their actions change (Vogt, 2010). Constructivists merely assert that present 
social structures are socially constructed; it does not suggest which social 
constructions are preferable to others, nor does it suggest, except in vague terms, 
how one might consciously alter the continuing evolution of state identity and interest 
in the international system (Vogt, 2010). In the constructivist tradition, the approach 
would thus be to describe South African foreign policy (how the government 
perceives itself) and after studying how the two prospective visits of 2009 and 2011 
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by the Dalai Lama to South Africa was handled, ascertain whether a new reality may 
not in fact  have been constructed.  
 
The gap in the literature that may be filled by this study would be to contribute to the 
understanding of the interaction between foreign policy and media framing thereof. It 
is an almost axiomatic assumption that the media influences government policy and 
by definition then also foreign policy. This study will not attempt to prove such 
causality in this relationship, but would give an indication of the communications 
relationship between government and the media regarding foreign policy. It will 
analyse the process by means of a case study, describing the process and 
explaining what was learned from it, in order to reach a better understanding.  
 
This study does not attempt to investigate the gate-keeping15 role of the media. 
Where media quotes of sources such as political parties or civil society organisations 
are included in this study, it is done to gauge the possible reaction of the government 
to these pronouncements. What is of importance to this study is what was out in the 
public domain (what the media chose to publish), what the government chose to 
react to and any possible changes that might have occurred in government’s foreign 
policy stance.  
 
It was further found that none of the original media statements by the DFA and 
DIRCO on the Dalai Lama were available on the department’s website. Thus, no 
comparison of what they actually said on the matter to what was reported in the 
media was feasible. It is possible that the statements mentioned in the media were 
made in response to enquiries by the media and not actually initiated and formally 
issued by the Department.16  
 
Regarding public diplomacy, this study endeavours to contribute to the 
understanding of the relationship between the government and the media, especially 
in the South African context. DIRCO has a number of agencies in its Public 
Diplomacy Branch, whose mandate is specifically tailored to deal with media-related 
issues and opportunities. This study aims to establish how the matter at hand in the 
                                                 
15 Regulating the flow of information. (White: 1964: 161) 
16 ‘Department’ refers to the DFA and DIRCO. 
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specific issue studied was dealt with to gauge the influence of public attitudes in the 
responses of DIRCO, as it reacts to the reporting of foreign affairs. 
 
9. Structure of study 
 
This study is divided into six chapters. This chapter, Chapter One, offers an 
introduction to the study and explains the study framework.  
 
Chapter Two offers a conceptual analysis of diplomacy and public diplomacy as 
instruments of foreign policy, defining and discussing both aspects at length.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the South African media landscape (print media, news 
agencies, broadcasting, internet and telecommunications) and the interests, norms 
and identity underlying the media. 
 
In Chapter Four the legislative and regulatory environment in which the media in 
South Africa operates is thrashed out, with specific reference to the pending 
PIB/PSIB and the proposed MAT.  
 
Chapter Five considers the elements, pillars, principles and main actors in post-
apartheid South African foreign policy. It also studies South Africa’s diplomatic and 
public diplomacy institutions.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven offer a study case on how government and the media relate 
on a matter of contention in the public diplomacy sphere, looking at the 2009 and 
2011 proposed visits to South Africa by the Dalai Lama.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, offers a conclusion and recommendations on 
findings made in the study.  
 
 
 
10.  Conclusion  
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South Africa’s foreign policy, diplomacy and media environment underwent major 
changes since the advent of democracy in this country in 1994. Widely lauded for its 
human rights approach to foreign policy, the ANC-led government expanded the 
country’s foreign relations to an unprecedented level. However, several 
contradictions soon became evident as the country’s foreign relations did not always 
correspond to its stated human rights-based foreign policy. This is clearly illustrated 
in the case study selected for this study. The case study is also an illustrative 
example of the intricate link between foreign policy, diplomacy and the media in a 
country. 
 
Constructivism maintains that states go through a process of socialisation into 
international values, including those related to human rights. They consider how 
states internalise norms and how this forms foreign policy. This study will investigate 
aspects of this process through the case study.  
 
The following chapter offers a conceptual analysis of diplomacy and public 
diplomacy, defining the ideas and considering the purpose and practice of both.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the relationship between diplomacy, public diplomacy and 
propaganda, and how diplomacy and public diplomacy are used as instruments of 
diplomacy. It defines diplomacy, looks at the purpose of diplomacy, and considers 
diplomacy in democracies, types of diplomacy and the practice of diplomacy. Public 
diplomacy is also studied as a type of diplomacy, including the elements of public 
diplomacy, public diplomacy and power, propaganda and the practice of public 
diplomacy. In addition, visa diplomacy is also considered as a particular type of 
public diplomacy.  
 
Effective, forceful and active diplomacy is an important aspect of foreign policy and a 
valuable instrument of securing national interests and attaining the goals and 
objectives of foreign policy in regional and global politics (Dahl, 2011). Public 
diplomacy can be seen as a specific type of diplomacy, but is different from 
traditional diplomacy as it deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation 
and execution of foreign policies, and encompasses the cultivation by governments 
of public opinion in other countries (PDAA, 2008). Public diplomacy is also to be 
distinguished from propaganda though there is a connection. Propaganda always 
carries with it a negative connotation, implying distortion and manipulation, which 
public diplomacy would not necessarily entail (Brown, 2008).  
Hendrickson defined public diplomacy as the conduct of international relations by 
governments through public communications media and through dealings with a 
wide range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for the purpose of influencing 
the politics and actions of other governments (CPD, 2013). Crocker Snow Jr. (CPD, 
2013) argued that public diplomacy, which traditionally represented actions of 
governments to influence overseas publics within the foreign policy process, had 
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expanded - by accident and design - beyond the realm of governments to include the 
media, multinational corporations, NGOs and faith-based organisations as active 
participants in the field.  
This study will focus more specifically on public diplomacy through the media and the 
media’s framing of foreign policy issues.  
 
2. Defining diplomacy 
 
Briggs (1968: 202) describes diplomacy as an instrument of a government’s foreign 
policy and as the conduct of official business by trained personnel representing 
governments. Berridge (2001: 69-70) defines diplomacy as the “conduct of relations 
between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home or abroad.”  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a conceptual analysis of diplomacy 
and public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. For the purposes of this 
study, public diplomacy is defined as the conduct of international relations by 
governments through the mass media.  
 
3. Purpose of diplomacy 
 
The purpose of diplomacy is to reach agreements within a framework of policy. US 
foreign officer James Reeves Childs (in Plischke 1979: 672) offers another view: 
 
The art of diplomacy consists of making the policy of one government 
understood, and if possible, accepted by other governments. Policy is thus the 
substance of foreign relations; diplomacy is the process by which it is carried 
out.  
 
Diplomacy is an inseparable part of international relations (Voskopoulos, undated). 
States use diplomatic missions to recognise other states. Once diplomats are sent 
to a host country, this country is de facto and de jure recognised and is accorded 
political standing. Diplomacy also involves collecting, interpreting and decoding 
information collected in the host country. Diplomats collect information, sort it 
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coherently and transmit it to their country to produce an accurate reflection of the 
local political situation and the strategy of the host country. What is mostly needed is 
unbiased information. Diplomats residing in one country not only collect information, 
but also interpret it. 
 
Foreign policy making is related, inter alia, to the domestic environment 
(Voskopoulos, undated). It is a situation where one variable is inter-connected to 
another. Effective and accurate diplomacy helps balance the equation between the 
domestic and international political systems, which are tied together. It is not only an 
instrument of foreign policy, but also a contributor to its formulation. All the 
information collected through diplomatic channels is assessed, valued and taken into 
consideration when it comes to foreign policy planning.  
 
The primary contribution of constructivism to the process of diplomacy is in the 
emphasis placed on understanding how interests and identities shift over time 
through discussion and dialogue (Woolcock & Bayne, 2007: 33). This is often applied 
to processes of bargaining and negotiation and to how diplomatic agents use 
persuasion, threat or inducement, public diplomacy and information to alter the 
negotiating positions of others (Ulbert & Risse, 2005). 
 
4. Diplomacy in democracies 
 
The function of diplomacy between democracies is the management of relations 
between independent states by processes of negotiation (Nicolson, 1969: 41-42). 
The professional diplomat is the servant of the sovereign authority in his own 
country. In democratic states sovereign authority is represented by an elected 
majority of legislators and a government to whom the majority accord executive 
powers.  
 
The civil service of which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess 
no politics. Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal of the government in 
power, to tender advice, and if need be raise objections, but execute the instructions 
of the government without resistance. The civil service must loyally serve all 
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constitutional governments irrespective of the party and the government should have 
confidence in all civil servants irrespective of their party sympathies.  
 
A career diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson (1969), has a somewhat harsh judgement of 
the electorate and the public. He lists a number of pitfalls for diplomacy and foreign 
policy management emanating from the nature of the diplomatic state.  
 
Firstly, although the people are the sovereign authority which ultimately controls 
foreign policy, they are not always aware of the responsibilities this entail (Nicolson, 
1969: 47). In a democracy the innumerable anonymous and ‘unconscious’ electorate 
controls foreign policy, and a sense of personal or corporate responsibility no longer 
exists as was the case with an individual monarch or a governing class. The 
sovereign people are not conscious of their sovereignty and are unaware that they 
have caused certain treaties to be signed. This ‘irresponsibility’ is encouraged by the 
media advocating the repudiation of pledges without mentioning that these pledges 
were incurred by a duly elected government and ratified by legislators.  
 
Secondly, this problem is also connected to the problem of ‘ignorance’ (Nicolson, 
1969: 47-8). He argues that even educated electors are “almost totally unaware” of 
the treaties by which their countries are bound. Though they have been published, 
debated by legislators and discussed by the media, the majority of people have no 
conception of their existence and would clamour about “secret diplomacy” once they 
were invoked. It is only when honouring national engagements becomes a matter of 
topical concern that the public takes note of their existence. Only at that stage will 
the sovereign people clamour for the appeal of contracts of which they had 
approved.  
 
In the third instance, it is contested that the ordinary elector does not apply to foreign 
affairs the same thought he devotes to domestic matters (Nicolson, 1969: 48). He is 
“unwilling to make an effort of comprehension or to try to understand the simplest 
elements of the problem”. They imagine that foreign policy is framed in much the 
same manner as domestic policies: prepared by a responsible minister, submitted to 
the executive, approved by the legislature and handed to the department for 
execution. They ignore the fact that other countries with equally powerful 
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armaments, interests and prejudices, must be consulted if any policy is to be 
effective.  
 
Fourthly, Nicolson also warns against certain forms of popular knowledge (Nicolson, 
1969: 48-49). The professional diplomat is cautious of generalisation based on 
hastily observed phenomena, but the elector shows no such hesitation. Nicolson 
argues that judgement of the elector is based on feelings rather than upon thoughts, 
leaving him to the mercy of any chance encounter or accidental conversation (or 
influence of the media, one might add).  
 
In the fifth place, the danger of delay is also mentioned (Nicolson, 1969: 49). An 
absolute monarch or dictator can frame and execute a policy within the space of 
hours. A democratic government has to wait for public opinion to digest “its own 
conclusions”. These may be more sensible than the “somnambulist certainties” of a 
dictator, but the time lapse in the democratic process is often fatal to efficient policy 
or negotiation.  
 
In the sixth instance, the problem of imprecision is also mentioned (Nicolson, 1969: 
50). Nicolson objects to the “vagueness and fluidity” of democratic policy and the 
uncertainty arising from “the irresponsible attitude of sovereign democracy towards 
its own obligations”. There is also a tendency of all democracies to prefer a vague 
and comforting formula to what should be a binding definition. Nicolson argues that 
the effectiveness of diplomacy is dependent upon the conviction it inspires, yet if 
policy is non-committal, diplomacy will be vague.  
 
Finally, Nicolson (1969: 50) also protests the fact that for diplomatic policy to appeal 
to the ordinary person, the emotional, dramatic or moral aspects of a situation are 
emphasised to suppress the practical. He argues that this could actually lead the 
diplomat into hypocrisy, as when, in defending vital national interests, he pretends to 
be defending some abstract idea.  
 
Nicolson (1969: 50–52) also addresses the problems relating to diplomatic practice. 
As a career diplomat, Nicolson, objects to the tendency of democratic countries to 
allow their politicians to take a personal part in negotiation. Granting that there was 
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place for heads of state, government and ministers to attend important conferences, 
it should not be encouraged. This aroused public expectation, lead to 
misunderstandings and create confusion. The time available at such visits is not 
sufficient to allow for patient and calm deliberation. Negotiation is far better left to the 
professional diplomat. He touches on the relationship with the media (specifically the 
press) as the sovereign democracy needs to be informed. He also argues that a 
satisfactory adjustment between the needs and rights of a popular press and the 
requirements of discretion has yet to be found. However, the advantages of a free 
press are immeasurably greater than its disadvantages, that it is little more than a 
minor inconvenience (Nicholson 1969: 50-52).  
 
The Guardian (25/9/2012) argues that the media’s role in ensuring a free flow of 
information, ideas and opinions remains a critical element in maintaining a healthy, 
fully functioning democracy, even as rapid technological and social developments 
are changing how the media reach the masses around the world. As the industry 
evolves beyond traditional newspapers, radio and television outlets, and now 
includes an array of social networks accessed electronically by an assortment of 
desktop and mobile electronic devices, one thing remains constant – the role of the 
news media as a “watchdog” has not changed. A democracy is not possible without 
journalists to question the actions of government officials, confirm the truth of what 
officials tell the public and gather facts needed by citizens to make informed 
decisions. 
 
Risse (undated) contends that decision-makers in democratic polities, socialised in 
the norms governing liberal states, are likely to communicate through diplomacy their 
intentions in the international realm by referring to these very norms. When they 
encounter fellow democrats, a collective understanding of these norms can be easily 
established, providing a common basis for further communication of peaceful 
intentions.  
 
Leaders of democratic states communicating their peaceful intentions to each other 
can always validate their claims by pointing to the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
inherent in their domestic structures. In other words, the validity claims of 
peacefulness are substantiated by one’s own domestic structure. As a result, the 
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spiral model of the security dilemma is reversed and uncertainty reduced. This forms 
the basis for the democratic peace theory. Risse, (undated) also asserts that 
democracies to a large extent create their enemies and friends by inferring their 
aggression from their domestic structures. Enmity and friendship in the international 
system is thus socially constructed.   
 
5. Types of diplomacy 
 
Depending on the approach taken to a particular diplomatic matter, different types of 
diplomacy can be identified (USIP, 2011). One approach is to consider the different 
tracks of diplomacy. Track 1-diplomacy refers to formal discussions typically 
involving high-level political and military leaders and focusing on cease-fires, peace 
talks, treaties and other agreements. Third-party interveners are almost always 
official – a government or international organisation.  
 
Track 2-diplomacy refers to unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed 
at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the formal 
process (USIP, 2011). Track 2-activities typically involve influential academic, 
religious, NGO and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-
ranking officials. The range of unofficial interveners is similarly broad – religious 
institutions, academics, former government officials, NGOs and think tanks. 
 
Track 3-diplomacy refers to people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals 
and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile 
communities and involving awareness-raising and empowerment within these 
communities (USIP, 2011). Normally focused at the grassroots level, this type of 
diplomacy often involves organising meetings and conferences, generating media 
exposure and political and legal advocacy for marginalised people and communities.  
 
Finally, multi-track diplomacy is a term for operating on several tracks 
simultaneously, including official and unofficial conflict-resolution efforts, citizen and 
scientific exchanges, international business negotiations, international cultural and 
athletic activities and other cooperative efforts (USIP, 2011). These efforts could be 
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led by governments, professional organisations, businesses, churches, media, 
private citizens, training and educational institutes, activists and funders. 
 
The contemporary diplomatic milieu of world politics is characterised by a mounting 
diversity of actors, which poses a more complex image of international interactions 
than the traditional intergovernmental perspective (Acuto, 2011). Breaking with the 
traditional notion of diplomacy, the present global governance landscape is 
characterised by ever-growing multi-stakeholder involvement that constructs the 
texture of world politics and organises multilateralism.  
 
Government officials, either voluntarily or forcefully, partake in global policy networks 
put in place through various ‘hybrid’ modes of diplomacy. The contemporary 
response to the realist model can be found in “network diplomacy” as a broader 
engagement with various actors across the globe. Diplomats who choose this path 
have to embrace alternative views of world politics, as they are set to become 
“diplomatic entrepreneurs” – building multiple connections, upholding moral norms, 
such as human rights regimes, and seeking trans-national relationships. 
 
6. Practice of diplomacy 
 
One of the main goals of diplomacy is to execute foreign policy and achieve its 
strategic objectives through tact. Four of the most important features of diplomacy 
are representation, communication, negotiation and diplomatic privilege and 
immunity (Dayang, 2011). 
 
An important feature of diplomatic activity is state representation though the dispatch 
of missions and diplomatic agents overseas (Dayang, 2011). The sending of 
emissaries and establishing embassies have long been the backbone of diplomacy. 
Ministries of foreign affairs manage foreign policy and embassies and consular posts 
are established by states in countries where they have diplomatic and consular 
relations. Permanent missions to international organisations such as the UN, the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union (EU) also represent 
states in multilateral diplomacy. The role of diplomatic representation is not limited to 
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state actors. Diplomats also interact with non-state actors such as the media, 
religious groups, universities and NGOs.  
 
Diplomacy is the primary means by which states intermingle and communicate with 
each other (Dayang, 2011). Communication is an important feature and an essential 
aspect of diplomatic activity. Some of the usual forms of diplomatic communication 
include face-to-face meetings, pull-aside meetings and the writing of note verbales, 
aide memoirs and joint statements. Usually, diplomats communicate with their home 
office and counterparts in ministries of foreign affairs, who may also act as 
gatekeepers. However, global issues and the participation of non-state actors in 
international affairs have expanded the role of ministries of foreign affairs.  
 
Diplomats have become regular channels of communication not only between and 
among state agents, but also as communication channels of other government 
agencies in the area of trade, migration, environment, culture and human rights. A 
key role of diplomats is gathering information on the situation in receiving states. 
They assess and analyse information for its strategic significance and report on it to 
their home ministries of foreign affairs or to the relevant functional government 
agencies. This aspect of reporting is crucial and necessary in crisis situations, 
particularly during volatile events. Diplomats are not only expected to report 
information, but also to take care of their citizens’ welfare and communicate with the 
family members of those affected by the crisis (Dayang, 2011). 
 
Corollary to communication is diplomatic negotiation. Through negotiation, states 
can communicate, interact and promote their strategic interests. Some examples are 
bilateral agreements in trade and investment, extradition treaties and multilateral 
agreements. A diplomatic negotiator’s role is to promote national interests and the 
welfare of his country’s citizens in the receiving state. A diplomat negotiating a 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreement needs to know which sectors he must 
protect; which markets to open and to muster good judgment on; and which position 
to compromise when necessary. Through negotiations, states can benefit from 
mutually binding treaties. Such bilateral or multilateral agreements which are 
mutually beneficial may not be possible without diplomacy (Dayang, 2011). 
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Another important feature of diplomatic activity is the diplomatic privilege and 
immunity enjoyed by diplomatic agents. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (1961) provides for the legal basis of privilege and immunity. Two aspects 
of diplomatic privileges and immunities include: 
 
• certain inviolabilities to diplomatic staff and their family members, and to 
diplomatic premises and private residence (Article 37); and  
• Immunity from criminal jurisdiction, as well as civil and administrative 
jurisdiction of the receiving state (Article 31).  
 
The unique and special treatment accorded to diplomats is justified, if such 
measures are essential for the effective execution of the functions of diplomats in 
promoting the sending state’s objectives in the receiving state and if it is for the 
purpose of ensuring the personal safety of diplomats in conducting their activities. 
The principle of reciprocity is also upheld by receiving and sending states (Dayang, 
2011).  
 
Landsberg (2004: 10-11) describes diplomacy as the management of international 
relations and politics through negotiations. It is mainly silent – or quiet – in nature, 
but could be vociferous or of the megaphone variety. It seeks to mediate differences 
and resolve and settle disputes, but also to persuade and compel through 
communicating promises, threats, codes and symbols. Most official attempts by 
governments to exert influence abroad are through formal diplomatic channels or 
communication between heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs.  
 
Governments can resort to diplomatic recognition or extension of denial of 
recognition of new states and governments as ways of exercising political influence. 
Classic bilateral diplomacy has been supplemented by multilateral conference 
diplomacy as in the UN. Diplomacy is especially associated with bargaining between 
governments, and this in turn, is often associated with a problem-solving negotiating 
process. Diplomacy is seen an essential part of international politics and provides 
the norms, protocols and practices to assist with the reconciliation of differences 
between states.  
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Diplomacy is also described as a peaceful means of implementing national strategy 
through win-win approaches (Voskopoulos, undated). Since we live in an anarchic 
international environment, each state focuses its policy on sustaining its status quo 
or improving its position in a clearly hierarchical system. This system has the form of 
a pyramid. The closer a state is to the top, the better its chances to achieve its goals. 
Consequently, diplomacy is more probable to bear fruit when a country is 
independent, autonomous and developed. 
 
Constructivism is concerned with the impact of norms on international relations. 
Norms are inter-subjective in that they are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through 
social practice. The practice of diplomacy enacts and reproduces accepted 
international beliefs. Norms constitute actors and meaningful action by situating both 
in social roles (Farrell, 2002).  
 
7. Public diplomacy as a type of diplomacy 
 
Coined in the mid-1960s by former US diplomat Edmund Gullion, public diplomacy 
was developed partly to distance overseas governmental information activities from 
the term propaganda, which had acquired derogatory connotations (CPD, 2011). 
According to Tuch (1990: 3), public diplomacy is official government efforts to shape 
the communications environment overseas in which the own state’s foreign policy is 
played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and 
misunderstandings complicate relations with other nations. Public diplomacy can 
also be defined as seeking to promote the national interest of the own state through 
understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences (PDAA, 2008).  
 
Public diplomacy is further seen as the transparent means by which a sovereign 
country communicates with publics in other countries, aimed at informing and 
influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest 
and advancing its foreign policy goals (CPD, 2011). In this traditional view, public 
diplomacy is considered an integral part of state-to-state diplomacy. In this sense, 
public diplomacy includes activities such as educational exchange programmes for 
scholars and students; visitor programmes; language training; cultural events and 
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exchanges; and radio and television broadcasting. Such activities usually focus on 
improving the “sending” country’s image or reputation as a way to shape the wider 
policy environment in the “receiving” country (CPD, 2011). 
 
Distinct from the “narrow” traditional, state-based conception of public diplomacy 
described above, recent scholars have offered a “broader” conception of the field’s 
scope by developing the concept of the new public diplomacy; it defines public 
diplomacy more expansively than as an activity unique to sovereign states (CPD, 
2011). This view aims to capture the emerging trends in international relations, 
where a range of non-state actors with some standing in world politics (supranational 
organisations, sub-national actors, NGOs and even private companies), 
communicate and engage meaningfully with foreign publics and thereby develop and 
promote public diplomacy policies and practices of their own.  
 
Supporters of the new public diplomacy (Nye: 2010, Melissen: 2005,  Hocking: 2005) 
point to the democratisation of information through new media and communication 
technology as a new force that has greatly empowered non-state actors and 
elevated their role and legitimacy in international politics. As a result, a new public 
diplomacy is seen as taking place in a system of mutually beneficial relations that is 
no longer state-centric; it is composed of multiple actors and networks, operating in a 
fluid global environment of new issues and contexts (CPD, 2011). 
 
Public diplomacy has developed a different meaning from public affairs, which refers 
to a government’s activities and programmes designed to communicate policy 
messages to its own domestic audiences (CPD, 2011). Public affairs is the provision 
of information to the public, press and other institutions concerning the goals, 
policies and activities of the own state (PDAA, 2008). Therefore, public affairs seek 
to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and 
other groups and institutions, as well as domestic and international media. The thrust 
of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience.  
 
Research supporting a constructivist perspective suggests that ideas are potent 
forces and influence behaviour significantly (Lord, 2005). Constructivist scholarship 
supports the following three propositions: 
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• Human interaction is shaped primarily by ideas, not just material interests. 
• The most important ideas are widely shared beliefs that transcend the beliefs 
of individuals.  
• Shared beliefs influence the interests and identities of individuals, groups and 
even nations. 
 
Ideas matter, in other words, they are an important source of power. Public 
diplomacy can help to remind people of enduring ideas, spread new ideas, or 
counter bad ones. Even if policies are disliked, public diplomacy can influence the 
climate in which policies are viewed and remind people that they share values that 
are larger and ultimately more important than a particular policy (Lord, 2005). 
 
The local media plays a critical role in managing the perception and reputation of a 
country in the eyes of a foreign public; and the local aspect is not only significant in 
studying public diplomacy and the media, but also relevant to public diplomacy 
strategies and tactics abroad (Wang & Chang, 2004). Although the content of most 
television, radio and print media is still created with a national or local audience in 
mind, their networks of foreign correspondents will ensure that messages do get 
transferred from one region to another. 
 
The domestic outreach of public affairs (which is the main focus of this study) more 
often involves responding to requests for information about foreign policy from the 
news media and others (Fitzpatrick, 2010). The role of public affairs is seen as 
enabling the right of a people of a democratic nation to be kept informed about the 
actions and motives of their government. 
 
In this study, where the government’s refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama will be 
tracked, following media coverage of the event through the Independent News & 
Media, public affairs will be relevant more than public diplomacy. The South African 
Government’s explanation of its policy to its domestic audience is more relevant in 
this case study.  
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7.1. Elements of public diplomacy 
 
Public diplomacy can be explained by contrasting its principal characteristics with 
those of “official diplomacy”. Firstly, public diplomacy is transparent and widely 
disseminated, whereas official diplomacy is opaque and its dissemination narrowly 
confined. Secondly, public diplomacy is transmitted by governments to wider, or in 
some cases selected, “publics”, whereas official diplomacy is transmitted by 
governments to other governments. Finally, the themes and issues with which official 
diplomacy is concerned, relate to the behaviour and policies of governments, 
whereas the themes and issues with which public diplomacy is concerned, relate to 
the attitudes and behaviours of publics (Rosen & Wolf, 2005).  
 
While traditional official diplomacy focuses on relationships between the 
representatives of states or international actors (Saddiki, 2006), public diplomacy is 
directed at foreign publics in foreign societies as a principal target, in order to 
influence their attitudes. In general, public diplomacy remains a key instrument of 
official foreign policy, to support its objectives, or at least, to reduce hostility to the 
country (Saddiki, 2006).  
 
The essential functions performed through public diplomacy are:  
 
• press and public affairs activities of governmental officials (president, 
ministries, diplomats and government officials);  
• informational and cultural activities organised by diplomatic missions abroad;  
• educational and cultural exchanges;  
• international exchange of people’s programmes;  
• international television and radio; and  
• government-sponsored activities of NGOs (Saddiki, 2006).  
 
The task of public diplomacy involves, among other functions, engaging the media to 
put a country's policies in the correct perspective and to dispel any wrong impression 
about its policies (Gilboa, undated). The “media diplomacy” aspect of public 
diplomacy has become a major instrument of foreign policy and journalists are more 
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frequently and more intensively engaged in diplomatic events and processes. The 
media serves both as an independent actor and as a tool in the hands of policy-
makers. An important element of public diplomacy is media liaison, where journalists 
are frequently engaged in diplomatic events and processes. The media functions 
both as an independent actor and as a tool in the hands of policy makers.  
 
Active government public diplomacy can be understood as a set of foreign affairs 
ministry functions that includes promotion, outreach, feedback, management and 
servicing (Rasmussen, 2013). Government-initiated public diplomacy goes even 
beyond these ‘passive’, technocratic functions to active engagement of a foreign 
public with the goal of advancing the state’s ideals, interests and narrative as the 
words promotion and outreach fail to do justice to the centrality of the diplomatic 
task: the projection of one’s state into the host nation. Public diplomacy can thus be 
seen as a constructivist function aimed at the ‘construction’ of a state’s international 
image. 
 
7.2. Public diplomacy and power 
 
It is important to distinguish between public diplomacy and some related terms such 
as propaganda and “soft power”. Nye (in Belfer Centre, 2003) defines soft power as 
“the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your 
goal”. It differs from hard power, “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic 
and military might to make others follow your will”.  
 
The concept of soft power has become a core concept in public diplomacy studies. 
Soft power is also described as the degree to which a political actor’s cultural assets, 
political ideals and policies inspire respect or affinity on the part of others and has 
come to be seen as a resource, with public diplomacy being a mechanism that seeks 
to leverage soft power resources (CPD, 2009). 
 
Dayang (2011) maintains that public diplomacy is not a form of marketing for an 
international audience. He sees public diplomacy as the conduct of relations of 
sovereign states through agents. As an aspect of diplomacy, public diplomacy is 
generally concerned with the influence of public opinion on the formulation and 
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implementation of foreign policy. The objective of influencing public opinion has long 
been one of the aims of foreign policy even before the introduction of the term “public 
diplomacy”. To be effective, public opinion must be engaged in a dialogue with 
foreign publics. It is not a one-way or top-down communication activity, but a two-
way communication activity, which gives importance to listening as much as to 
conveying its message and influencing public opinion. Cultural understanding is a 
key to communication, because information is filtered through the cultural 
perceptions of the listener (Dayang, 2011).  
 
As explained before, soft power moves people to act through cooperation rather than 
coercion (Gilboa, 2011). Public diplomacy is presented as an official policy which 
translates soft-power resources into action. Power is usually conceived in terms of 
dispositions and capacities, which suggest how things could be different 
(Berenskoetter, 2007). Constructivism tends to question the inevitability of the status 
quo, thus lending itself as the obvious framework for understanding public diplomacy 
and soft-power application.   
 
The concept “soft power” defines attempts by powerful figures and countries to 
shape others’ perceptions of them (Cull, 2013). Contemporary soft power now 
underlies any fundamental understanding of international relations, a shift brought 
about by the key role of communication in our lives. Today, nations are perpetually in 
the glare of the media spotlight.  
 
Global political discourse has become a battleground of rival stories online and on 
screen. This makes it all but impossible to wield the brute force of hard power 
without provoking a counter reaction. For countries concerned about how they are 
perceived by their friends and rivals, getting the media to focus on the right stories to 
project the right image has never been more important (Cull, 2013).   
 
7.3. Public diplomacy and propaganda 
 
This section distinguishes between public diplomacy and propaganda; both are 
instruments of foreign policy, though few governments would admit to actually 
applying propaganda. 
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7.3.1. Definition of propaganda 
 
Propaganda in the most natural sense is to disseminate information or promote 
particular ideas (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006: 2-3). In Latin it means “to propagate” or 
“to sow” and was used by the Vatican in the sense of propagating the faith. However, 
the word lost its neutrality, and to identify a message as propaganda came to 
suggest something negative or dishonest, implying the use of lies, distortion, deceit, 
manipulation, mind control, psychological warfare and brainwashing.  
 
Jowett and O’Donnell (2006: 1) describe propaganda as a form of communication 
that attempts to achieve a response “that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist” whereas persuasion entails interactive attempts to satisfy the needs of 
both persuader and persuadee. Elements of informative and persuasive 
communication may be incorporated into propagandistic communication.  
 
To study propaganda from a journalistic point of view is to understand how news 
management or ‘spin’ shapes information, emphasising positive features and 
downplaying negative ones, casting institutions in a favourable light. To examine it in 
view of political science is to analyse the ideologies of practitioners and the 
dissemination and impact of public opinion (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006: 3). 
 
Terms implying propaganda that have gained popularity are ‘spin’ and ‘news 
management’, referring to a coordinated strategy to minimise the negative effects of 
information and present in a favourable light a story that could be damaging to self-
interest (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006: 3).  
 
Spin is often used with reference to the manipulation of political information. Besides 
being associated with unethical, harmful and unfair tactics, propaganda is also 
commonly defined as “organised persuasion”. Persuasion differs from propaganda 
but is used to describe all suspicious rhetoric. Propaganda has been described as 
organised mass persuasion with covert intent and poor reasoning (Jowett & 
O’Donnell, 2006: 3).  
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Ellul (1965: 52 & 276) contended that nearly all biased messages in society were 
propagandistic, even when the biases were unconscious. He maintained that truth 
did not separate propaganda from moral forms because propaganda used truth, half-
truth and limited truth.  
 
Doob (1935: 390) defined propaganda as the attempt to affect the personalities and 
control the behaviour of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of 
doubtful value in a society at a particular time. However, he felt that a clear-cut 
definition was neither possible, nor desirable, because of the complexity of the 
matter.  
 
In many Western states propaganda may be translated as advertising or public 
relations, but usually the social meaning includes some element of deception (Clark, 
2003). Propaganda as a function of a government is a “persuasive communicative 
act … directed at a foreign audience" (Clark, 2003). Clark (2003) argues that the 
most money is not spent by propagandists on propaganda, but on "facilitative 
communication" which would constitute what many international radio stations 
engage in, including radio newscasts, press releases and artistic and cultural 
programmes.  
 
From a constructivist perspective, states do not operate in isolation, but are part of a 
world system and have specific identities in that system (Clark, 2003). The way 
states use their government-funded communication is based on the state's identity 
and a state's relationship with other states. Governments would, however, never 
label this communication as propaganda, even if it were, because of the negative 
connotations associated with the word. Propaganda is an attempt by the government 
of one state to influence another to act or think in ways which are conducive to the 
interests of the source.  
 
Looking at how the audience perceives messages, it may be concluded that if media 
audiences simply do not attend to the constructed nature of media accounts of 
politics, they are likely to label such accounts news (Clark, 2003). When they are 
more aware of their constructed nature, they are more likely to label such 
presentations editorials. When audiences understand media accounts of political 
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phenomena as constructed explicitly to serve political goals, particularly goals they 
do not share, they are more likely to label such presentations propaganda.  
 
7.3.2. Forms of propaganda 
 
Though propaganda takes many forms, it is almost always in some form of activated 
ideology. It might be agitated, attempting to rouse an audience to certain ends and 
resulting in change; or it could be integrative to render an audience passive, 
accepting and non-challenging (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006: 16).  
 
Propaganda is also described as white, black or grey in relationship to its source and 
accuracy of information. White propaganda comes from a source identified correctly 
and the information in the message tends to be accurate. It attempts to build 
credibility with the audience. In the case of black propaganda the source is 
concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications and 
deceptions. Grey propaganda is somewhere between black and white. The source 
may not be correctly identified and the accuracy of the information is uncertain 
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006:16-20).  
 
If propaganda is defined as a deliberate attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent 
of the propagandist, the constructivist link is obvious (Sletteland, 2008). Government 
propaganda is a delicate issue in many countries. It is sometimes argued that public 
diplomacy can be white or grey propaganda, but never black. Black propaganda is 
known to be undermining in the long term, but propaganda-sensitive societies 
sometimes react negatively on white and grey propaganda as well.  
 
The association with propaganda is regarded as a problem for public diplomacy in 
general, because of its connotation to mind-control, deception and cultural 
imperialism (Sletteland, 2008). The new information environment is a central concern 
for public diplomats. It has become increasingly difficult to control and influence 
media and compete for attention. In this context, when regarded independently of its 
previous successes, public diplomacy can appear somewhat ‘desperate’. Although 
public diplomats experience difficulties with getting media coverage, they engage in 
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a long-term relationship with journalists and editors and hence depend on credibility 
(Sletteland, 2008). 
 
7.3.3. Difference between public diplomacy and propaganda 
 
Public diplomacy cannot be equated with propaganda (Brown 2008). If the two ideas 
were represented by two circles, they would intersect, but neither circle would be 
within the other (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 3: Public diplomacy and propaganda 
 
 
Source: Brown 2008 
 
In distinguishing between the two entities, public diplomacy will be examined as at its 
best and propaganda at its worst (Brown, 2008). The better public diplomacy is and 
the worst propaganda is, the intersection of the two circles diminishes proportionally. 
The multitude of tools used by public diplomacy and propaganda, are often identical 
(such as the mass media). The intent of the practitioners of public diplomacy and 
propaganda may be the same. Neither is altruistic. When public diplomacy and 
Public diplomacy Propaganda 
70 
 
propaganda are used as state instruments, they serve a country’s interests. At their 
best and at their worst, they do so in significantly different ways.  
 
At its best, public diplomacy provides a truthful, factual exposition and explication of 
a nation’s foreign policy and way of life to overseas audiences; it encourages 
international understanding; listens and engages in dialogue; and objectively 
displays national achievements overseas. At its worst, propaganda forces its 
messages on an audience, often by repetition and slogans; demonises elements of 
the outside world and claims the nation it glorifies can do no wrong; it simplifies 
complex issues, including history; and misrepresents the truth or deliberately lies 
(Brown, 2008). 
 
Both public diplomacy and propaganda, at their best or their worst, can achieve 
credibility with their audiences (Brown, 2008). However, the best public diplomacy 
achieves credibility through careful presentation of fact and thoughtful 
argumentation, while the worst propaganda achieves credibility by falsification and 
sensationalism.  
 
As a rule, public diplomacy at its best, which appeals to the intellect, is believed in 
the long run, while propaganda at its worst, which inflames atavistic emotions, is 
believed only for short periods. The best public diplomacy convinces audiences that 
its content and purpose mesh and that therefore, it is honest; the worst propaganda 
leads audiences to believe that its content does not reveal its true purpose and that 
therefore, it is dishonest (Brown, 2008).  
 
Propaganda is source-based, cause-oriented, emotion-laden content that utilises 
mass persuasion media to cultivate the mass mind in service to the source’s goals 
(Snow, 2012).  At its best, propaganda involves pro-social causes that do not stray 
too far from the truth. At its worst, propaganda serves a strictly pro-source function 
that uses whatever means necessary to fulfil its goals.  
 
Public diplomacy puts human interaction front and centre in far less manipulative 
ways than propaganda (Snow, 2012).  Public diplomacy is based on indirect 
behavioural influences such as culture, values and ideology that direct nations 
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toward interdependence over confrontation.  Ideally, the target audience is more like 
a ‘prosumer’ (proactive consumer) consuming messages from the sender, but also 
proactively responding and persuading back in a two-way exchange of ideas. 
 
The belief that reality is socially constructed leads constructivists to place a greater 
role on norm development, identity and ideational power than the other major 
theoretical paradigms. Indeed, norms, identity and ideas are key factors in 
constructivist theory (Cristol, 2013). Propaganda and public diplomacy are all about 
‘selling’ ideas, very often about changing identities or at the very least changing 
perceptions about other identities. Distinguishing between these is a normative 
judgement.  
 
7.4. Practice of public diplomacy 
 
The method of modern public diplomacy is different from marketing. Public 
diplomacy methods can be divided into listening; advocacy; cultural diplomacy; 
exchange diplomacy; and international broadcasting (Dayang, 2011).  Whereas in 
the past, communication was one-way and non-interactive, current practice uses 
various forms of media and new technologies in conveying messages and receiving 
feedback from audiences. Listening has become an essential feature of public 
diplomacy (Dayang, 2011). 
 
On-line social networks such as Twitter (www.twitter.com) and Facebook 
(www.facebook.com) have added a new dimension to public diplomacy the same 
way the “CNN Effect” made an impact on public diplomacy delivery, by emphasising 
immediate response to crisis situations and sound bites (Dayang, 2011).  
 
An important contribution of the internet is the localisation or domestication of 
international affairs. Social networks have played a role in rallying young people to 
fight against tyranny, which had a domino-effect. This has been clearly illustrated in 
the events associated with the so-called Arab Spring which erupted in 2011. From 
being an obscure domestic issue, “people power” in, for example, Tunisia was seen 
on You Tube (www.youtube.com) and incited replication from other countries in the 
Middle East (Dayang, 2011).  
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In terms of advocacy, public diplomacy promotes its national culture and ideas. 
Public diplomacy can have various applications. For some countries, the distinction 
of public diplomacy and public affairs is blurred. For example, for the Philippines and 
India, which have large diaspora communities overseas, its public diplomacy efforts 
are not only aimed at influencing foreign audiences, but also at influencing the 
opinion of its citizens overseas (Dayang, 2011). In the age of information technology, 
a state’s public diplomacy initiative is easily accessible to a wider foreign audience, 
as well as to the domestic audience and foreign citizens abroad. Thus, diplomats are 
required to be ever responsive to the needs of its citizens overseas, because not 
doing so would put the government and the diplomats in a bad light (Dayang, 2011).  
 
Public diplomacy will not displace traditional state-to-state diplomacy as practiced by 
foreign ministries, but will have an impact on the way they do business (CPD, 2011). 
Foreign ministries and diplomats will need to go beyond bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy and construct and conduct relations with new global actors. Public 
diplomacy, as an aspect of diplomacy, is not a form of international marketing. Public 
diplomacy is not a sales pitch and it is not concerned with selling a product for profit. 
Its aim is to pursue national interest by informing and influencing public attitudes to 
support its political and strategic intentions (Dayang, 2011). 
 
Public diplomacy operates through actions, relationships, images and words in three 
time frames: 24/7 news streams; medium range campaigns on high-value policies; 
and long-term engagement. Its tools range from electronic media; to cultural 
diplomacy; to personal communication (Gregory, 2008). States practice public 
diplomacy due primarily to rational interests, not ideals of democracy or openness. 
However, there is a general social trend, as predicted by normative expansion 
understood by sociological, constructivist theories, towards the practice of public 
diplomacy (Rasmussen 2009: 20). The growing number of states practicing public 
diplomacy points to an emerging standard that goes further than a rational, interest-
based computation. Idealistic incentives for performing public diplomacy are 
restricted notwithstanding the original notion of “credible diplomacy” as truth over 
propaganda (Rasmussen 2009: 1) There is an overpowering impulsion for countries 
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to amplify their public diplomacy efforts. It is becoming an increasingly imperative 
advantage in a globalised world (Rasmussen 2009: 20).  
 
It has thus been established that whereas there may be a close link between 
diplomacy and public diplomacy in that both can be seen as instruments to further 
the own state’s image or interest vis-à-vis other states, public diplomacy messages 
are aimed at consumption by a larger more public audience.  
 
8. Visa diplomacy as a particular type of diplomacy 
 
Most commonly visa diplomacy is a phenomenon where a visa is used as a 
diplomatic tool to communicate government discontent or displeasure at other states 
and a coercive instrument to change or bend another state’s position on a particular 
issue (Stringer, 2004:13-15). The use of visa denials or the introduction of a visa 
regime is done in pursuit of legitimate national interests.  
 
Visa diplomacy is a form of retortion, which is the commission of an unfriendly, but 
legal act, usually undertaken in response to a prior, equally unfriendly act, by the 
other party (Stringer, 2004: 13-15). Visa diplomacy could be placed in the same 
realm as sanctions, but is less controversial. Visa diplomacy fits into the same 
category as “targeted” or “smart” sanctions, since they do not only avoid the 
possibility of humanitarian impact of broader travel restrictions, but deny legitimacy 
to political leaders.  
 
Visas provide states with a simple, low-cost vehicle of diplomatic communication to 
express both subtle and less subtle shifts in policy or emotions (Stringer, 2004: 27). 
They allow regimes to make policy statements that cannot be expressed by other 
means. It appears to be a successful approach when used for recognition purposes 
and to convey publicly a move towards greater cooperation. It seems to be more 
problematic as an instrument of coercion in the spectrum of interstate conflict below 
the level of warfare, as it is rather a weak form of retortion if not used in conjunction 
with other instruments and merely useful as a way to posturing. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
Diplomacy is thus a tool of a government’s foreign policy used to reach agreements 
within a framework of policy. Communication is crucial in diplomatic activity. 
Diplomatic negotiation is important here. A vital aspect of diplomatic activity is state 
representation through missions abroad, where diplomatic privilege and immunity is 
paramount.  
 
Public diplomacy is a form of transparent diplomacy promoting the national interest 
of the state through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences. 
Public diplomacy activities can be distinguished from public affairs, which refer to a 
government’s programmes to communicate with its own domestic audiences. Public 
diplomacy can also be distinguished from propaganda, which is a form of persuasion 
usually associated with lies, distortion, deceit and manipulation. Though public 
diplomacy cannot be equated with propaganda, the two ideas do share some 
similarities in the persuasive element they both possess. 
 
Public diplomacy, like constructivism, understands the normative or ideational 
structures underpinning audience influence (Byrne, 2012). Public diplomacy bridges 
the breach with some public audiences as a result of the normative or ideational 
structures from within which they operate. Public diplomacy practitioners are 
instinctively and intentionally occupied in understanding the identities, value 
positions and norms both applicable to their own and others’ ideational structures to 
successfully engage and influence publics and achieve policy objectives. By dealing 
in the currencies of constructivism, public diplomacy operationalises constructivist 
approaches. 
 
The next chapter discusses the South African media landscape, investigating the 
South African public, private and independent media, including print, news agencies, 
broadcast, internet and telecommunications. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE  
 
1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain interests, norms and identity as part of the 
media; and to outline the South African public, private and independent media 
landscape, including the print media, broadcasting, internet and telecommunications.  
A democratic political culture requires a vibrant civil-society sector and an 
independent media to ensure that citizens are well informed about the actions and 
performance of government institutions and officials, and that citizens have the 
means to freely influence public policies (USAID, 2013). In recent years, more than 
90 governments have sought to pass restrictive laws and regulations, hampering the 
ability of civil society organisations to register, operate freely or receive foreign 
funding. In 2012, only 14, 5 per cent of the world’s inhabitants lived in countries with 
a completely free press (USAID, 2013). 
There is a close connection between journalism and democracy. Citizens can 
exercise their democratic rights only if they are fully informed (Krüger, 2004: 3-4). 
According to the 2002 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa: 
“Respect for freedom of expression, as well as the right to access to information held 
by public bodies and companies, will lead to greater public transparency and 
accountability, as well as good governance and the strengthening of democracy” 
(University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, 2002).  
 
As journalism is practised on behalf of the public, the media claim freedom not for 
themselves, but for the citizenry in general (Krüger, 2004: 3-4). Japan’s Canon of 
Journalism states that: “The public’s right to know … cannot be ensured without the 
existence of media, operating with the guarantee of freedom of speech and 
expression” (Pressnet, 2012). These lofty ideals easily lay a basis for ethics, bridged 
by credibility.  
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Sunday Times editor Jovial Rantao states that:  
 
Credibility is the lifeblood of our profession as journalists … Without it not one 
person will believe a single word that we write. One of the basic tenets of our 
profession is to ensure that the credibility of the information that we gather on 
a daily basis is unquestionable (cited in Krüger, 2004: 4). 
  
There is also the question as to whether values and principles encapsulated in 
media ethics need to be adapted for local circumstances (Krüger 2004: 9-10). 
Zambian academic Francis Kasoma (1994: 34) argues that generally accepted 
standards are based in European morality and that African journalists should look to 
their own moral heritage as African values would be kinder: “There is too much of the 
cold Euro-American brand of news reporting in Africa.”  
 
European journalism ethics are seen as based on deontology, that decisions are 
taken asking the question: “what is the duty of a moral person?” African ethics are 
seen as situational, taking account of the consequences for the community. 
According to Kasoma (1994: 34), “development journalism” is practised to further 
national development goals, but this should not mean simply following a government 
agenda:  
 
The basic problem is determining who decides whether news is, or is not, in 
the national interest. Such power should belong to journalists and not to 
politicians.  
 
In the 1980s, there was a thriving ‘alternative’ press sector including journals, 
magazines and newspapers in South Africa (OSISA, 2010: 21). As these survived 
largely through foreign funding, the majority of such publications closed down during 
the early 1990s, as donor funding focus shifted. There are a few smaller but 
significant media groups (notably Mail & Guardian newspapers and UmAfrika) and 
according to reports, over 200 non-profit and community newspapers. Some of the 
alternative journals have survived (such as the Agenda feminist journal and the 
Labour Bulletin) and recently a number of other left-wing publications have emerged 
(such as New Agenda and Amandla).  
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2. Interests, norms and identity as part of the media  
 
Mass media have a strong impact in constructing social reality, by framing images of 
reality in a predictable and patterned way (Scheufele, 1999). Media effects are 
limited by the discourse between mass media and recipients. Media discourse is part 
of the process by which individuals construct meaning and public opinion is part of 
the process by which journalists develop and crystallise meaning in public discourse. 
In political communication, framing has to be defined and operationalised on the 
basis of this social constructivism.  
 
Mass media actively set the frames of reference that receivers use to interpret and 
discuss public events (Scheufele, 1999). At the same time, the receivers are 
influenced by pre-existing meaning structures. Active processing refers to a receiver 
seeking out additional sources based on the assumption that mass-mediated 
information in general is incomplete, slanted or in other ways ‘coloured’ by the 
intentions of the communicator. Reflective integrators would ponder the information 
received or talk to others to fully understand what they have learned. Selective 
scanners use the mass media to only find information relative to them.  
 
2.1.1. Interests 
 
The formation of frames could be explained by an interaction of journalists’ practices 
and the influence of interest groups (Scheufele, 1999). These groups marshal 
support and opposition to their interests. They use mass media to construct opinion 
and reality and their societal influence to establish certain frames of reference.  
Herman and Chomsky's (1988) "propaganda model" of the media postulates a set of 
five filters that act to screen the news and other material disseminated by the media 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988: xi). These filters result in a media that reflects elite 
viewpoints and interests and mobilises support for the special interests that dominate 
the state and private activity. These filters are:  
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• the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass-media firms;  
• advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;  
• the reliance of the media on information provided by Government, business, 
and experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of 
power;  
• ‘flak’ (negative responses to a media report) as a means of disciplining the 
media; and  
• (at that stage on the media agenda) "Anti-communism" as a national religion 
and control mechanism (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: xi).  
 
The raw material of news must pass through successive filters leaving only the 
cleansed residue fit to print, they maintain. The filters fix the premises of discourse 
and interpretation and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place (Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988: xi).  
 
Frames suggested by interest groups or political actors as sound bites are adopted 
by journalists and incorporated in their coverage of an event or issue (Scheufele, 
1999). This serves to explain how news is constructed and how societal interests 
impact on the process.  
 
2.1.2. Norms 
 
The formation of frames could also be explained by journalists’ norms (Scheufele, 
1999). Regarding norms, media everywhere subscribe to a code of conduct of some 
kind. The South African Press Council (SAPC) subscribes to a particular code 
(SAPC, 2011).17  The mechanism is based on two pillars: a commitment to freedom 
of expression, including freedom of the press; and a commitment to excellence in 
journalistic practice and ethics.  
 
                                                 
17 The South African Press Council, the Ombudsman and the Appeals Panel form an independent co-
regulatory mechanism set up by the print media to provide impartial, expeditious and cost-effective 
adjudication to settle disputes between newspapers and magazines, on the one hand, and members 
of the public, on the other, over the editorial content of publications (SAPC, 2011). 
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The Council has adopted the South African Press Code to guide journalists in their 
daily practice of gathering and distributing news and opinion, and to guide the 
Ombudsman and the Appeals Panel to reach decisions on complaints from the 
public (SAPC, 2011). More than 640 publications subscribe to the Code. The Council 
is the custodian of this Code and may amend it from time to time, depending on 
needs.  
 
The industry believes in independent co-regulation involving exclusively 
representatives of the press and representatives of the public as the only way to 
guarantee the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press and other 
media guaranteed in the Constitution (SAPC, 2011). Any other form of regulation 
would threaten the independence of the press and freedom of expression. 
 
According to the Press Code, the press exists to serve society. Its freedom provides 
for independent scrutiny of the forces that shape society and is essential to realising 
the promise of democracy (SAPC, 2011). It enables citizens to make informed 
judgments on the issues of the time. Their work is guided at all times by the public 
interest, understood to describe information of legitimate interest or importance to 
citizens. As journalists, they commit themselves to the highest standards of 
excellence, to maintain credibility and keep the trust of their readers. This means 
striving for the maximum truth, avoiding unnecessary harm and acting 
independently.  
 
Although codes of conduct go a long way to setting out the dos and don’ts of the 
profession (journalism and the media) applying them to real-life situations is often not 
straight forward - for instance, the public’s right to know tugs against an individual’s 
right to privacy (Krüger, 2004: x-1). According to the Press Code of Professional 
Practice in South Africa: 
 
The primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to 
serve society by informing citizens and enabling them to make informed 
judgments on the issues of the time. The freedom of the press to bring an 
independent scrutiny is a freedom exercised on behalf of the public (My 
Pressporta, 2012). 
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Ethics is about right and wrong (Krüger, 2004: x-1). It is clearly distinct from the law. 
Where ethics set the highest standards of ideal behaviour, the law is concerned with 
the minimum or “the bottom line below we should not fall.” On the other hand the law 
carries sanctions of a more vigorous kind than any ethical code, whereas ethics 
appeals to the journalist’s responsibility and conscience.  
 
Krüger (2004: 12-13) offers a set of guiding principles for ethics in journalism: 
 
• Truth-telling: Seek truth and report it as fully as possible. This speaks to the 
fundamental truth-telling function of journalism and has two sub-themes: 
accuracy and fairness. The need for accuracy is obvious; and bias and 
unfairness can badly undermine the truthfulness of a report; 
• Independence: This arises as credibility is affected by any perceived or real 
conflicts of interest. Audiences will discount any reporting seen as influenced 
by considerations outside of journalism, such as personal, commercial or 
political motives. Journalists need to be vociferous in their defence of media 
freedom; 
• Minimising harm: While truth-telling is a driving force, this consideration puts 
on the brakes. People can be hurt by journalism; it can deepen a trauma 
suffered; reputations can be damaged; people can be subjected to ridicule, 
recriminations and even physical danger; and public sensitivities can be 
offended. These cannot always be avoided, but should be minimised; and 
• Accountability: Journalists should be prepared to answer for their work 
through published corrections and cooperation with the system of self-
regulation. This is different from state regulation, which would undermine 
media freedom.  
 
Considering the profound influence of mass media like television on cultural 
perceptions and attitudes, it is important for the creators of media content to grapple 
with ethical issues (Lule, 2012). Most democratic constitutions would guarantee the 
freedom of the press as an important ingredient in upholding democratic principles. 
Freedom from government censorship allows the news media to keep citizens 
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informed about the state of their society. However, the press can take this freedom 
from censorship and restriction too far. Constitutions also usually guarantee 
individuals certain rights to privacy and most journalists undertake in their codes of 
ethical journalism to protect these rights.  
 
2.1.3 Identity 
 
Regarding media identity, Nicholas and Price (1998: 20-21) note that media owners 
argue that ultimately it is the consumers who determine the nature of media 
products. However, they contend that the news organisation’s origins should be 
taken into account to understand its identity. Some were set up by individuals 
seeking political influence. A local media organisation has to identify with its region 
very strongly, while a national media organisation can upset the odd local community 
or two and still survive. A media organisation’s critical independence can be affected 
by its relationship with other organisations which need publicity.  
 
Hard economic facts may be difficult to determine, as they are often sensitive, but 
they have a very strong influence on identity through advertisement and other 
financing. Understanding how a media organisation is structured (who has the real 
power and how it is exercised) will offer insight into the pressures, motivations, fears 
and hopes which affect the way media products are presented to the public 
(Nicholas & Price, 1998: 20-21).  
 
On the other hand, the media also generate, corroborate and accelerate identity 
formation, just as they diminish, overshadow or negate it (Hadland et al., 2008:3). 
Since 1994, South Africa has experienced a significant change in its political and 
media landscapes (Hadland et al., 2008:9). These transformations impacted on both 
individual and collective identities of South Africans. Those that had emerged and 
grown under apartheid were destabilised; while the reconfiguration of the social-
political and media landscape created the conditions for, and promoted the 
emergence of, new individual and collective identities. The South African identity, as 
shaped by media influence, remains a work in progress (Hadland et al., 2008:12).  
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3. The South African public, private and independent media landscape 
 
The media in South Africa is well-established and sophisticated. It comprises print 
media (newspapers and magazines), broadcast media (radio and television) and 
electronic media (Internet). Though South Africa has a wide range of media, there 
are many people in remote rural areas who still do not have access to a diverse 
range of information. Radio has the greatest reach of any media in South Africa 
(OSISA, 2010: 19).  
 
Key issues facing this industry include, among others, the role of the press in a 
fledgling democracy, illiteracy and the attraction and retention of advertising revenue. 
In order to contextualise the media landscape in South Africa, this section outlines 
the main media actors in the country which are relevant to the study.  
 
3.1. Print media 
 
As indicated before, four major companies dominate the South African newspaper 
and magazine industry, namely Independent Newspapers, Naspers, Caxton and 
Avusa, as well as a number of large publishers. There are several daily and weekly 
newspapers and a magazine market comprising hundreds of consumer, business 
and professional titles.  
 
3.1.1. Avusa Limited  
 
Avusa Limited (hereafter Avusa) leads the weekly newspaper and financial 
publications market through the Sunday Times (with 3, 3 million readers the biggest 
paper in the country) and the Sunday World. It also shares in daily influential 
newspaper the Business Day and the weekly Financial Mail magazine (OSISA, 
2010: 20). In addition, Avusa also owns the daily Sowetan newspaper (aimed at 
black readers), major newspapers in the Eastern Cape and a range of free-sheet 
newspapers. Avusa also has interests in book publishing, the music industry and 
other entertainment entities, including movies. In mid-2008, major black economic 
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empowerment (BEE) investment company Mvelaphanda Holdings finalised the 
acquisition of a 25, 5 per cent stake in Avusa (OSISA, 2010: 20).18 
 
3.1.2. CTP Property Limited  
 
Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited (hereafter Caxton) publishes 
knock-and-drop local papers, as well as the national daily newspaper The Citizen. 
The newspaper division of the company owns or co-owns 88 titles (including free 
and for sale newspapers). The magazine unit has 15 titles and Caxton owns one of 
the largest commercial printers in South Africa. Avusa has an indirect 38 per cent 
stake in Caxton, although its shareholders had approved the splitting off of these 
assets into a separately listed company, named ElementOne (OSISA, 2010: 20).  
  
3.1.3. Independent News & Media 
 
Independent Newspapers, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Irish Independent News 
& Media (South Africa) Limited, is soon to be run by local players after the group’s 
Irish parent company agreed to sell the company to a Sekunjalo-led consortium 
(Business Day, 17/6/2013). It publishes 14 daily and weekly newspapers in South 
Africa’s major metropolitan areas including The Star (Johannesburg), the Cape 
Argus (Cape Town), the Isolezwe (IsiZulu newspaper, Durban), the Cape Times 
(Cape Town), The Mercury (Durban) and the Pretoria News. Weekend newspapers 
include the Independent on Saturday, the Sunday Independent and the Sunday 
Tribune (OSISA, 2010: 20-21).  
  
3.1.4. Nasionale Pers 
 
Nasionale Pers (hereafter Naspers) owns Media 24, which in turn controls 60 per 
cent of South Africa’s magazine market (OSISA, 2010: 21). Naspers (2010) defines 
itself as a “multinational media company with principal operations in electronic 
media” (including pay-television, internet and instant-messaging subscriber platforms 
and the provision of related technologies) and print media (including the publishing, 
                                                 
18 Avusa was formerly known as Johnnic Communications.  
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distribution and printing of magazines, newspapers and books, and the provision of 
private education services).  
 
It publishes 50 newspaper titles including Afrikaans newspapers Die Burger 
(Western and Northern Cape), the Beeld (Gauteng), the Volksblad (Free State) and 
the national weekly the Rapport, the tabloid Daily Sun, as well as the Sunday 
newspaper City Press. In South Africa, Naspers controls Internet service provider M-
Web, as well as Multi-Choice, which owns subscription broadcasters Digital Satellite 
Television (DStv) and M-Net (OSISA, 2010: 21).  
 
Newspapers and magazines (apart from “knock-and-drop” newspapers) are not 
readily affordable for the majority of South Africans, as many cost more than, for 
example, a loaf of bread. This in part accounts for the high readership per copy of 
popular newspapers (OSISA, 2010: 19). The development of the South African press 
since the end of apartheid has shown two significant trends: the stagnation and 
decline of the traditional mainstream newspapers, and the phenomenal growth of 
papers with a black, working-class readership (BrandSA, 2011a).  
 
The stagnation of South Africa's mainstream press, which traditionally had a wealthy 
white readership, mirrors the trend in established newspapers in developed countries 
across the world. This is generally attributed to the growth of the Internet, with more 
and more who have access to choosing to find their news online instead of on the 
printed page (BrandSA, 2011a).  
 
The opposite trend, the remarkable growth of newspaper readership in the lower end 
of the market, is a phenomenon seen in developing countries such as India and 
China (BrandSA, 2011a). This is due to the vast improvement in the living standards 
in South Africa's poorest communities, the major beneficiaries of change in the 
country. Their living conditions and general standard of living changed with access to 
housing, electricity, running water, job opportunities and minimum wages.  
 
In this vast new readership one paper stands out: The Daily Sun. Launched in 2002 
to fill the enormous gap in the newspaper market, this tabloid has seen its circulation 
rise from 78 000 in its first year to 513 291 in the first quarter of 2009 – in copies 
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sold. Its readership has increased from under half a million to 5,2 million. It now has 
a market penetration of 51,8 percent – a single newspaper with the majority market 
share (BrandSA, 2011a).  
 
The Daily Sun's success has led to an increasing "tabloidisation" of South Africa's 
newspaper industry, with a number of new tabloids being launched (BrandSA, 
2011a). These include the Afrikaans-language Son and the English-language Daily 
Voice, both targeting working class so-called coloured and, to a lesser extent, white 
readers in the Western Cape. 
 
The number of newspaper and magazine titles measured by the South African 
Audience Research Foundation (SAARF)19 All Media Products Survey (AMPS) 20 
has grown since 1998 (See Table 1). Penetration of print media inevitably is highest 
amongst wealthier communities. SAARF reports, for example, that while only six per 
cent of the population in Living Standard Measurement (LSM) 1 reads a newspaper, 
there is 75 per cent penetration in LSM 10 (OSISA, 2010: 19). 
 
Table 1: South African magazines and newspapers (1998-2008) 
 
Number of magazines published 
 1998 2000 2002 2005 2007 2008 
Weekly 15 13 15 13 16 14 
Fortnightly  5  5  3 2  1 2 
Monthly 43 59 61 66 88 93 
 
Number of newspapers 
 1998 2000 2002 2005 2007 2008 
                                                 
19 SAARF publishes media audience and brand research, providing data for target marketing and a 
common currency for buying and selling media space and time. It measures the audiences of all 
traditional media (SAARF, 2012). 
20 SAARF’s AMPS collects information on the readership of newspapers and magazines, television 
viewing, radio listening, cinema-going and on the acquisition, possession or use of selection or 
products and services together with extensive demographic data (SADA, 1995). 
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Daily 17 17 16 18 20 22 
Weekly 27 26 22 24 27 28 
Any 44 43 40 43 50 51 
 
Source: Marketing Mix, 2010 
 
Most of the mass media publishes in English or Afrikaans. Smaller media groups 
face huge challenges, as major distribution networks and big media players control 
printing presses. Newspapers are primarily distributed in metropolitan areas and are 
not always easily accessible in poor rural areas. The costs of purchasing 
newspapers for poor people are thus prohibitive, if one considers transport costs 
(OSISA, 2010: 21).  
 
The largest newspapers in terms of readership and penetration according to SAARF 
AMPS are outlined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Daily newspaper readership / penetration (2005-2009) 
Daily 
newspaper 
Frequency/Type Area 
published 
Language 2005 
readership 
( % 
penetration of 
adult 
population) 
2009 
readership 
(% 
penetration of 
adult 
population) 
Daily Sun  Daily tabloid 
 
Gauteng, 
Free State, 
Eastern 
Cape, 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
English 9,8 14 
Sowetan Daily tabloid Gauteng English 5 4,7 
The Star Daily broadsheet Gauteng English 1,8 2,5 
Isolezwe Daily broadsheet KwaZulu-
Natal 
IsiZulu 1,6 2,4 
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Source: Marketing Mix 2010 
 
More recent figures show that total sales for daily newspapers dropped from 1,68 
million to 1,53 million (daily average) from 2009 to 2013 (Harber, 2013). Most of the 
newspapers belonging to The Independent Newspaper group fell by about 20 per 
cent. These figures include digital subscriptions. Afrikaans newspapers also 
continued their downward slide. Even those newspapers that had been bucking the 
general trend did not do so this time. IsiZulu newspapers had mixed results, breaking 
their pattern of consistent growth. The shining star was Isolezwe. The Daily Sun 
continued its downward trend from its peak of near 500 000, now down to 322 324.  
 
To understand the long-term trends, total daily newspaper sales in 2009 were 1,96 
million and they are now 1,53 million (Harber, 2013). Between 2002 and 2009, the 
figures were boosted largely by the new tabloids, which found a new market and 
grew quickly over about five years. The older newspapers were generally staying in 
the same place or dropping. Since the tabloids joined the downward trend from 
2011, this brought total newspaper sales tumbling down. The three isiZulu 
newspapers bucked the trend, as did some of the weeklies, but this seems to have 
come to an end. 
 
The weekly Mail & Guardian has a penetration of 1, 6 per cent. The Mail & Guardian 
is 87,5 per cent owned by Newtrust Company Botswana Limited, which is owned by 
Zimbabwean publisher and entrepreneur, Trevor Ncube (OSISA, 2010: 23). The 
London-based Guardian Newspapers Limited holds 10 per cent of the company and 
minority shareholders make up the rest (Mail & Guardian, undated). Table 3 outlines 
the largest weekly newspapers in terms of readership. 
 
Table 3: Newspaper readership/penetration (2005-2009) 
Weekly 
newspapers 
Type/ 
frequency 
Area 
published/ 
distributed 
Language 2005 
( % 
penetration 
of adult 
population) 
2009 
( % 
penetration 
of adult 
population) 
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Sunday 
Times 
Sunday 
newspaper 
National  English 10,7 12,6 
Sunday Sun Sunday tabloid  National  English 6,2 8,3 
City Press 
  
Sunday 
newspaper 
National  English 6,4 6,5 
Soccer 
Laduma 
National 
soccer focused 
newspaper 
National  English 5,7 8,7 
Sunday 
World 
Sunday  
tabloid  
National  English 5,1 5,9 
Rapport Sunday 
newspaper  
National Afrikaans  5,1 4,5 
 
Source: Marketing Mix, 2010 
 
Recent figures for weeklies show that total sales went up slightly from 652 000 to 
666 000 (weekly average), but only because the Soccer Laduma went up, while all 
others slipped (Harber, 2013). For weekend papers, the total fell from 2,42 million to 
2,27 million (weekly average).  
 
3.2. News agencies 
  
There is one national news agency – the South African Press Agency (SAPA) – 
which is jointly controlled by the major newspaper groups (OSISA, 2010: 23). In May 
2008 the SABC launched a news agency to provide raw or packaged audio and 
visual content, mostly to the media.  
 
A number of smaller news agencies have been established including African Eye 
(Mpumalanga), Health-e (focusing on health news) and the Eastern Cape News 
Agency (Grahamstown). Government established a government news service 
BuaNews to distribute government information and news to media. This agency was 
re-launched as the South African Government News Agency or SAnews (OSISA, 
2010: 23).  
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3.3. Broadcasting 
 
Over the past few years the SABC has been experiencing a number of crises 
(OSISA, 2010: xiii). These developments resulted in public debate on the public 
broadcaster and created the chance for a thorough review of public broadcasting 
legislation, as well as the organisational structures of the SABC. Civil society 
organisations, in particular the broad-based Save Our SABC (SOS) Coalition took up 
the challenge and started developing concrete policy papers for broadcasting reform 
from 2008.21  
 
In October 2009, the Department of Communications, for its part, gazetted what was 
received as a controversial Public Broadcasting Services Bill. If passed into law, this 
would fundamentally change the legal and regulatory environment for broadcasting 
in the country and, critics argue, allow government to exert more rather than less 
control over the sector (OSISA, 2010: xiii). 
 
3.3.1. Radio 
 
South Africa has one of the largest radio networks in Africa, with private, public and 
community broadcasting (OSISA, 2010: 23). Apart from the public broadcaster, the 
SABC, there are also a number of private radio stations and numerous community 
radio stations. Radio has the greatest reach of any media in South Africa with the 
public broadcaster’s stations accessible to nearly all South Africans (OSISA, 2010: 
23).  
 
Radio is one of the most affordable mediums, as radio sets are relatively inexpensive 
and stations broadcast free-to-air. According to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA 
2008), 76,6 per cent of South African households (766 of every 1 000) owned 
working radio sets in 2007 (compared with 73 per cent in 2001). Radio listenership 
has been steadily increasing and 93,3 per cent (933 of every 1000) of South Africans 
                                                 
21 SOS (Save Our SABC) Coalition was renamed SOS Support Public Broadcasting. 
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listen to radio (OSISA, 2010: 23). The SABC and all the commercial stations also 
stream content over the Internet.  
 
As of March 2009, 96 community and three low-power radio stations, as well as 13 
commercial and 18 SABC radio stations were licensed (OSISA, 2010: 23). The 
public broadcaster has stations in each of the official languages, as well as a station 
broadcasting in two Khoi San languages - !Xu and Khwe. Commercial radio stations 
are centred in the major metropolitan areas (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, 
Polokwane, Nelspruit and Mafikeng) and broadcast primarily in English. Community 
radio stations are targeting both geographic communities and/or special interest 
groups (e.g. Muslims, Chinese speakers, “Boere Afrikaners” etc). They broadcast in 
a range of official and other local languages.  
 
3.3.2. Television 
 
Television has been available in the country since 1976, with satellite television 
being available from the mid 1990s (OSISA, 2010: 24). There are currently four 
television broadcasters, namely the SABC (a public broadcaster), DStv, TopTV 
(encoded subscription television) and e.tv (a commercial free-to-air channel).  
 
Ownership of television sets has increased rapidly since 1994 (linked in part to the 
extension of the electricity grid). According to Statistics South Africa’s (Stats SA) 
2007 Community Survey, 65,6 per cent of households (656 of 1000) in 2007 owned 
a working television set (compared to 53,8 per cent in 2001) (Stats SA, 2007: 36). 12 
television operators are licensed in South Africa: 
 
• three national public television channels  
• one national private free-to-air channel (e.tv) 
• one terrestrial subscription service (M-Net, owned by Naspers)  
• two satellite subscription services (DStv, also owned by Naspers and TopTV)  
• three one-year community television licences (Soweto TV in Johannesburg, 
Cape Community TV in Cape Town and Bay TV in Richards Bay). Other 
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community television services have operated from time to time on 30-day 
special event licences (OSISA, 2010: 24). 
  
3.4. Internet 
 
According to Stats SA’s Community Survey 2007, computer ownership in the home 
almost doubled between 2001 and 2007. Around 8,6 per cent of households owned 
computers in 2001, increasing to 15,7 per cent of households (157 of 1000) in 2007. 
Internet usage was not measured in 2001 and therefore no comparative data is 
available (Stats SA, 2007: 36). The statistics however show that 7,3 per cent of 
households (73 of 1000) had access to Internet at home in 2007 (Stats SA, 2007: 
36). The most used media site is News24 (part of the Naspers/Media 24 stable). 
Bizcommunity.com (2007) indicates that connected South Africans spend 27 per 
cent of their online time on websites created by 24.com, Media24's digital publishing 
arm.22 This equates to slightly more than one in every four minutes online – at least 
16 per cent more than any other local digital publisher.  
  
3.5. Telecommunications 
The percentage of households with a landline telephone has decreased from 24,4 
per cent in 2001 to 18,6 percent in 2007 (186 in 1000) (OSISA, 2010: 24, 52 & 74). 
At the same time there has been a significant increase in cellular telephone 
ownership from 32,3  per cent of households in 2001 to 72,9 per cent in 2007 (729 in 
1 000). The Learning Information Networking and Knowledge Centre (LINK) 
published the Telecommunications Sector Performance Review (LINK, 2006: 41-42) 
stating that mobile operators cover over 90 per cent of the country, though 
subscribers are predominantly in major urban centres.23 The study attributes this 
partly to costs, and points out that South Africa’s mobile costs are higher for both 
high- and low-end users than those in, for example, Botswana.  
 
The report furthermore notes that there is an “access shortfall” in relation to 
broadband. In terms of GDP per capita, South Africa is broadly comparable to 
                                                 
22 Bizzcommunity (www.bizcommuniy.com) is a media and marketing electronic newsletter. 
23 The Telecommunications Sector Performance Review measures and assesses ICT market 
developments against national policy objectives. It is concerned with such data as indicators of 
delivery on national objectives (LINK, 2006). 
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Turkey, Mexico, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Broadband penetration 
per 100 inhabitants, on the other hand, is on average two-thirds less in South Africa 
than in any of these five other countries (LINK, 2006: 41-42). The authors of the 
above-mentioned study attribute this to both lack of supply and high prices (LINK, 
2006: 41-42). Many research0ers have emphasised that access to 
telecommunications still reflects apartheid disparities in South Africa, and thus while 
richer households (which are still predominantly white) have access to a range of 
services, poorer (predominantly black) households have limited access.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Democracies require vibrant civil societies and independent media to guarantee that 
citizens are knowledgeable about the activities and performance of government 
institutions and officials, and that those citizens can unreservedly influence policies.  
 
South Africa is a media-knowledgeable nation, inundated with print, broadcast and 
online offerings. In spite of this, many people in rural areas still do not have access 
to a varied range of information. Radio has the greatest reach of any media in South 
Africa with the SABC’s stations accessible to nearly all South Africans. It is one of 
the most affordable mediums, as radio sets are relatively inexpensive and stations 
broadcast free-to-air. Computer ownership in the home almost doubled between 
2001 and 2007. Government has been trying to construct a new media landscape 
with interventions through the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA). 
The media landscape in South Africa is changing, in ownership particularly. This is 
happening in the midst of declining newspaper sales. Most newspaper sales have 
been in quite severe decline for the past two years, reversing a trend of previous 
years. There are just a couple of exceptions, mainly the Zulu-language newspapers. 
The problem is that with advertising revenue falling, it has not been matched by 
growth in the new media internet sector. It has been predicted that more and more 
online news will go behind a paywall (Harber, 2013). Readers will have to pay for it, 
because advertising has not produced the kind of revenue needed to sustain online 
news media.  
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The media reflects elite viewpoints and interests and mobilises support for the 
special interests that dominate the state and private activity. Regarding norms, 
media everywhere subscribe to a code of conduct of some kind. Considering the 
profound influence mass media have on cultural perceptions and attitudes, the 
creators of media content have to grapple with ethical issues. Concerning media 
identity, ultimately consumers might determine the nature of media products. 
However, the news organisation’s origins should be taken into account to understand 
its identity. The media also generate, corroborate and accelerate identity formation, 
just as they diminish, overshadow or negate it.  
 
The next chapter addresses the legislative, regulatory and institutional environment 
of the media in South Africa to explain the relationship between government and the 
media. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF THE MEDIA IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the legislative, regulatory and institutional environment of the 
media in South Africa in order to explain the government’s role in regulating the 
media. Legislation governing the media is discussed, including the controversial 
PSIB and the public discourse around it. The chapter further considers the 
governmental institutions involved in regulating the media. The self-regulatory 
institutions governing the media are also discussed.  
 
Broadcasting and print media are regulated differently in South Africa. South Africa 
does not have a national press/media law (Bussiek et al., 2010: 41-42). The Imprint 
Act (Act 43 of 1993) requires only that the name and address of the printer appear 
on any printed matter intended for public sale or distribution. Thus, media and 
journalists are not subject to special regulations but, as any other citizen having to 
comply with general laws.  
 
Print media regulate themselves through the Press Council/Press Ombudsman 
established and funded by the Newspaper Association of South Africa, which 
represents the major newspaper groups (Bussiek et al., 2010: 41-42). Broadcasters 
have the option of: either adhering to a code developed by the regulator (the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ICASA) and adjudicated by 
the Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) of ICASA; or of abiding by their 
own code administered by the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa 
(BCCSA). 
 
The ruling party has questioned the principle of self-regulation of the press (ANC, 
2007). At its 52nd National Conference in December 2007, the ANC resolved to 
investigate the establishment of a MAT: 
95 
 
With particular reference to the print media, the ANC notes that the current 
form of self regulation … is not adequate to sufficiently protect the rights of the 
individual citizens, community and society as a whole (ANC, 2007). 
 
2. South African media legislation 
 
The media in South Africa operates within the ambit of a wide range of legislative 
measures. The following can be regarded as the most important.  
 
2.1. The Constitution  
 
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter Two of the South African 
Constitution deals with freedom of expression and makes provision for freedom of 
the press and other media; and freedom to receive or impart information or ideas 
(South Africa, 1996). 
 
2.2. The Broadcasting Act  
 
As fundamental principles and objects the Broadcasting Act (Act 4 of 1999) identifies 
freedom of expression and the journalistic, creative and programming independence 
of broadcasters and independence of regulation as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The object of the Act is to:  
 
• establish and develop broadcasting policy in South Africa in the public interest 
and for that purpose to contribute to democracy, development of society, 
gender equality, nation building, provision of education and strengthening the 
spiritual and moral fibre of society; 
• safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic 
fabric of South Africa;  
• encourage ownership and control of broadcasting services through 
participation by persons from historically disadvantaged groups; and  
• Ensure plurality of news, views and information and provide a wide range of 
entertainment and education programmes (South Africa, 1999). 
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2.3. The Electronic Communications Act  
 
The Electronic Communications Act (Act 35, 2005) aims to make new provision for 
the regulation of electronic communications services, electronic communications 
network services and broadcasting services; and provide for the granting of new 
licences and new social obligations (South Africa, 2005). The Act was amended in 
2007 to explicitly provide for the facilitation of strategic interventions by government 
in the electronic communications sector to reduce the cost of access to information, 
communication and technology (South Africa, 2007). 
 
2.4. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 
 
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) Act (Act 13, 
2000) provides for the establishment of ICASA. The Act recognises that 
technological and other developments in the fields of broadcasting and 
telecommunications are causing a rapid convergence of these fields and 
acknowledges that the establishment of an independent body to regulate 
broadcasting and telecommunications is required (South Africa, 2000). 
 
3. Proposed legislation affecting government relations with the media 
 
For the purpose of this study, examples of proposed media legislation relevant to this 
study are discussed here as this legislation has implications for the country’s foreign 
policy. The Constitution, in Chapter 2, Section 16, safeguards freedom of the media, 
as it stipulates that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes 
“freedom of the press and other media” (South Africa, 1996). However, the proposed 
PIB, now the PSIB, and plans for a MAT have severely damaged the relationship 
between the government and the media.  
 
3.1. Protection of Information Bill 
 
This section outlines the PIB, public debate on it and its implications for the theme of 
this study. As proposed in 2010 the PIB, Bill 6 of 2010, aimed to provide for the 
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protection of certain information from destruction, loss or unlawful disclosure; and to 
regulate the manner in which information may be protected (South Africa, 2010). The 
PIB further recognised the importance of information to the national security, 
territorial integrity and well-being of the Republic; acknowledged the harm of 
excessive secrecy; affirmed the constitutional framework for the protection and 
regulation of access to information; desired to put the protection of information within 
a transparent and sustainable legislative framework; and aimed to promote the free 
flow of information within an open and democratic society without compromising the 
security of the Republic (South Africa, 2010). 
 
In addition to this, the PIB would ensure a coherent approach to protection of state 
information and the classification and declassification of state information and would 
create a legislative framework for the state to respond to espionage and other 
associated hostile activities (South Africa, 2010). The PIB also set out procedures on 
how classified documents were to be handled during court proceedings and required 
courts to prevent public disclosure of classified documents that form part of court 
records. The PIB also sought to: 
 
• create a statutory framework for the protection of State information;  
• set out criteria and processes in terms of which State information may be 
protected from destruction or from unlawful disclosure;  
• set out criteria and processes in terms of which information protected from 
disclosure and which is classified, may be declassified;  
• create offences and proposed sentences for unlawful disclosure of 
information, including the crime of espionage;  
• make it an offence for an individual to knowingly supply false information to 
the national intelligence structures;  
• establish guidelines for the treatment by courts of classified documents;  
• provide for the Minister of State Security to issue regulations on information 
security across government; and  
• Repeal the existing Protection of Information Act, 84 of 1982. (South Africa, 
2010). 
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Initial concerns about the Bill centred around the application of the Bill to cover all 
organs of state, the overly broad definition of the concept of “national interest” which 
could be used as ground for classification of information, the inclusion of commercial 
information as a category of information that could be classified, the criminalisation 
of disclosure of classified information even if in the public interest and the absence of 
an independent review mechanism on classification decisions (ODAC, 2012). 
 
3.1.1. Media and public reaction to proposed media legislation 
 
 Public opinion and the participation of civil society are two of the main elements of 
a democracy, where the media plays a vital role. Therefore, the debate about the 
PIB has been in the public space since it was first tabled and resurfaced when an 
amended version was reintroduced to Parliament in 2010. The Business Day 
(2/6/2010) reported that the PIB had returned to Parliament with much of its 
“draconian provisions” intact and with clauses that would criminalise “information 
peddling”.  
 
By November 2010, the Open Democracy Advice Centre of South Africa (ODAC) 
estimated that Avaaz, an advocacy group, had collected over 40 000 signatures for a 
petition against the Bill, The Right-To-Know campaign (R2K) had support of over 9 
000 individuals and 350 institutions and the DA had delivered a petition supported by 
close to 30 000 South Africans (ODAC, 2010).24 ODAC also argued that at stake 
were constitutionally enshrined principles of transparency of the public service, 
accountability and open democracy, seen to be under threat from the provisions of 
what has come to be referred to by critics as the “Secrecy Bill”. 
 
Initially, the government seemed unmoved amid such widespread criticism and even 
called in senior government legal advisors to state before Parliament that the Bill in 
its original form would pass constitutional muster (ODAC, 2010). This set the scene 
for mobilisation around local media by civil society, business and even foreign media 
in opposition of government’s legislative intentions. The already somewhat turbulent 
                                                 
24 ODAC’s mission is to promote open and transparent democracy; foster a culture of corporate and 
government accountability; and assist people in South Africa to be able to realise their human rights 
(ODAC, 2010). 
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relationship between government and the media was further plunged into turmoil by 
the heavy-handed arrest of the Sunday Times journalist Mzilikazi wa Afrika. The 
media reacted with outrage and linked the incident to the proposed legislation, seen 
as an attempt to ‘muzzle’ them. According to the Mail & Guardian (4/8/2010) 
Mzilikazi wa Afrika was “marched out of his offices” at the Avusa building in 
Johannesburg, just as editors emerged from a meeting about media freedom.  
 
A front page editorial in The Citizen (5/8/2010) commented: 
 
A campaign against the media, orchestrated by ANC cadres who do not like 
their dealings being aired, has taken an ugly, physical turn ... The chilling 
message ... is clear: Write about us and we will get you.  
 
The media went as far as linking these measures to apartheid legislation. A Sowetan 
editorial on 5/8/2010 critiqued: "While purporting to be on the side of those who will 
give their life for a free press, the ANC is actually hell-bent on taking the country 
back into the dark days of apartheid legislation." The leader of the opposition 
Democratic Alliance (DA) and Western Cape Premier, Helen Zille, agreed (Pretoria 
News 5/8/2010) that the arrest of wa Afrika could not be viewed “in isolation from the 
disturbing trends to stifle media freedom”. She saw it as “a sinister forewarning” of 
how media freedom would be infringed upon by the proposed Media Appeals 
Tribunal (MAT) and the Protection of Information Bill (PIB).  
 
Thirty-six South African editors subsequently signed the Auckland Park Declaration 
in protest against the PIB expressing concern about attempts to curtail freedom of 
expression and the free flow of information in the country. They said they “vigorously 
oppose” the restrictive clauses in the PIB and the proposed MAT and appealed to 
the government and the ruling ANC to abide by the founding principles of the South 
African democracy and abandon these proposed measures (Times Live, 8/8/2010). 
 
A Beeld editorial (10/8/2010) noted that the ANC was concerned about the things the 
media did right “exposing of squandering, poor governance and corruption" and 
concluded that the Auckland Park Declaration stated correctly that the ANC planned 
to “hit at the roots of democracy”.  
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The government also faced dissent from its own ranks and the ranks of the ruling 
alliance, as the Business Day (23/8/2010) quoted Congress of South African Trade 
Union (COSATU) General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi as saying the proposed PIB 
was a "mockery" and assuring journalists the PIB would not be passed as it was. As 
the resistance built against the measures, former intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils 
also called for a rethink on the legislation, calling it "too broad and unfocused" and 
the penalties proposed "harsh" (Daily News, 16/6/2011). 
 
Civil society also joined the resistance to the perceived clampdown on the media. It 
was reported in the Sunday Independent (22/8/2010) that South Africa's most 
prominent writers started a petition, joining the media in protest against the PIB as 
well as the ANC's proposed MAT. Among the signatories of the letter sent to 
President Zuma were many whose works were banned under apartheid.   
 
The Business Day (19/8/2010) quoted the General Council of the Bar saying that 
the PIB was “unnecessary, unconstitutional and undesirable,” adding its voice to 
the widely held view that it would not pass constitutional muster.  
 
The debate also migrated to the foreign media. The Rapport (15/8/2010) indicated 
that "the proposed MAT and laws to limit especially the print media in South Africa 
were making headlines in newspapers worldwide." The Sunday Tribune 
(22/8/2010) reported that Gavin O'Reilly, the president of the World Association of 
Newspapers and News Publishers, sent a letter to South Africa’s President, Jacob 
Zuma, on behalf of the association and the World Editors' Forum, presented 
formally at the UN, UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) 
and the Council of Europe. It called on the President to ensure that the PIB and 
the MAT proposals were either amended in line with constitutional safeguards for 
freedom of the press, or withdrawn altogether.  
 
Local media noted government concerns about foreign coverage of the debate on 
media freedom in South Africa. The Business Day (20/8/2010) quoted government 
spokesperson Themba Maseko as saying that “negative international coverage of 
South Africa's perceived intention to restrict the freedom of the press and expression 
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was increasingly concerning the government”. He acknowledged that the negative 
stories had ‘migrated’ to international pages and that government was "obviously 
concerned about that". The Sunday Times (19/9/2010) noted that the Minister of 
State Security, Siyabonga Cwele, appealed for calm in the debate about the 
government's proposed PIB, saying the “loud opposition” to it was undermining 
South Africa's international reputation.  
 
The Citizen (20/9/2010) objected to Minister Cwele’s analysis of the situation asking: 
“Does he really lack the insight to see that it is the onerous provisions of the PIB, 
rather than the widespread protests, that are causing damage to South Africa’s 
image abroad?”  
 
The Business Day (19/8/2010) quoted South African National Editors’ Forum 
(SANEF) Chairman, Mondli Makhanya, as saying that he was very encouraged by 
the interest the international community had taken "in this worrying 
development”.25 He remarked that "those people driving these processes” had to 
realise that South Africa was not “some small island in the Pacific” and what 
happened in this country was “being very closely watched by the world." 
 
Government eventually relented and returning to Parliament in October 2010 its 
new position included improvements to the Bill: 
 
• the removal of the concept of protection of information in the national 
interest;  
• the removal of the section related to the classification of commercial 
information; and 
• The public interest override for review of classification decisions. Even 
though the government agreed to a public interest override for requests for 
information or review of classification decisions, there was no agreement 
on a public interest defence for people that disclose or publish or distribute 
classified information (ODAC, 2010). 
 
                                                 
25 SANEF is a voluntary forum of senior journalists, editors and journalism educators from all areas of 
the media industry in South Africa (SANEF 2012). 
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Further concessions were later announced as the Pretoria News Weekend 
(25/6/2011) quoted ANC Member of Parliament (MP) Llewellyn Landers saying “a 
rethink came as a result of serious concern expressed by senior ANC members and 
civil society”. The key concessions were: 
 
• narrowing the scope of the PIB to apply only to security and intelligence 
services, with a clause allowing other organs of state to apply for inclusion if 
necessary; 
• allowing for a retired judge to review disputed classification of information; and 
• Removing minimum jail sentences that apply without the option of a fine for 
the disclosure of classified information, except for the crime of espionage. 
 
SANEF told MPs (Daily News, 27/6/2011) that while it appreciated important 
proposed amendments, such as narrower grounds for classification and the 
introduction of ‘balance’ between the needs for openness and transparency and 
preserving state secrets, it was still concerned about many remaining aspects of the 
PIB and their potential effects on “our democratic state”. The Sowetan (27/6/2011) 
also urged the ANC to go further to include the public interest defence clause, which 
would essentially decriminalise the release of information in the public interest. 
 
iol (2/9/2011) reported that the absence of a public-interest defence clause in the PIB 
meant it was destined for a Constitutional Court challenge, where critics hoped it 
would be “thrown out”.26 The ANC persisted in refusing to include such a clause, 
which would protect anyone – including journalists and whistleblowers – which 
released or published classified information in the public interest. Journalists would 
face stiff prison terms under the proposed law if they published classified information 
without first asking the government to declassify it.  
 
Media lawyer Dario Milo said the absence of a public-interest defence was 
problematic, because it would have functioned as an important means for information 
of serious concern to citizens to be disclosed, regardless of the fact that the 
                                                 
26 The Constitutional Court is South Africa's highest court on constitutional matters. Its jurisdiction is 
restricted to constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters 
(Constitutional Court, undated). 
103 
 
information was classified (iol 2/9/2011). The ANC told Parliament’s special 
committee processing the PIB that it would not allow a public-interest defence to be 
written into the PIB, as this would place journalists in a class of their own. Arguing 
against the inclusion, the ANC’s chief negotiator on the PIB, Luwellyn Landers, said 
the PIB merely made the media subject to the rule of law.  
 
3.2. Protection of State Information Bill 
 
As Parliament was about to vote on what had by then become the revised PSIB,  the 
National Press Club (NPC) declared 22 November 2011, “Black Tuesday”, in 
protest.27 The Press Club called on all South Africans to wear black on the day 
(LeadSA, 2011). “Black Wednesday” was synonymous with the apartheid 
government which banned two newspapers and 19 black consciousness movements 
on Wednesday 19 October 1977.  
 
Press Club Chairman Yusuf Abramjee said the proposed legislation did not only 
affect the media, but that civil society at large also needed to raise its voice. 
Abramjee said South Africa was again facing a serious threat to freedom of speech, 
expression and of the media. ANC Chief Whip in Parliament, Mathole Motshekga, 
said the National Press Club's plans were a senseless distortion of facts and the only 
result “this unfortunate comparison” would achieve was to dilute the real history of 
Black Wednesday and insult the victims “of apartheid's barbaric laws" (News24, 
21/11/2011). 
 
Despite the outcry, the National Assembly voted in favour of the Bill. The PSIB 
intends to ensure a coherent approach to the protection of valuable information and 
the classification and declassification of state information. It will create a legislative 
framework for the state to respond to espionage and other associated hostile 
activities (Bill 6 of 2010). Therefore, the objectives of the PSIB are to: 
 
• classify and declassify state information;  
                                                 
27 The NPC aims to promote the professional, social and other interests of the media fraternity and to 
raise the status of the journalistic profession as a whole (NPC, 2002). 
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• procedures to do so;  
• establish a classification review panel to review and oversee status reviews;  
• create a legislative framework for the state to respond to espionage and 
hostile activities and to provide for certain other offences and penalties; and  
• repeal the Protection of Information Act, 1982 (Act 84 of 1982) (South Africa 
2010b). 
 
3.2.1. Media and public reaction 
 
Dario Milo, Media Law associate professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
wrote about the PSIB, stating that the new draft was a significant improvement both 
on the first draft introduced in Parliament in 2008, and the draft introduced in 2010. 
The indefensibly vague notion of the “national interest”, which would have resulted in 
chronic over-classification, was removed. So was the original attempt to permit the 
classification of commercial information. Better thresholds for classifying information, 
based on demonstrable and not speculative harm to national security and a 
classification review committee, was also a step in the right direction (Times Live, 
27/22/2011).  
 
Despite these welcome developments, Milo considered the criminal sanctions the 
PSIB sought to impose as “very stiff”. The unjustifiably wide net of liability was 
rendered “constitutionally intolerable” by the fact that there was no general public 
interest defence to be invoked by a whistleblower to disclose information that had 
been classified and which the public had a genuine “right to know” (Times Live, 
27/11/2011).  
 
It was later reported that “after steadfastly refusing to include a public interest 
defence clause” in the PSIB, ANC delegates to the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP), the second house of the South African Parliament, ad hoc committee 
dealing with the PSIB appeared to open the door a fraction by proposing several 
significant changes to the PSIB (iol, 11/5/2012). Although the proposal did not, strictly 
speaking, amount to a public interest defence, it was the closest the ANC had come 
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to offering protection for those who revealed classified information in what could be 
deemed to have been in the “public interest”.  
 
In another significant concession, the ANC proposed that minimum prison sentences 
be scrapped altogether (iol, 11/5/2012). ANC delegates proposed amendments to the 
draft that would protect anyone who disclosed information that was incorrectly 
classified by officials to hide “an unlawful act or omission, incompetence, inefficiency 
or administrative error” - or to avoid “embarrassment, scrutiny or criticism”.  
 
The Mail & Guardian (14/6/2012) reported that as South Africa’s human rights record 
was scrutinised by a working group of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) 
in Geneva, it found itself “on the receiving end of significant international 
condemnation” with regard to the PSIB. The intervention – described as the biggest 
collective stand yet taken by foreign governments on the issue – was welcomed by 
activists who opposed the PSIB. 
 
In response, South Africa’s delegation insisted the PSIB was not aimed at the media 
(Mail & Guardian, 14/6/2012). The primary purpose was not to regulate or interfere in 
any way with the media or access to information, but sought to amend statutes not 
consistent with the Constitution. The government had also been very open and had 
engaged with the media and with civil society.  
 
The DA said views expressed at the UN would boost efforts to amend the legislation 
and welcomed any influence brought to bear that would result in the PSIB being 
amended to make it more acceptable and constitutional (Mail & Guardian, 
14/6/2012). Noting the government’s remarks that the PSIB was not intended to curb 
the media, the DA commented that whether or not it was the purpose of the PSIB 
was debatable. The fact remained that the PSIB posed a significant threat to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
The Department of State Security rejected proposals by the ANC to give greater 
protection to whistleblowers, remove all minimum prison sentences from the PSIB 
and narrow the definition of national security (Mail & Guardian, 13/6/2012). Acting 
Director-General of State Security, Dennis Dlomo, dismissed a proposal by 
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opposition parties to delete a provision that the new classification law trump PAIA if 
the two came into conflict.  
 
The gesture of the ANC’s MPs to accommodate a call by rights groups to include a 
public interest defence for those charged with revealing state secrets, by proposing 
that people who revealed classified information to expose criminal wrongdoing be 
exempted from prosecution, was also rejected by the Department (Mail & Guardian, 
13/6/2012). So was the ANC’s stated readiness to remove clauses that would, 
according to legal experts, place an unacceptably heavy onus on those charged 
under the legislation. The Director of ODAC, Alison Tilley, said the department’s 
attempt to prescribe to lawmakers was problematic, as it was an attempt from the 
executive to tell Parliament how to legislate. This demonstrated a clear 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
 
The ANC suggested changes to the contentious PSIB again by proposing to reinsert 
a clause offering protection for those who revealed classified information to expose a 
crime (iol, 21/11/2012). The move was welcomed by the DA (iol, 21/11/2012). ANC 
lawmakers furthermore agreed to remove a clause which stated that the measure 
would trump PAIA, and to reword a preceding clause to state that in case of a clash 
between the new official secrets legislation and any other law, courts must prefer a 
reasonable interpretation that avoids a conflict “taking into consideration the need to 
protect and classify certain state information in terms of this act”. They also made a 
proposal to give explicit permission to the Public Protector, the Auditor General and 
all other Chapter Nine institutions to be in possession of classified information (iol, 
21/11/2012).28  
 
‘Jubilant’ ANC MPs reportedly passed the PSIB, with proposed amendments, in the 
NCOP in November 2012 with 34 votes in favour and 16 against (Pretoria News, 
30/11/2012). State Security Minister, Siyabonga Cwele, said those opposing the Bill 
had not told South Africans that it was more progressive than any other act 
anywhere else in the world that governed the protection of classified information. He 
said the government would not support a bill that undermined the Constitution and 
                                                 
28 Chapter Nine Institutions are the state institutions supporting constitutional democracy, named after 
their place in the Constitution (Polity, 2012). 
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did not strike a balance between secrecy and transparency (Pretoria News, 
30/11/2012). Western Cape Social Development Member of the Executive Council 
(MEC) Albert Fritz, speaking on behalf of Premier Helen Zille, said that if he was a 
journalist, he would “fear for his life” (Pretoria News, 30/11/2012).  
 
The DA vowed to continue to fight the PSIB all the way to the Constitutional Court, 
saying it was still inconsistent with the Constitution (Weekend Pretoria News, 
1/12/2012). DA parliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko said while the “tireless 
efforts” of opposition parties and civil society had led to some important changes to 
the Bill, they did not go far enough (Weekend Pretoria News, 1/12/2012). ANC 
parliamentary spokesperson Moloto Mothapo said it was ‘nonsense’ that the Bill 
would not pass constitutional muster. It was a “complete redraft” of what had been 
introduced to Parliament in 2008 (Weekend Pretoria News, 1/12/2012).  
 
The PSIB was eventually adopted in the National Assembly on 25 April 2013 with 
189 votes in favour, 74 against and one abstention (Mail & Guardian, 26/4/2013). 
State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele told MPs the legislation had been 
significantly altered and the government was confident that it had addressed the 
concerns of the people.  
 
The Mail & Guardian (25/4/2013) explained that Section 79 of the Constitution 
allowed the President to refer the Bill back to the National Assembly and the NCOP 
for reconsideration.29 If he was still unsatisfied with it at the end of that process, he 
could refer it to the Constitutional Court. It was suggested that the Bill was probably 
heading for a Constitutional Court review regardless of the President's decision. If 
the court justices were to decide that the Bill was constitutional, the President would 
have to sign it; a decision civil society and opposition parties thought unlikely.  
 
Despite wide-reaching reforms to the Bill, there is consensus among civil society and 
opposition parties that the reforms have not gone far enough to ensure the Bill's 
constitutionality (Mail & Guardian, 25/4/2013). Murray Hunter, national coordinator of 
                                                 
29 Section 79 reads: “The President must either assent to and sign a Bill passed in terms of this 
Chapter or, if the President has reservations about the constitutionality of the Bill, refer it back to the 
National Assembly for reconsideration” (South Africa, 1996). 
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the Right2Know (R2K campaign), said while there was no guarantee of a win in the 
courts, he felt the organisation had a "moral obligation" to try. Nic Dawes, SANEF's 
chairperson and editor of the Mail & Guardian, said the Bill affected the basic rights 
of South Africans and the country would only benefit from "rigorously ensuring the 
Bill complies with constitutional precepts" (Mail & Guardian, 25/4/2013).   
 
R2K protesters picketed near the offices of the ANC in Johannesburg on 9 
September 2013 pleading with President Jacob Zuma not to sign the PSIB into law. 
They cited a lack of protection for whistleblowers as a sticking point (The New Age, 
10/9/13). On 13 September 2013, media reported that the President had 
“unexpectedly backtracked” by announcing that he had “serious reservations” about 
the constitutionality of the Bill and that he had referred it back to the National 
Assembly to be fixed. The President said sections 42 and 45 lacked meaning and 
coherence, consequently were irrational and, accordingly, were unconstitutional 
(Business Day, 13/9/13).  
 
ODAC executive director Mukelani Dimba said they supported the conclusion of the 
President that the Bill did not pass constitutional muster, but added that ODAC 
believed that the unconstitutionality and inappropriateness of the Bill extended 
beyond sections 42 and 45 and instad went to the underlying rationality and 
foundation of the Bill (Business Day, 13/9/13).  
 
SANEF chairman Mpumelelo Mkhabela also welcomed the President’s decision 
saying although the President cited only a few problematic clauses, this was merely 
an example and Parliament now had an opportunity to reconsider other clauses 
which may be unconstitutional (Sowetan, 13/9/13). The DA said that the sending 
back of the PSIB based on two rather technical objections did not cover the 
unconstitutional sections of the Bill and therefore the party’s objetions to the Bill 
stood (Beeld, 14/9/13).  
 
The Cape Argus (13/9/13) commented that putting the Bill back into political play 
was to be welcomed, but there might be cause for suspicion, considering the 
President’s narrow focus. The Sunday Independent (15/9/13) also cautioned that the 
President’s objections to the Bill were not necessarily the problematic sections that 
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could have a devastating effect on media freedom and citizens’ right to know. The 
Sunday Times (15/9/13) suggested that if there was a way that MPs could use the 
President’s limited referral to reopen a fundamental debate on the intentions of the 
Bill, they should seize it. Beeld (16/9/13) commented that the resistance to the 
unconstitutional attack on freedom of speech remained unchanged, despite the 
President’s decision. The Citizen (16/9/13) insisted that the redrafted Bill should be 
challenged in the Constitutional Court.  
 
3.3. Media Appeals Tribunal 
 
In most instances the matter of a MAT would be mentioned in one voice with the 
proposed legislation. A 2010 ANC discussion document explaining the idea of a MAT 
(ANC, 2010), argues in favour of “structured accountability” and having to give an 
account of one’s action, either directly to the public or via public authorities. This will 
often feed into, but is not necessarily connected to, “checked accountability, which 
means to be accountable in a sense of being liable to sanction if found to have acted 
in breach of some requirement or expectation attaching to the exercise of power”.  
 
The view is held that the creation of a MAT would “strengthen, complement and 
support” the current self-regulatory institutions (Press Ombudsman/Press Council) in 
the public interest (ANC, 2010). It is suggested that Parliament be seized with this 
matter to consider the desirability of MAT being a statutory independent institution, 
established through an open, public and transparent process and be made 
accountable to Parliament. Parliament should consider the mandate of the MAT and 
its powers to adjudicate over matters or complaints expressed by citizens against 
print media, in terms of decisions and rulings made by the existing self-regulatory 
institutions, in the same way as with broadcasting. 
 
 3.3.1. Public reaction 
 
The Mail & Guardian (28/1/2008) reported that the ANC's Polokwane conference30  
                                                 
30 The ANC held its 52nd National Conference at the University of Limpopo in Polokwane from 16 to 20 
December 2007. 
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fleshed out its proposal for a MAT “to keep journalists in check”. An ANC policy 
conference in June 2007, first raised the idea in a brief reference calling for an 
investigation into media self-regulation and the desirability of establishing a MAT. The 
proposed body had been given a name, the MAT; it would be statutory; answerable 
to Parliament; and seemed intent on acting as a channel for appeals against 
decisions by the Press Ombudsman. The resolution made these proposals after 
affirmation of support for media freedom – but defined this in a very particular way: 
“The right to freedom of expression should not be elevated above other equally 
important rights such as the right to privacy and, more important, rights and values 
such as human dignity” (ANC Today, 2010).   
 
The ANC insisted that it did not want to curtail press freedom with a proposed MAT, 
but warned that print media did not seem committed to transformation (Sowetan, 
11/1/2010). ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said the self-regulatory system of 
the press ombudsman did not allow for punitive measures against newspapers. He 
explained that a MAT would be similar to how broadcast media was regulated by 
ICASA (Mail & Guardian, 10/8/2010). He gave the assurance that the ANC was not 
prepared to limit the freedom the Constitution guaranteed the press. Mthembu said 
the ANC wanted an independent statutory body accountable to Parliament to deal 
with complaints against newspapers, instead of only using the press ombudsman 
who dealt with complaints.  
 
The media also reflected government’s position on the matter as the Beeld 
(12/8/2010) quoted the President saying media houses had to be regulated, because 
they sometimes tended to “go too far". In defence of the ANC's proposed MAT he 
said that "the media said the MAT would limit them and that they were the public 
guard dog, but they were never elected” (to this position). He argued that they had to 
be controlled, because they sometimes went “overboard about rights”.  
 
The President argued that the media could not be the only institution that understood 
rights: “The ANC understands the rights, because it fought for it." The Cape Argus 
(4/8/2010) also quoted him as saying the media had put itself on a pedestal and 
asked who was “guarding the guardian?” He asked if a guardian could be a proper 
guardian when it did not reflect the society it claimed to protect and represent. 
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The Argus Weekend (15/8/2010) commented that President Zuma's critique of the 
media was remarkable, not only in its deception regarding ANC motives, but in its 
fundamental lack of comprehension of what free speech and a free press really 
meant. The paper noted that the President questioned whether the media truly 
mirrored South Africans' lives and emphasised that the value of a free media lied in 
precisely the opposite: a multiplicity of competing viewpoints and voices and the 
freedom of readers and viewers to choose for themselves.  
 
Referring to the President’s suggestion that the ANC could not want to cover up 
wrongdoing on the part of the powerful, since it was the ANC itself that had driven 
corruption-busting, the paper recalled issues such as the arms deal saga31, the 
“Selebi scandal”32, the Mbeki-era33 “AIDS-denialism” and the “shabby demise of the 
Scorpions”34 to incline to a “decidedly different viewpoint” (Argus Weekend, 
15/8/2010). The paper suggested that in the absence of any commitment to 
strengthening the media and, instead, a single-minded focus on controlling it, the real 
motive for a MAT and the PIB could only be a desire to “tame the press”.  
 
The Sowetan (20/8/2010) quoted the South African Jewish Board of Deputies 
(SAJBD) saying they conceded that it was accepted that media freedom was not an 
absolute right, but one that should be exercised in a fair and responsible manner and 
that there was therefore a definite need for effective regulatory bodies to be in place 
to hold the media accountable where necessary.35 It warned, however, that it was 
vital that such bodies be independent entities. The SAJBD was concerned about the 
                                                 
31 The Strategic Defence Acquisition involved the purchase of billions of rands of weaponry by the 
South African Government. It has been subject to repeated allegations of corruption. 
32 Jackie Selebi, the former national commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and a 
former President of Interpol was charged, found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 15 years 
imprisonment in 2010. He was released on medical parole in 2012. 
33 Thabo Mbeki served as South African President from 1999 until September 2008. He made two 
statements based on research by so-called “dissident” HIV/AIDS scientists: that HIV does not 
necessarily cause AIDS; and that antiretrovirals (ARVs) are toxic. This would become the cornerstone 
of a much decried policy that denied important truths about HIV and AIDS. 
34 The government’s decision to disband the Scorpions and to incorporate the unit into the SAPS was 
interpreted as a reaction to the fact that they dared to charge high-profile members of the ANC and to 
prevent further prosecutions. 
35 The SAJBD's mission is to work for the improvement of human relations between Jews and all 
other peoples of South Africa, based on mutual respect, understanding and goodwill and to protect 
the civil liberties of South African Jews (SAJBD, 2013). 
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proposed MAT, because they anticipated the creation of a regulatory body that was 
not independent, but “beholden to the government of the day”.  
 
The SAPC announced a complete review of its constitution in the wake of criticism 
emerging in debate over the ANC’s planned MAT (Mail & Guardian, 23/8/2010). 
Commenting on the composition of the team to undertake the review, Press 
Ombudsman Joe Thloloe said they were dealing with a system of self-regulation, not 
regulation from outside. He explained that if any outside institution told editors what 
to put into the papers or not, it would be contrary to Section 16 of the Constitution 
and interfere with the freedom of the press.36 The team would review the SAPC’s 
constitution, the South African Press Code and complaints procedures. The 
constitution of the SAPC outlined its powers, its jurisdiction, its aims and objectives, 
and its membership. 
 
During a debate on the matter divergent opinions were expressed: 
 
• ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said the proposed MAT was receiving 
“overwhelming support” as the self-regulation of the media industry left “much 
to be desired”. 
• Press ombudsman Joe Thloloe said the media was not against an inquiry into 
the possibility of a statutory MAT, but they were against the fact that some 
members of the ANC had already implied it was “a done deal”. 
• SANEF media freedom committee chairperson Thabo Leshilo insisted there 
was overwhelming opposition to the MAT and more support for free speech. 
• The Head of the Wits School of Journalism Anton Harber said the media 
should be accountable to its peers, readers, public, the law and courts, but 
journalists could not be accountable to politicians.  
• CEO of the MDDA Lumko Mtimde said South Africans should be allowed to 
discuss the MAT and decide on it (Mail & Guardian, 24/8/2010). 
 
                                                 
36 Section 16 of the Constitution reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which 
includes (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or 
ideas; (e) freedom of artistic creativity; and  (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
(South Africa, 1996). 
113 
 
The Sunday Tribune (22/8/2010) reported that the US-based Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ) wrote a letter to President Zuma urging him to use his influence as 
head of state to prevent the establishment of the MAT in its present form. Four of the 
world’s largest news agencies added their voices to the opposition against the 
proposed MAT and PIB (Daily Maverick, 6/9/2010). Agence France Presse (AFP), 
Associate Press (AP), Bloomberg and Reuters wrote to President Zuma, expressing 
their concerns that a proposal for a MAT and the PIB could restrict their work and the 
work of other journalists. A MAT would undermine the media’s independence if it 
were to answer to Parliament or any arm of the government and it may not be in line 
with the freedom of expression enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
In Parliament, President Jacob Zuma said the proposed MAT was intended to 
"strengthen, complement and support” self-regulatory institutions (News24, 
8/9/2010). The President noted that the debate had resulted in a decision by the 
SAPC to review its constitution with a view to strengthening its self-regulatory 
mechanisms. Mario Oriani-Ambrosini, IFP MP, said the debate on press freedom 
should not even be opened, as the solution lay in the law against defamation.  
 
The ANC turned down an invitation to attend a “Big Media Debate” on media freedom 
hosted by the University of South Africa (Unisa) (News24, 12/10/2010). The ANC 
national spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said that the ANC would not participate in 
the debate until after Parliament had debated the MAT.  
 
The DA’s Lindiwe Mazibuko, said there were currently many areas where relief could 
be sought from bad journalism; Dr Pieter Mulder, leader of the Freedom Front Plus 
(FF+), described the proposed MAT as a “red light” for the country’s democracy 
(News24, 12/10/2010). A MAT could never be independent, because it would be 
appointed by the government. 
 
Speaking after a meeting between government and SANEF, South Africa’s Deputy 
President, Kgalema Motlanthe37, said the review of the media's self-regulatory 
mechanism, the Press Ombudsman, would influence whether there was a need for a 
                                                 
37 Kgalema Motlanthe served as South Africa’s third post-apartheid President from September 2008 
until April 2009. Since 2009, he has been South Africa’s Deputy President. 
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MAT: “If the process of reviewing the self-regulatory mechanisms produces 
mechanisms that can address the concerns about its shortcomings, we see no 
difficulty in accepting that right product.” (iol, 16/10/2010).  
 
iol (16/10/2010) quoted press ombudsman Joe Thloloe telling a University of Pretoria 
(UP) debate on media freedom that the ANC had got the print media in its sights, 
because it was the one section of the media not under its control.  
 
Regarding the MAT issue, the Beeld (10/1/2011) quoted a member of the ANC’s 
Communication Committee as saying that the ANC was encouraged by the 
transformation in the office of the Press Ombudsman, though this did not mean that 
the party would let go of its plans to refer the MAT to Parliament for investigation. It 
was speculated that referral to Parliament may be an honourable way to make the 
MAT disappear, quoting an “informed” ANC member saying: “Then we can say we 
followed the constitutional route and it did not work, without being embarrassed.”  
 
The Mail & Guardian (31/12012) also reported on submissions made to the Press 
Freedom Commission. The ANC still believed “independent regulation” was the way 
to go when it came to the continuing debate over press regulation, arguing that self-
regulatory efforts were undermined by vested interests (Mail & Guardian,  31/1/2012). 
However, on the second day of the Press Freedom Commission hearings, 
newspaper editors sounded a strong warning about the consequences of being seen 
to regulate the press (Mail & Guardian, 1/2/2012). 
 
4. Institutional framework 
 
There are a number of institutions dealing with government communications and the 
South African brand. These include GCIS, the IMC and DIRCO.  
 
4.1 Government Communication and Information System 
 
The purpose of GCIS is government communication that informs citizens to 
participate in democracy and to lead government communication through submitting 
a National Communication Strategy (NSC) to Cabinet ensuring coherent messages, 
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as well as open and extended channels of communication between government and 
the people, towards a shared vision. GCIS provides communication and information 
services to the domestic and foreign media to improve their knowledge of 
government-related issues (GCIS, 2010).  
 
4.2 International Marketing Council  
 
The IMC (2010) was established in August 2002 to help create a positive and 
compelling brand image for South Africa. At that time, the world was unsure about 
what to think of South Africa, with many different messages being sent out by 
various sources. This did very little to build the country’s brand and it was evident 
that to attract tourism and investment, there was a need to co-ordinate marketing 
initiatives to make them more effective.  
 
This led to the creation of the IMC, whose main objective is the marketing of South 
Africa through the BrandSA campaign. There are many benefits to having a 
consolidated brand image, with the most important being that a consistent BrandSA 
message creates strategic advantages in terms of trade and tourism for the country 
in an increasingly competitive marketplace (IMC, 2010). The primary objective of the 
IMC is to develop and implement a pro-active marketing and communication strategy 
for South Africa and to promote South Africa. The original BrandSA slogan “Alive 
with Possibility!” was replaced with “Inspiring new ways!” (BrandSA, 2011b).  
 
Regarding international relations, the GCIS MTSF (GCIS, 2009) states that it leads 
the international marketing of the country and provides overall guidance, ensuring 
that the country is marketed abroad through the IMC. It guides the IMC in the 
development of the country brand in line with government’s vision, and builds 
consensus among key stakeholders in support of the country’s marketing initiative. 
The NSC, which would probably encompass GCIS’ media policy, is a classified 
document.  
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4.3. Department of Foreign Affairs/Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation relations with the media 
 
Regarding South Africa’s foreign policy and the media, the DFA’s 2008 Discussion 
Document both recognises a role for the media, but also puts limits to this:  
 
South Africa is a democratic country and the formulation of foreign policy 
should be an open and transparent process. However, South African actions 
must be in keeping with international practice, including the need for 
appropriate confidentiality. Diplomacy is by its very nature ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
and not diplomacy through the media (DFA, 2008).  
 
The document also quotes an observation by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Alfred Nzo38, in Parliament on 8 August 1994:  
 
Without international interaction such as trade, scientific and technological 
exchange and cultural exchange, South Africans and South Africa would be 
much the poorer. In this regard the DFA, universities, institutes and the media 
have a particular responsibility to stimulate a debate on our international 
relations, to inform the public and involve the people of South Africa in the 
promotion of our international relations (DFA, 1994).  
 
A subdivision of DIRCO, the Public Diplomacy Unit (PDU), later upgraded to a full 
branch, focuses specifically on developing South Africa’s reputation both at home 
and internationally (DFA, 2008). Effective media relations and management 
represent an integral part of any public diplomacy programme and South Africa has 
embraced the media as a platform for dialogue and the projection of a positive 
national image. To this end, a number of agencies are employed, serving as 
subdivisions of the PDU, whose mandate is specifically tailored to deal with media-
related issues and opportunities. 
 
                                                 
38 Alfred Nzo served as South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1994 until 1999. 
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The CPD (2010) discusses South Africa’s public diplomacy programme, noting that 
effective media relations and management represent an integral part of any such 
programme. It is noted that South Africa has embraced the media as a platform for 
dialogue and the projection of a positive national image.  
 
A 24-hour operations centre gathers international news reports around the clock 
(CPD, 2010), serving both as an early warning system for major international crises 
or developments and as a constant gauge of South Africa’s standing in the world. 
Supplementing the 24-hour Operations Centre, the International News Scan 
regularly provides updates on political, diplomatic and economic developments, 
monitors the opinions of world leaders and tracks developments in major 
International Organisations such as the UN, the African Union (AU) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).  
 
Particular attention is paid to coverage of South Africa’s DIRCO as a broad measure 
of local and foreign public opinion (DFA, 2006). The information compiled by these 
news-analysis units is ultimately communicated to top-level South African officials 
around the world so that they will be prepared to deliver timely and appropriate 
responses to international developments as they occur. 
 
In addition to news gathering and analysis, the PDU also provides speechwriting 
services, assisting officials to present a positive image at media events (DFA, 2006). 
The department’s Media Liaison Unit also organises frequent press conferences and 
media briefings to inform the nation and the world at large about South Africa’s 
endeavours internationally, and to enhance the country’s stature internationally. The 
PDU furthermore emphasises the use of non-traditional media, specifically by 
intensifying the application of the Internet as a public diplomacy tool.  
 
5. Regulatory framework 
 
The South African media operates in a particular regulatory framework governed by 
legislation and self-regulation; it is subject to certain standards and protocols, and 
owing to its membership of certain bodies, acts according to the guidelines set by 
these.  This regulatory framework includes the Constitution, which guarantees media 
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freedom, and more specific legislation which all have a bearing on the activities of 
the different media. 
 
5.1. Statutory bodies 
 
The media in South Africa also operate within the scope of a number of statutory 
bodies that influence their activities.  
 
5.1.1. The Media Development and Diversity Agency 
 
The MDDA was established in 2003 as an independent, statutory body whose 
functions are to redresses the exclusion and marginalisation of disadvantaged 
people from access to the media and the media industry; and to promote media 
development and diversity by providing funding and other support to community, as 
well as to small commercial media (MDDA, 2012). 
 
5.1.2. Independent Communications Authority of South Africa  
 
ICASA was established as a merger of the telecommunications regulator, the South 
African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA). ICASA is responsible for regulating the 
telecommunications, broadcasting and postal industries in the public interest, and 
ensuring affordable services of a high quality for all South Africans (ICASA, 2012).   
 
ICASA also issues licenses to telecommunications and broadcasting service 
providers, enforces compliance with rules and regulations, protects consumers from 
unfair business practices and poor quality services, hears and decides on disputes 
and complaints brought against licensees, and controls and manages the effective 
use of the radio frequency spectrum. ICASA is a Chapter 9 institution in terms of the 
South African Constitution and is a portfolio organisation of the Department of 
Communications (ICASA, 2012).  
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5.2. Self-regulatory bodies in the media 
 
The following institutions fulfill “self-regulatory” functions within the media 
environment in South Africa. 
 
5.2.1. The Press Council, Press Ombudsmen and Appeal Panel 
 
The SAPC, the Ombudsman and the Appeals Panel are self-regulatory mechanisms 
set up by the print media to provide what they call “impartial, expeditious and cost-
effective adjudication” to settle disputes between newspapers and magazines, on the 
one hand, and members of the public, on the other, over the editorial content of 
publications. The mechanism is based on two pillars, namely freedom of expression, 
including freedom of the press; and excellence in journalistic practice and ethics 
(SAPC, 2012).   
 
The Council has adopted the South African Press Code to guide journalists in their 
daily practice of gathering and distributing news and opinion, and to guide the 
Ombudsman and the Appeals Panel to reach decisions on complaints from the 
public. More than 640 publications, mainly members of Print Media South Africa, 
subscribe to the Code (SAPC, 2012). 
 
5.2.2. Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa 
 
In order to promote freedom of speech, the free flow of information and the 
maintenance of high standards of broadcasting in South Africa, the National 
Association of Broadcasters of South and Southern Africa (NAB) established a 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) in 1993.   
 
The BCCSA was recognised by the Independent Broadcasting Authority in 1995.  
The objects of the BCCSA are to ensure adherence to high standards in 
broadcasting and to achieve a speedy and cost-effective settlement of complaints 
against full members of NAB who have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of 
the BCCSA and its Code of Conduct (BCCSA, undated). 
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5.3. International standards 
  
South Africa is one of the founding members of the United Nations (UN). The 
Preamble to the UN Declaration of Human Rights indicates that the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from 
fear and want, has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.  
Article 19 states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.  
This right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (UN, 
undated). 
 
5.4. Independent media organisations/structures  
 
There are a number of independent organised media structures operating in South 
Africa.   
 
5.4.1. The South African National Editors’ Forum 
 
SANEF is a non-profit organisation whose members are editors, senior journalists 
and journalism trainers from all areas of the South African media. They played an 
active role in promoting a climate of free expression and transparency in a 
democratic South Africa and subscribe to the constitutional principles of freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press.   
 
SANEF’s chief aim is to be a representative and credible voice of journalism in 
society, to facilitate diversity in newsrooms and reporting, enable a culture of real 
debate and promote free and independent journalism of the highest standard. 
SANEF also defends media freedom and campaigns for the elimination of legislation 
and commercial pressures that restrict media. SANEF’s vision is to promote the 
quality and ethics of journalism, to reflect the diversity of South Africa, and to 
champion freedom of expression (SANEF, 2012). 
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5.4.2. Print and Digital Media South Africa 
 
The purpose of Print Media South Africa (PMSA) was to represent, promote, 
express, interact and intervene in all matters concerning the collective industry and 
matters of common interest to members. Representing over 700 newspaper and 
magazine titles in South Africa, PMSA was organised into three specific, focused 
operating bodies which addresses the specific needs of the respective industry 
sectors, including newspapers, magazines and publishers (PMSA, 2012).  
 
Print and Digital Media South Africa (PDMDA) is an umbrella body incorporating print 
and digital media. The PDMSA is a natural progression from the long-established 
PMSA and illustrates a commitment as an interactive organisation to keeping pace 
with the fast-changing media world. An evolving and vibrant association, its express 
purpose is to represent and promote all aspects concerning the industry and its 
members (PDMSA, 2013).     
 
5.4.3.  National Association of Broadcasters  
 
The formation of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) coincided with 
South Africa’s democratisation and the “freeing of the airwaves”, which entailed the 
restructuring of the state monopoly in broadcasting into a broadcasting dispensation 
offering choice in services, content and ownership (NAB, 2012). The NAB is a non-
profit organisation funded entirely by its members.   
 
Over 80 organisations belong to the NAB and hundreds of individuals working in 
broadcasting and associated industries involve themselves in their activities. They 
exist to represent the interests of South African broadcasting and work to promote a 
broadcasting system that provides choice and diversity for audiences; a favourable 
climate for broadcasters to operate within; and a broadcasting industry grounded in 
the principles of democracy, diversity and freedom of expression (NAB, 2012). 
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5.4.4. Freedom of Expression Institute 
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) was established in 1994 to protect and 
foster the rights to freedom of expression and access to information, and to oppose 
censorship (FXI, 2012). The FXI undertakes a wide range of activities in support of 
these objectives, including lobbying, education, monitoring, research, publicity and 
litigation and the funding of legal cases that advance these rights.   
 
The FXI is voluntary, non-governmental and a member of the International Freedom 
of Expression eXchange (IFEX), which monitors freedom of the media and freedom 
of expression on a global scale.  Through the IFEX Action Alert system, FXI 
publicises freedom of expression violations in South Africa and draws in other 
organisations to support its campaigns (FXI, 2012).   
 
5.5. Organisations representing community media 
 
The National Community Radio Forum (NCRF) was formed in 1993 to lobby for the 
diversification of the airwaves in South Africa and to foster a dynamic broadcasting 
environment through the establishment of community radio stations (NCRF, 2012). 
The NCRF has about 120 community radio station projects in its membership, with 
about 75 of the stations on air and others waiting to be licensed by ICASA. 
Community radio collectively is now the third largest broadcaster nationally with 
almost five million listeners in the deepest rural areas of the country, covering all 
provinces.  
 
The NCRF identified as a key objective, the forging of greater unity of purpose 
among South Africa’s community radio stations, as well as strengthening the sectors’ 
natural partnership with civil society in deepening democracy.  The mission of the 
NCRF is to build a vibrant and sustainable community media sector in Southern 
Africa. Its vision is to advocate and lobby on behalf of their members various 
stakeholders to advance participatory democracy towards sustainable social 
development in communities (NCRF, 2012). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
There are a number of institutions dealing with government communications and 
promoting the South African brand. The GCIS provides guidance to government with 
regard to communication. Regarding South Africa’s international image, the IMC 
helps to create a positive and compelling brand for South Africa. The Public 
Diplomacy Branch focuses on developing South Africa’s reputation both at home and 
internationally. South Africa has embraced the media as a platform for dialogue and 
the projection of a positive national image.  
 
The South African media operates in a particular regulatory framework governed by 
legislation and self-regulation; it is subject to certain standards and protocols, and 
due to its membership of certain bodies, acts according to the guidelines set by 
these.  This regulatory framework includes the Constitution, which guarantees media 
freedom and more specific legislation which all have a bearing on the activities of the 
different media.  
 
The media in South Africa also operate within the scope of a number of statutory 
bodies that have an influence on their activities. A number of institutions also fulfill 
“self-regulatory” functions within the media environment in South Africa. 
 
The proposed PSIB and plans for a MAT have severely dented the relationship 
between the government and the media. Civil society, business and even foreign 
media mobilised around the local media in opposition to government’s legislative 
intentions. The prevailing consensus seemed to be that government was intent on 
using the proposed legislation to prevent the media from exposing corruption and 
poor governance in its ranks.   
 
Government eventually relented and a number of successive changes to the 
proposed legislation followed. However, the matter of the absence of a public 
interest defence clause, which would protect anyone who released or published 
classified information in the public interest, meant the legislation seemed destined 
for a Constitutional Court challenge, where critics hoped it would be “thrown out”.  
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The proposed statutory MAT further complicated the relationship between 
government and the media. In the wake of the debate about it the SAPC announced 
a complete review of its constitution. The objection to the MAT was that if any 
outside institution told editors what to publish or not, it would interfere with the 
freedom of the press. Though the Deputy President said the review of the Press 
Ombudsman would influence whether there was a need for a MAT, the ANC insisted 
“independent regulation” was the way to go, arguing that self-regulatory efforts were 
undermined by vested interests. 
 
It is clear that external and internal media regulation can be distinguished regarding 
media policy (Fourie, 2008: xxii). External regulation refers to the laws and 
regulations applied to the media and communications sector and are legally enforced 
by statutory regulatory institutions such as ICASA. The purpose is to formally direct 
media ownership and to protect society against possible harmful influences.  
 
Internal regulation includes the rule and codes of conduct formulated by the media 
and communications industry itself, for itself and applied to itself by organisations 
such as the Press Ombudsman. The purpose is to achieve and maintain a high level 
of professionalism and ethical conduct, and to adhere to the rules of external 
regulation. 
 
The next chapter considers South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy and 
diplomacy.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOUTH AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since 1994, the conduct of South African diplomacy changed. Whereas it was 
previously a case study of "pariah diplomacy", it has now become more conventional 
(Muller, 1998). South Africa is still adapting to an ever-changing regional, continental 
and global environment, against the background of the historic situation and of the 
evolution of diplomacy world-wide.  
 
There is a particularly sharp contrast between pre-political transition and post-
political transition in South African diplomacy. Firstly, the ‘old’ South African 
diplomacy had been secret and low-key, whereas the ‘new’ is characterised by 
summitry and a powerful role for the head of state (Muller, 1998).   
 
Secondly, the ‘old’ had particular difficulties in Africa and Southern Africa and 
interaction with the region was often characterised by the use of force, whereas the 
‘new’ has a strong regional focus. In the third instance, the ‘old’ was primarily 
bilateral, whereas the ‘new’ has a very strong emphasis on the multilateral (Muller, 
1998).  
 
Finally, the ‘new’ South African diplomacy was heralded by a rapid extension of 
formal relations and representation abroad for a country which had formerly been the 
most isolated in modern times (Muller, 1998).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy 
principles, priorities, actors and pillars. It also studies South Africa’s diplomatic 
institutions and practice. In addition, South Africa’s public diplomacy institutions and 
activities are investigated, including nation branding.  
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2. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy principles 
 
During September 1995, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo spelt out 
South Africa's foreign policy principles at a Heads of Mission Conference in Pretoria 
(DFA, 2008).39 He stated that the underlying principles which serve as guidelines in 
the conduct of South Africa’s relations, include a commitment to the promotion of 
human rights; the promotion of democracy; justice and international law in the 
conduct of relations between nations; international peace and internationally agreed-
upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts; the interests of Africa in world 
affairs; and economic development through regional and international cooperation in 
an interdependent world (DFA, 2008).  
 
Holsti (1977: 144-151) distinguishes between “categories” of foreign policy 
objectives, such as core values and interests, to which all governments and nations 
commit their very existence; middle-range goals, which normally impose demands 
on other states; and universal long-range goals. These are: 
 
• Core values and interests are those goals for which most people are willing to 
make ultimate sacrifices. They are stated in the form of basic principles of foreign 
policy and are more frequently related to the self-preservation of the state. They 
are short-range objectives, as other goals cannot be achieved unless the states 
pursuing them maintain their own existence.  
• Middle-range objectives are divided into three further types: The first include 
attempts of governments to meet economic betterment demands through 
international action; the second is to increase a state’s prestige in the system 
through diplomatic ceremonial and military capability displays; and the third 
include forms of self-extension to seek access that cannot be achieved through 
diplomacy or trade.  
• Long-range goals are the plans concerning the ultimate political or ideological 
organisation of the international system.  
 
 
                                                 
39 The DFA and DIRCO distinguish between principles, objectives and elements of foreign policy 
without defining these concepts. 
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According to DIRCO (2011b), its strategic objectives are to, through bilateral and 
multilateral interactions, protect and promote South African national interests and 
values; conduct and coordinate South Africa’s international relations and promote its 
international relations policy objectives; monitor international developments and 
advise government on international relations policy and related domestic matters; 
protect South Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; contribute to the 
formulation of international law, and enhance respect for the provisions thereof; 
promote multilateralism to secure a rules-based international system; maintain a 
modern, effective and excellence driven department; provide consular services to 
South African nationals abroad; and provide a world-class and uniquely South 
African state protocol service. 
 
These objectives are pursued in support of these foreign policy principles, namely 
the promotion of human rights; the promotion of democracy; justice and international 
law in the conduct of relations between nations; international peace and 
internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for conflict resolution; the interests of Africa 
in world affairs; and economic development through regional and international 
cooperation in an interdependent world (DFA, 2005). 
 
DIRCO has a “vision” of a prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist 
and united African continent which contributes to a just and equitable world (DIRCO, 
2011b). Its mission statement commits the department to promoting South Africa's 
national interests and values, as well as the African renaissance and the creation of 
a better world for all. 
 
3. Elements of South Africa’s foreign policy 
 
In the above-mentioned 2008 Discussion Document of the DFA (2008b), the 
characteristics and crucial elements of South Africa's foreign policy and international 
relations were summarised as:  
 
• South Africa must consistently endeavour to pursue a coherent foreign policy, 
which includes economic, security and political components. 
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• The approach should be preventive diplomacy and pro-active initiatives, rather 
than reaction to events. A monitoring network with African partners is essential. 
• South Africa should assume a leadership role in Africa in all those areas where a 
constructive contribution could be made without politically antagonising the 
country's African partners. 
• Government should continue to pursue a non-aligned approach, with due regard 
for the SADC, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)40, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM)41 and other membership commitments. 
• Diplomacy of bridge-building between the "North" and the "South" should be 
pursued. 
• In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interests regarding 
the major global issues, such as respect for human rights, democracy, global 
peace, security and the protection of the environment. 
• South Africa should constantly endeavour to positively influence and change the 
direction of events and developments internationally, to the extent that they affect 
South Africa. 
• Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, namely 
to promote the well-being of the country and its citizens. 
 
In addition to the principles discussed before, more practical issues are emphasised, 
such as reactive diplomacy; a leadership role in Africa; a continued non-aligned 
approach; bridge-building between the "North" and the "South"; and diplomatic 
relations promoting the well-being of the country and its citizens (DFA, 2008b).  
 
4. South Africa’s foreign policy priorities 
 
In its Budgetary Review for 2010, DIRCO (2010) noted that the following had been 
identified as areas where a change of emphasis was envisaged in policy priorities: 
 
                                                 
40 The OAU was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, on signature of the OAU Charter by 
representatives of 32 governments. A further 21 states have joined gradually over the years, with 
South Africa becoming the 53rd member on 23 May 1994 (DAF, 2013). 
41 NAM is a movement of 115 members representing the interests and priorities of developing 
countries. The movement has its origin in the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 
1955 (NAM, 2001). 
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• How to adjust South Africa’s expression of national interest; 
• How to ensure that foreign policy is rooted in domestic priorities and that the 
South African public is brought on board in order to support the department in 
its work; and 
• How to make sure that the private sector supports the objectives of South 
Africa’s foreign policy. 
 
The emphasis here is on the way forward and the focus seems to shift to get buy-in 
from the local audience. We find a mention of “the national interest”, and how foreign 
policy is entrenched in domestic priorities.  
 
5. South African foreign policy actors 
 
Foreign policy concerns the internal and external spheres of state interaction 
(Tjemolane 2011: 61-63). It involves domestic issues and institutions of the state 
directly or indirectly, as well as foreign matters on which decisions are based. South 
Africa’s foreign policy, although formulated at national level, also emphasises the 
government’s commitment to the region and the continent. Foreign policymaking is a 
complex process of interaction between many actors. Politicians are often the 
dominant decision-makers, thus overwhelming non-state actors such as civil society. 
Participating state-actors vary from state to state, with different roles and titles.  
 
5.1. The President 
 
Most heads of government are involved in foreign policy formulation and 
implementation and spend a great deal of their time on it (Hill, 2003: 53). This is also 
true in South Africa, where the President is both the head of government and state 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 63). The Constitution explains the role and functions of the 
President. The President is the head of state and head of the national executive. He 
must uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
Republic, and promote the unity of the nation and that which will advance the 
Republic.  
 
130 
 
Regarding his power and functions, he receives and recognises foreign diplomatic 
and consular representatives; and appoints ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and 
diplomatic and consular representatives in South Africa (South Africa, 1996). The 
President is the most powerful actor in foreign policymaking. Foreign policy powers 
are also vested in the hands of the Deputy President and a limited group of ministers 
or departments.  
 
Former President Nelson Mandela, owing to his personality and international 
standing, was prominent in foreign policy issues (Tjomelane, 2011: 63-65). Nelson 
Mandela became the “brand-name” utilised to sell South Africa in the international 
sphere. However, his profile reached the extent where the international community’s 
expectations on South Africa could not be fulfilled.  
 
Former President Mbeki had very good and influential diplomatic skills (Tjomelane, 
2011: 65-66). His achievements include a reconfiguration of South Africa’s relations 
with the US, the EU and the South, especially the African continent. He was actively 
involved in the development of the concept of the African Renaissance and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).42 He called for multilateralism in 
resolving regional conflicts and sent additional peacekeepers abroad. He also played 
a significant role in the NAM, the AU and the UN. 
 
President Zuma has appointed special foreign policy advisers to assist in certain 
areas of intense South African involvement. In October 2010, he appointed his 
political adviser, Charles Nqakula, as his special envoy to the Sudan (GCIS, 2011: 
314). South Africa is also playing an important mediation and facilitation role in 
Zimbabwe (GCIS, 2011: 307). Lindiwe Sisulu has been involved in the mediation 
process in Zimbabwe, but has also made pronouncements on the political situation 
in Swaziland.  
 
Against the backdrop of the current South African system of governance, a president 
can have superior influence on foreign policy. 
 
                                                 
42 NEPAD is the planning and coordinating technical body of the AU, aimed at eradicating poverty and 
creating sustainable growth (NEPAD, 2012). 
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5.2. Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
 
The international relations ministry is often the primary foreign policy planner 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 66). Unlike foreign policy that is somewhat “continuous”, foreign 
ministers change from government to government and from term to term. The 
international relations ministry does not exercise policymaking and execution 
separate from other government bodies. It is obliged to inform other cabinet 
members of foreign policy issues.  
 
Any international relations ministry must perform the following basic functions: 
 
• Routine information-gathering: The foreign ministry often relies on its 
diplomats who accumulate and analyse information about other countries. 
Diplomats perform information-gathering duties with intelligence services and, 
to a limited degree, the media. 
• Policymaking: Although politicians are responsible for foreign policymaking 
with the assistance of political parties, they need professional help from 
experts in the foreign ministry. It may be a daunting task for the minister in 
DIRCO to scrutinise incoming data, interpret and forecast other states’ actions 
and participate in foreign policymaking, all outside the advice of experts. 
• Memory: Within the foreign ministry, diplomats play a crucial role of record 
keeping. It is important to archive information on a state’s commitments and 
treaties into a system for future reference, especially for foreign policymaking 
(Hill, 2003: 77-78).  
 
The new democratic department was confronted with multiple intra-departmental 
challenges, including: 
• Racial composition: At the dawn of the post-1994 era, DIRCO was largely 
racially dominated by white staff. The fundamental challenge was to try to 
attain ethnic equilibrium in the department. 
• Gender issues: Male personnel outnumbered their women counterparts. By 
2009, DIRCO staff members stood at 1 083 males and 1 270 females, clearly 
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showing transformation, since women staff members now outnumber the 
male members.  
• Ideological affiliation: The department was divided into two camps, namely 
neo-mercantilist “holdover” diplomats who had a firm belief in the significance 
of trade and self-interest versus internationalist former political activists who 
had returned from exile believing in solidarity with the collective problems of 
the developing world. The challenge was to do away with ideological 
differences in the department. 
• Departmental leadership and policy coordination: Minister Alfred Nzo was 
accused of being unable to make firm decisions regarding policymaking and 
departmental transformation (Alden & Le Pere, 2004: 285). This resulted in 
poor policy coordination. There was some “hostility” between DIRCO and its 
portfolio committee, with the committee expressing dissatisfaction that it was 
shut out of foreign policy processes (Tjomelane, 2011: 68-69). 
 
The DIRCO minister is supposed to be a principal figure in foreign policy decision-
making, but primary decision-making powers are vested in the hands of the 
President (Tjomelane, 2011: 68-69). 
 
Since the inception of the modern state system, international law (the law between 
states and between states and international organisations) has been one of the 
mechanisms with which states attempted to establish and keep international peace 
and order (DIRCO, undated).  
 
Contemporary international challenges to governments like population flows and 
refugee problems (often resulting from gross human rights violations or conflicts and 
civil wars within the borders of states), fatal diseases, environmental threats and 
organised crime, can only be addressed by inter-governmental cooperation and 
regime creation, processes that need to be embedded in international law. These 
developments necessitate the involvement of a legal advisor trained in international 
law in the formulation and conduct of a state’s diplomacy (DIRCO, undated).  
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The State Law Advisors specialising in International Law are situated in the Office of 
the Chief State Law Advisor, located within the DIRCO (DIRCO, undated). The office 
consists of two components, namely the State Law Advisors and the South African 
Treaty Section that are at the disposal of clients.  
 
The office provides legal advice and inputs to the South African Government as a 
whole on International Law to ensure that international agreements are not in conflict 
with International Law and South Africa’s international obligations; legal advice and 
inputs to DIRCO and all missions abroad to ensure that within the domestic context, 
in particular in respect of departmental matters, including policy, DIRCO acts in 
conformity with South African law; and a Treaty and Information Service, the central 
record-keeping authority and custodian of all international agreements South Africa 
is a party to, and an effective information service specialising in domestic and 
International Law (DIRCO, undated).  
 
Legal advice is provided in respect of all questions relating to International Law on 
request to clients; and on questions relating to South African law, particularly private 
law, including law of contract, labour law and administrative law (DIRCO, undated: 
4). 
 
5.3. Department of Trade and Industry  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has been considered the “chief 
steward” of South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade and investment relations 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 72-73). The difference between foreign and trade policy is small. 
Many trade policies concluded by the DTI inevitably affect South Africa’s foreign 
policy in general.  
 
Notable trade policy actors within the DTI include the International Trade and 
Economic Development Division (ITED) (primary negotiator); the International Trade 
Administration Commission (ITAC) (trade policy administrator); and Trade and 
Investment South Africa (export and investment promoter) (Tjomelane, 2011: 73).  
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These deal with matters related to South Africa’s economic development, exports 
and diversification and industrialisation strategy.  
 
The DTI succeeded in bargaining the free trade agreement with the EU (Tjomelane, 
2011: 73). Consequently, it occupies an increasingly high profile in the WTO. The 
department envisions a "dynamic industrial, globally competitive South African 
economy, characterised by inclusive growth and development, decent employment 
and equity, built on the full potential of all citizens" (DTI, undated).  
 
The DTI also plays a role in South Africa’s foreign policy processes particularly on 
trade-related issues (Tjomelane, 2011: 73-74). South Africa’s economic relations 
with African countries are “impressive”. These partnerships are sustained through 
the countries’ banking, hotel, mining, retail, telecommunications, tourist, production 
and services industries, all operating under the auspices of the DTI.  
 
The DTI is also in the process of developing a free trade protocol in the SADC region 
and reforming the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).43 South Africa has 
however been accused by its African trade partners of being a self-interested 
dominant economic actor and an aspiring hegemon due to an outrageous number of 
its businesses (such as Vodacom, MTN and Shoprite) invading African countries’ 
markets and unbalanced trade patterns skewed in favour of South Africa (Tjomelane, 
2011: 73-74). 
 
5.4. Department of Defence  
 
The Department of Defence (DOD) is a prominent role-player in South Africa’s 
foreign policy (Tjomelane, 2011: 73-74). Although often linked with the aggressive 
employment of armed force in war zones, military instruments also incorporate 
warless military methods (military aid and assistance, military intervention, military 
deployment in peacekeeping missions and military threats) executed abroad. Under 
                                                 
43 SACU consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The SACU Secretariat 
is located in Windhoek, Namibia. SACU was established in 1910, making it the world’s oldest 
Customs Union  (SACU, 2007).  
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the umbrella of the DOD there is also the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF). It is a foreign policy instrument and participates more in foreign policy 
implementation than formulation. 
 
Other departments that have variable impacts on foreign policy-making include the 
departments of Health; Home Affairs; Finance; Justice; and Sports and Recreation 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 77). African international actors such as the SADC, the AU and 
even individual countries also influence South Africa’s foreign policy. 
 
5.5. Parliament 
 
The Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (PCIRCO) 
integrates Parliament into the foreign policy-making process (Tjomelane, 2011: 77-
78). Where Parliament is inferior to a national constitution, concrete parliamentary 
participation in international issues, such as foreign policy implementation is usually 
not strong. Parliamentary and public contributions have had little influence on foreign 
policy execution.  
 
In South Africa, regarding its role in foreign policy-making, Parliament has 
complained that its input is almost always marginalised. This has made it difficult for 
the portfolio committee to fulfil its purpose. Its role in foreign policy is mainly at the 
formulation stage in a form of debates among committee members (Tjomelane, 
2011: 77-78). 
 
5.6. Civil society 
 
In the context of influencing foreign policy, civil society refers to any non-state actor 
within a “society” including academia, businesses, labour unions, private media and 
voluntary organisations (Tjomelane, 2011: 79). Such actors include research 
institutions such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).  
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The print media such as The Star and the Business Day; and electronic media, such 
as SABC3 and the e-News Channel, also regularly carry articles and discussions on 
issues pertaining to South Africa’s foreign policy or foreign policy context.  
 
These actors can make substantial foreign policy inputs through research 
publications, seminars, and interaction with and reporting on relevant role-players 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 79-80). Although civil society does not decide on policies, it exerts 
influence on foreign policy formulators and implementers or endeavours to do so. 
Civil society often represents the views of and informs the masses, cooperates with 
or denounces government actions on policies embarked on.  
 
Civil society is, however, largely placed on the periphery of foreign policy-making 
(Tjomelane, 2011: 80). Although many observers perceive that civil society “should” 
prominently be party to foreign policy-making, there has not been regular and 
consistent involvement of civil society in this regard. This is indicative of what has 
been seen as a lack of transparency and openness in South Africa’s foreign policy, 
which is contrary to what the post-1994 democratic government pledged.  
 
It is clear that within the context of the South African foreign policy process, a wide 
range of actors are involved. The president as the head of government is the primary 
figure that undertakes foreign-policy decisions and implementation. However, the 
president is not the only actor involved in the process, as other government 
departments also contribute to the process.  
 
DIRCO plays a critical part in foreign policy formulation and implementation through 
diplomacy. Trade policies concluded by the DTI affect South Africa’s foreign policy. 
The DOD is also involved in foreign policy decision-making, with the SANDF being 
more involved in foreign policy implementation than formulation. The PCIRCO 
supports DIRCO on foreign affairs issues in Parliament. Civil society’s contribution to 
foreign policymaking is evident through actors such as academia and NGOs.  
 
6. Pillars of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy 
 
In October 2011, President Zuma explained that South Africa's foreign policy was  
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guided by four pillars, namely the African agenda; South-South cooperation; North-
South dialogue; multilateral and economic diplomacy; and bilateral relations with 
individual countries (South Africa.info, 2011).  
 
In reality, there will always be an overlap between these items (SAIIA, 2008). 
Consider in particular the relevance of a South-South consensus on participation in 
the global system of governance. 
 
6.1. Consolidation of the African agenda 
 
In its Annual Report 2008-09, the then DFA (2009) reiterated that the consolidation 
of the so-called “African Agenda” remained the principal focus of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. By consolidating the African Agenda, policy makers intend to foster 
the process of peaceful and secure change in Africa to achieve wealth for the whole 
continent (Pretz, 2008: 8). This included an improved initiative for the AU; a deeper 
integration in Africa through SADC; SACU and NEPAD, for a peaceful and safe life 
for all.  
 
Shaping the content and nature of public discourse on the African Agenda is a basic 
element in South Africa’s approach towards the continent (Fakir, 2007: 3). The 
notion of the African Agenda is fairly broad in its meaning and seems to entail a 
combination of themes and issues of concern to the political leadership of the 
continent. At one level it seems to signify general debates on processes to promote 
African democracy and governance and the challenges these face. At another level, 
it appears to represent South Africa’s own key challenges to shape a leading role 
and advance its own strategic interests on the continent.  
 
Thus, South Africa’s African Agenda serves the role of setting out a continental 
agenda, as evidenced by the vigorous participation in and support of various 
collective activities and programmes on the continent (Fakir, 2007: 3). A less 
obvious, but potentially important role is to conceal the fact that the country seeks to 
promote its own long-term interests on the continent – among others the 
strengthening of the country’s position within the continent. It is important to 
understand this multiple role of the African Agenda to appreciate its strategic benefit. 
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One of the strategic goals of the African Agenda is the search for peace and 
security, as well as socio-political and economic stability in Africa (Fakir, 2007: 3). 
This rests on five key premises, namely peace, security and stability through the AU; 
development through NEPAD; effective governance through mechanisms such as 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM);44 cooperation through international 
partnership pacts; and regional economic communities (RECs) - or sub-regional 
bodies - as the building blocks for a continental institutional order. 
 
The partnership strategy is an integral part of South Africa’s African Agenda and is 
especially critical in two ways. Firstly, it serves to construct a basis for enlisting the 
support of prospective foreign investors who could provide much-needed financial, 
technical and other assistance for the Agenda and its programmes of action. This 
assistance has the potential to serve as an incentive to African countries to pursue 
the necessary reforms and other programmes (Fakir, 2007: 4-5). 
 
Secondly, the creation of partnerships with key states in various parts of the 
continent is vital in ensuring that South Africa wins geo-politically strategic allies and 
regional champions of the African Agenda that it can rely on in pursuing its vision of 
the future of the African continent. It also serves to create a basis on which these key 
states can generate a stake in the promotion of the African Agenda, thus potentially 
offsetting the risk of South Africa being seen to pursue its own Agenda exclusively 
and unilaterally (Fakir, 2007: 4-5).  
 
Former Director-General in The Presidency, Frank Chikane, believes that the African 
agenda, once spearheaded by former President Thabo Mbeki, is losing momentum 
and the gains made are being reversed (Times Live, 20/3/2012).  
 
The consolidation of the African Agenda is a main focus of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. It involves a blend of subjects. It sets out a continental programme, but also 
supports South Africa’s own national interest in Africa. This rests on the premises of 
                                                 
44 The APRM is a mutually agreed programme, voluntarily adopted by the member states of the 
African Union, to promote and re-enforce high standards of governance. The peer review mechanism 
is a self-monitoring mechanism (NEPAD, 2012). 
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peace, security and stability through the AU; development through NEPAD; effective 
governance through the APRM; cooperation through partnerships; and RECs. 
 
6.2. South-South cooperation 
 
Interpress News Service (2009) reported that there was more to South-South 
cooperation than making the right noises at international gatherings. South-South 
collaboration between developing countries was described as a growing and 
dynamic phenomenon, an important process vital in confronting shared challenges. 
Led by what was depicted as “emerging giants” India, Brazil and South Africa 
through the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the South was seen as 
a tremendous source of tested solutions to development challenges, including the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).45 
 
The following statement by former President Mbeki reflects the value attached by 
South African policy-makers to the building of strategic partnerships in the South: 
“For countries of the South to realise rapid development including fair trade, 
economic development, job creation and poverty eradication, these developing 
countries, should, first and foremost, form strong partnerships and strategic alliances 
that would unlock the vast resources and economic opportunities within and between 
their countries and regions” (DFA, 2006). 
 
Promoting solidarity, cooperation and self-help among states of the South has been 
a key feature of the South-South discourse (SAIIA, 2008: 2). The emerging global 
economic and political clout of some of the bigger developing countries has the 
potential to reshape both South-South and traditional North-South engagement in a 
way that is much more responsive to the aspirations of the developing world than in 
the past. However, this does not signify any greater ease in achieving consensus 
among such a large grouping of countries that, albeit developing, have diverse 
interests.  
 
                                                 
45 In 2000, 189 states undertook to free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivation. This 
pledge turned into the eight Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2013). 
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South-South cooperation supports three key themes important for South Africa, 
namely the transformation of the power configuration and global governance 
architecture reflected in North-South relations; the strengthening of self-help 
initiatives among developing countries through increasing intra-South trade and 
investment, cooperation in science and technology and capacity building based on 
similar circumstances and experiences; and support for NEPAD projects, especially 
where Southern partners have unique contributions to make (SAIIA, 2008: 3). 
 
South Africa’s programme for its South-South engagement with the arrival of 
democracy in 1994, was characterised by chairing various traditional South-South 
forums; leading and participating in the establishment of new formal and informal 
South-South forums; taking an active interest in global governance reforms; and 
expanding its relations with countries of the South (SAIIA, 2008: 5).  
 
There are several South-South forums, some with long histories that aim to seek 
closer South-South cooperation (SAIIA, 2008: 10). The most prominent are NAM and 
the Group of 77 (G77)46, which have long attempted to find common ground among 
developing countries, the former on political and the latter on social, economic and 
technical issues. 
 
South Africa joined NAM in 1994 and assumed the Chair of the movement when it 
hosted the XII NAM Summit of Heads of State or Government in Durban in 1998 
(DIRCO, 2006). During the next four years, South Africa sought also to remain highly 
engaged in the Palestinian question and the evolving Iraq crisis, the challenges to 
multilateralism and the role of the UN.  
 
The Zimbali Process at ministerial level initiated a review of the methodology and 
organisation of the NAM and the need for a revitalisation of the movement. A new 
relationship was also established with inter alia the Group of Eight (G8) and the EU 
and relations with the G77 were strengthened.47 South Africa handed over the Chair 
to Malaysia at the XIII NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur and remained a member of the 
                                                 
46 The G77 was established in 1964 by 77 developing countries at the end of the first session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. 
47 Since 1975, heads of state or government of the major industrial democracies have met annually to 
deal with major economic and political issues (G8, 2012). 
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NAM Troika of past, present and future chairs until Cuba assumed the Chair in 
September 2006 (DIRCO, 2006).  
 
In August 2004, South Africa hosted the XIV NAM Ministerial or mid-term review 
Conference in Durban on behalf of the Africa-group. This event was held back-to-
back with the Asian-African Sub-Regional Organisations Conference (AASROC) II in 
preparation for the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference in 2005 (DIRCO, 
2006).  
 
The South African Government attempted to organise a group of major emerging 
economies of the South into a G8 of the South. In a letter addressed in 2000 by 
President Mbeki to the heads of state of Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria 
and Saudi Arabia, South Africa suggested that such a forum should be created to 
match its counterpart in the developed North (SAIIA, 2008: 14). There was little 
resonance from the countries approached and subsequently other initiatives, notably 
the IBSA and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping (BRICS) came to 
replace this idea. 
 
Of all of the South-South forums IBSA is the smallest South-South cooperation body 
and seemingly the most dynamic (SAIIA, 2008: 14-15). IBSA is a trilateral, 
developmental initiative between India, Brazil and South Africa established in 2003 
to promote South-South cooperation and exchange. The body consists of a self-
selected group of three democratic countries that are significant economic and 
political powers in their respective continents/regions.  
 
Members are not typically inwardly focused developing countries, but ones that have 
a broader world-view and represent credible and capable representatives from the 
South with the ability and clout to prove leadership and engage with other developing 
countries on creating a South-South consensus on a number of international issues 
(SAIIA, 2008: 14-15).  
 
IBSA members represent substantial markets, generally exercise a stabilising 
influence globally and actively aspire to have a voice on international issues. The 
main objectives of IBSA are to promote South-South dialogue, cooperation and 
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common positions on issues of international importance; trade and investment 
opportunities between the three regions of which they are part; international poverty 
alleviation and social development; the trilateral exchange of information, 
international best practices, technologies and skills, as well as to complement each 
others’ competitive strengths into collective synergies; and cooperation in a broad 
range of areas, namely agriculture, climate change, culture, defence, education, 
energy, health, information society, science and technology, social development, 
trade and investment, tourism and transport (IBSA, undated). 
 
South Africa also joined Brazil, Russia, India and China (formerly known as the BRIC 
grouping) to form what is now referred to as the BRICS club (The Guardian, 
19/4/2011). Sébastien Hervieu of The Guardian argued that in choosing to broaden 
their constituency, the BRICS states made a significant move. This was no longer an 
artificial body founded on comparable economic performance, but increasingly a 
political club representing the developing world, determined to counterbalance 
Western influence in major international forums.  
 
The China Daily (15/9/2011) noted that South Africa's ascension into the BRICS club 
of emerging economies raised some eyebrows internationally, but argued that the 
country had the credentials to back its membership. The foremost advantage South 
Africa was seen to offer its BRIC partners was access to one billion consumers living 
in Africa, as well as the vast mineral and agricultural opportunities the continent 
offered. South Africa's new allies were calling for change, such as reform of the 
world's financial bodies and the UNSC. As a BRICS member, it would have to 
support these calls and add its own voice and diplomatic weight.  
 
The BRICS countries shared several global forums: the UN, Group of 20 (G20) and 
IBSA.48 It was said to be in the interest of Africa and South Africa to call for a 
restructuring of international economic and political institutions, a more equitable and 
sustainable trade dispensation and agreement on climate change. These are 
evidently issues on South Africa’s agenda, as after the BRICS group had invited 
                                                 
48 The G20 brings together finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America, as well as the European Union (G20, undated). 
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South Africa to join (Daily Maverick, 4/10/2011), South Africa’s DIRCO minister, 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, said South Africa agreed with BRIC's member states 
about the role of emerging economies in advancing the restructuring of the global 
political, economic and financial architecture into one that was more equitable, 
balanced and rested on the important pillar of multilateralism. 
 
The global system is still stacked in favour of the more powerful (SAIIA, 2008: 38). 
Processes of decision-making in global forums are often obscure. However, the 
advocacy for reform has grown more strident, not only among Southern states, but 
also global social movements. The debate has shifted to one that emphasises the 
importance of a more balanced global system that promotes sustainable 
development. 
 
South-South cooperation strategy is largely committed to solidarity and development 
(Landsberg, 2006: 9). The development dimension of South-South strategy 
promotes the goals of market access and trade and investment benefits for 
developing countries. South-South cooperation is mostly dedicated to solidarity and 
development. South Africa’s agenda for South-South engagement is characterised 
by: chairing of different South-South forums; participating in the establishment of 
new South-South forums; taking an interest in global governance reforms; and 
expanding relations with countries of the South.  
 
IBSA is the smallest of all of the South-South forums, but is ostensibly the most 
active, representing considerable markets, exercising a stabilising sway 
internationally and dynamically aspiring to have a say on international issues. Within 
the BRICS club, member states agree about the role of emerging economies in 
advancing the reorganisation of the global political, economic and financial design 
into one that is fairer, impartial and rests on multilateralism. 
 
6.3. North-South dialogue 
 
In terms of North-South dialogue, foreign policy strategists long held the view that 
engagement with developed countries was premised on forging partnerships for 
peace, security and development. South African foreign policy came to stress a new 
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priority, fundamentally altering the relationship between Africa and the North, while 
strengthening the relationship between Africa and the South. South Africa sought to 
bring about a redistribution of power between North and South (Landsberg, 2006: 2; 
7).  
 
The Mandela government viewed South Africa as an international bridge-builder, 
seeking to cultivate strong ties with the industrialised North, while reaching out to 
and speaking on behalf of African and Southern states. The assessment of the 
Mbeki government was that the Republic needed to cultivate positive ties with both 
North and South, with the aim of burden sharing in the area of development and 
bringing about a redistribution of power between these global blocs (Landsberg, 
2006: 2). 
 
South Africa came to promote global governance by emphasising the centrality of 
the UN in global affairs (Landsberg, 2006: 7). It stressed the need for a strong 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation global regime and pushed for the 
restructuring of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
conception of a multi-lateralist posture strongly emerged in South Africa’s foreign 
policy (Landsberg, 2006: 7).  
 
In terms of North-South dialogue, the emphasis has been on efforts to bring about a 
strategic partnership between the industrialised North and the developing South. 
This partnership would be based on mutual responsibility and mutual accountability 
where both sides in the partnership would have rights and responsibilities. South 
Africa set out to engage with developed countries on the premise that partnerships 
should be forged with the aim of bringing about peace, security and development in 
the South (Landsberg, 2006: 2; 7).  
 
South Africa chose to interact with countries from the North based on mutual 
accountability and responsibility. Key aims were to reverse “Afro-pessimism and 
“donor fatigue” and to secure sustained interest in the agendas of Africa and the 
South. South Africa systematically engaged leaders of the G8 with the aim of 
guaranteeing support for NEPAD. Its position on issues such as nuclear non-
proliferation, political democratisation, “Third World” debt relief and market access 
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was aimed at bringing about international redress between North and South 
(Landsberg, 2006: 2; 7). 
 
Building such a partnership would be complicated by the fact that whereas the 
primary concern of the developing countries were issues of poverty and 
underdevelopment, the developed world was concerned with realpolitik issues of 
peace and security, and of seeking an alteration in the global balance of power 
between North and South (Landsberg, 2006: 4).  
 
South Africa expressed concern that the most powerful states in the world dominated 
the international agenda by asserting their interests and priorities over the concerns 
of the developing countries. South Africa believed this should be transformed into a 
new global order based on partnership, shared responsibility and mutual interests. 
 
In terms of North-South dialogue South African foreign policy seeks to bring about a 
redeployment of influence between North and South. The emphasis has been on 
efforts to ensure a strategic partnership between the industrialised North and the 
developing South founded on joint responsibility and accountability. Partnerships 
should be forged with the aim of bringing about peace, security and development in 
the South.  
 
The main objective was to overturn “Afro-pessimism” and “donor fatigue” and to 
achieve sustained interest in the programmes of Africa and the South. Constructing 
such cooperation would be complicated by the fact that the main concerns of 
developing countries were poverty and underdevelopment, whereas the developed 
world was concerned with issues of peace, security and searching for an adjustment 
in the global balance of power between North and South.  
 
6.4. Transformation of global institutions 
 
Global democracy is a key political issue, though it is not a goal shared by all, as 
some would prefer the status quo (Patomäki & Teivainen, 2004: 1). South Africa’s 
post-apartheid foreign policy reveals that transformational global governance 
considerations have enjoyed a high priority in all administrations (Landsberg, 2010: 
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23). All have aimed to transform the global order from its Western bias to become 
more sensitive to the needs of Africa and the global South, while also championing 
the idea of a rules-based international society.  
 
The unilateralist tendencies of major powers have been opposed, while South Africa 
backed active participation in the multilateral domain. One goal was to transform 
structures and institutions of global governance, while another was to place 
developmental goals on the global agenda (Landsberg, 2010: 32).  
 
South Africa backed an overhaul of the global political, financial and trade order 
(Landsberg, 2010: 32). It pursued a pro-multilateralist posture and stressed the need 
to transform global political, developmental and financial institutions so that transfers 
of wealth and power would affect Africa and the South. The aim was to ensure that 
the developing world would have a voice and a greater say and stake in world 
affairs. 
 
Unlike other big developing states, South Africa emphasised that its positions were 
not only shaped by its own particular interests, but also by those of Africa at large 
(Kumar, 2011: 150). South Africa has thus taken upon itself a much larger 
responsibility than other big developing states, where the concerns of their regions 
are largely secondary to their own foreign-policy positions. This approach adds more 
legitimacy to South African perspectives in global forums. On the other hand, it 
requires South Africa to repeatedly seek affirmation of its role from the continent.  
  
South Africa has typically used its international presence and diplomatic 
resourcefulness to push for greater sensitivity on the part of the West to the 
development needs of Africa and the South. The concern was to help craft a global 
pact balancing the traditionally hard security concerns of the West with the human 
security concerns of the developing world (Landsberg, 2010: 32-33).  
 
South Africa could not realise its global developmental and transformational goals by 
defending the global status quo. These could only be attained using transformational 
tactics. This cause was supported by the fact that South Africa has become a 
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respected global player, is listened to by those who wield power globally and 
punches about its weight in global affairs (Landsberg, 2010: 32-33).  
 
It is suggested that for South Africa to play the role it should in reforming global 
governance, it will have to overcome the need to overcompensate for its complex 
African identity (Kumar, 2011: 150). As the largest and most developed African 
economy on the poorest continent, South Africa’s interests, global perspective and 
objectives often differ from those of most African states. South Africa will also have 
to build strategic partnerships with key African states.  
 
Transformational global governance issues aim to transform the global order from its 
Western prejudice to become more responsive to the needs of Africa and the global 
South, while also championing the idea of a rules-based international society. The 
unilateralist tendencies of major powers are opposed, while South Africa backs 
active participation in the multilateral domain. One goal is to convert institutions of 
global governance, while another is to place developmental goals on the global 
agenda.  
 
South Africa pursues a pro-multilateralist posture and emphasises the need to 
transform global political, developmental and financial institutions so that transfers of 
wealth and power would affect Africa and the South. The aim is to ensure that the 
developing world would have a voice and a greater say and stake in world affairs. 
South Africa emphasises that its positions are not only shaped by its own interests 
but also by those of Africa. 
 
7. South Africa’s diplomatic institutions and practice  
 
Landsberg (2004: 185) argues that South Africa’s grand and elaborate foreign policy 
strategies have allowed it to punch above its weight. These go well beyond those 
expected from a middle ranking power in Africa. Its diplomatic approaches put it in a 
position to influence world affairs in ways usually reserved for much greater powers. 
Since 1994, South Africa has sought to play in the premier league of world affairs. Its 
diplomacy tried to influence what it saw as a divided world: the developing South and 
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the developed North, NAM and Africa. The Mbeki government advocated a rules-
based global order and taking South-South cooperation seriously. 
 
Foreign policy elites viewed South Africa as the spokesperson for Africa in world 
affairs and in the vanguard with China, India and Brazil in articulating the agenda for 
the South (Landsberg 2004: 185). When South Africa successfully campaigned to 
host the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament, it did so on an African platform, thus 
using “sports diplomacy” to help assert its African credentials. South Africa rejected 
unilateralism and promoted multilateralism in international relations, seeking to be in 
the forefront of constructing norms and values for Africa and promoting democracy, 
peace and security on the continent.  
 
The post-1994 government brought about important philosophical shifts and many 
changes in emphasis and priorities (Muller, 1998). The old regime was 
philosophically right-wing oriented, uncompromisingly pro-Western, critical to the 
point of being hostile to the Third World and its causes, and sceptical about universal 
liberal ideals such as human rights and gender issues.  
 
The shift in policy implied that priority would now be given to the African continent 
and in particular Southern Africa, to the Southern hemisphere, the NAM and to 
universal moral and humanitarian issues (Muller, 1998). This had a substantial 
impact on the frequency and nature of contacts between South African leaders and 
their counterparts in the areas of priority, and on South African involvement in 
international organisations, conferences and agreements. South African foreign 
policy also shaped diplomacy. 
 
South Africa’s overseas missions grew quite spectacularly from 1990 onwards (see 
Figure 2). In 1990, South Africa had representation in only 30 states and by 2012 
this had grown to 183 (DIRCO, 2012).  
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Figure 4: Increase in the number of missions abroad 
 
 
 
Source: DIRCO 2012 
 
This includes embassies, high commissions, honorary consulates/honorary 
consulates-general/honorary consular agencies/honorary vice-consulates and liaison 
offices. South African representation abroad is a good illustration of the country’s 
"universal foreign policy" though it is clear that economic pragmatism weighs heavily 
in the allocation of missions abroad (Muller, 1998). The expansion process had been 
slowing and is all but over.  
 
Financial considerations play an important role in this, though it is not necessarily the 
only consideration. South Africa is facing some new dilemmas, including the problem 
that there is not full reciprocity in the country’s foreign representation: there are a 
number of countries maintaining a presence in South Africa despite the fact that 
South Africa has no representation in those countries, and there is also not full 
reciprocity as to the status of representation. In addition there is great disparity in 
residential and non-residential representation. Reciprocity is not an absolute rule in 
diplomacy, but too great a disparity could be cause for irritation in the long run.  
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Another development is the extensive use of summitry as a form of diplomacy in the 
new South Africa (Muller, 1998). This has been described as one of the main 
characteristics of the new South African diplomacy. Summitry has been used in the 
implementation of many aspects of South African foreign policy, but probably most 
noticeably to further South Africa’s economic interests, to forge relations with 
countries in Africa and the rest of the Third World and in South Africa’s role as 
regional agent for peace.  
 
Summit conferences and state visits are not the only forms of ad hoc diplomacy 
employed by South Africa (Muller, 1998). Many visits, at many different levels, take 
place, both of South African officials abroad and by foreigners to South Africa. Some 
are bilateral in nature and others multilateral, involving more than two parties at the 
same meeting. In some cases ministers are accompanied the President.  
 
International interactions continued to increase in frequency and intensity and foreign 
visits to and from South Africa increased under then President Thabo Mbeki. It 
reached such an extent that he was blamed for putting too much emphasis on 
international matters at the expense of local issues (Muller, 1998). The expectation 
was that this would change under President Jacob Zuma, who prior to his election, 
was depicted as “the people’s President”, but there is no indication of a decline. The 
opposite might even be true.  
 
The Multilateral Branch of the DFA became very prominent and active largely as a 
result of the shifts in South African foreign policy and because South Africa was 
accepted in international society again and joined many international organisations 
(Muller, 1998). This is a reflection of the importance attached to membership of 
international organisations; the demands of effective participation in international 
conferences; the need for the conclusion of many new agreements in a globalising 
world; and the special importance the new government attached to certain issues 
(such as non-proliferation and disarmament).  
 
South Africa concluded increasing numbers of international agreements, many of 
them multilateral, and was called to positions of leadership in some important 
international fora (Muller, 1998). 
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South Africa had been at pains not to be seen as hegemonic in political, diplomatic 
or military terms, but as a result of skewed trade relations it was still perceived as 
such, which greatly undermined its democratisation project in the region (Landsberg, 
2004: 185). A strategy was adopted emphasising that South Africa was a genuine 
partner in Africa that would work closely with African states to achieve common 
solutions to common African problems. A great deal was invested in South African 
diplomacy to manage outside perceptions that it harboured ambitions of dominance 
in the region.  
 
Landsberg (2004: 226 & 227) argues that South Africa adopted a strategy of “quiet” 
diplomacy with regard to many African conflict or crisis areas, including Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Comoros, and not only with regard 
to the situation in Zimbabwe. It had a general preference for behind-the-scenes 
engagement with belligerents in conflict situations, especially in Africa, even 
overstretching itself in peacemaking and peacekeeping to boost its image as 
peacemaker. These “quiet diplomatic intercessions” involved thankless negotiations 
coordinating peace efforts, mediating in conflict situations and trying to keep peace 
where there was little peace to keep.  
 
The post-1994 foreign policy-makers pursued bridge-building tactics between the 
North and the South and South-South partnerships (Landsberg, 2004: 228). It was 
pre-occupied with reintegrating South Africa into the international community, and 
articulated a highly ethical foreign policy emphasising human rights promotion, 
democratisation, international law, conflict resolution and defending the interests of 
Africa in world affairs.  
 
There was a focus on the need to reform and strengthen the UN and bring about 
international redress through a rules-orientated global order. It strove for a world 
where states from the developing South, especially African states, would come to 
respect the norms and principles of democratic governance, peace and human 
security; while the states from the industrialised North would live up to their historical 
obligations and commit to greater levels of foreign aid, open up their markets and 
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allow for fairer trade, address debt relief, help bolster Africa’s peacekeeping capacity 
and relate to Africans as partners and not as recipients of aid handouts.  
 
The post-1994 government brought about important idealistic shifts and changes in 
accent and priorities. Precedence was given to Africa, in particular Southern Africa, 
the Southern hemisphere, the NAM and universal ethical and humanitarian issues. 
This had an impact on the incidence and nature of interactions between South 
African leaders and their counterparts and on South African involvement in 
international organisations, conferences and agreements.  
 
Post-1994 foreign policy-makers endeavoured for a world where states from the 
developing South would value the norms and principles of democratic governance, 
peace and human security; while the states from the industrialised North would live 
up to their historical obligations and commit to greater levels of foreign aid, open up 
their markets and allow for fairer trade, address debt relief, help bolster Africa’s 
peacekeeping capacity and relate to Africans as partners and not as recipients of aid 
handouts.  
 
8. South Africa’s public diplomacy: institutions and practice 
 
South Africa’s public diplomacy is examined by considering its professed practice by 
the DFA, or now DIRCO. The contribution of the IMC is also considered.  
 
8.1. Public diplomacy institutions 
 
The PDU, later upgraded to a full departmental branch, focuses specifically on 
developing South Africa’s and Africa’s reputation both at home and internationally 
(DFA, 2007: 63). It addresses media liaison, engagement with national stakeholders 
and the promotion of South Africa’s policies and programmes at international level. 
The PDU coordinates all Departmental efforts aimed at shaping the communication 
environment at home and abroad, where South Africa’s foreign policy is played out. 
The PDU defines its responsibilities as promoting an understanding both 
domestically and internationally, of South Africa’s role and position in international 
relations (DFA, 2003: 274). DIRCO (2011a: 66) describes the functions of its Public 
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Diplomacy Branch in its Annual Report 2009-10 saying it addresses communication 
engagements with national and international stakeholders, media liaison and the 
promotion of South Africa’s image, policies and programmes at international level.  
 
As the PDU focuses on developing South Africa’s reputation both at home and 
internationally it is clear that DIRCO makes no real distinction between public 
diplomacy and public affairs in practice.  
 
During the 2009-10 financial year the Branch undertook a business process review 
to restructure its units to have better capacity to provide a fully-fledged public 
diplomacy service, including community engagements, and to provide an improved 
communication engagement service abroad (DIRCO, 2011b: 66). Its core mandate is 
described as keeping “the public and Departmental stakeholders informed” (DIRCO, 
2011b: 66) of its plans and activities. The focus seems to be more aimed at the 
home audience than the audience abroad. To have an understanding of the 
approach to public diplomacy by missions abroad, the purpose statement of the 
Public Diplomacy Section at the South African Embassy in the US can serve as a 
guideline. It is described as (South African Embassy Washington DC, undated) the 
effective presentation and promotion of South Africa's values, policies and image in 
the US through the Ambassador, the Embassy, partnerships and events that 
promote, protect and enhance South Africa's national interest. This is achieved 
through facilitating improved understanding of South Africa's foreign policy objectives 
and ensured through proactive media and public relations to maintain a prominent 
position in the US.  
 
8.2. Public diplomacy activities 
 
In an overview of its activities of the previous year, it becomes clear what the Branch  
does. DIRCO continued with the production and distribution of publicity materials 
including the Annual Report 2008-09, Budget Vote Speech 2009 booklet, Desk 
Calendar 2010, The Diplomat (DIRCO’s monthly newsletter), “Know your DIRCO”, 
as well as promotional banners and posters for various conferences, summits and 
workshops (DIRCO, 2010: 66-132).  
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Marketing initiatives “at par with international standards” were undertaken with the 
objective of popularising “the Brand DIRCO” to various stakeholders nationally and 
internationally (DIRCO, 2010: 66-132). DIRCO also participated and assisted in 
conferences, shows and exhibitions with the aim of building and projecting a positive 
image of South Africa globally. A number of activities were conducted centred on the 
promotion of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and South Africa’s state of readiness to host 
the World Cup.  
 
The main marketing and branding activities during the period included the Minister’s 
Dinner, the annual South Africa Tourism Indaba and facilitated and supported the 
Minister’s Outreach Campaigns such as participation in the G8/Africa Outreach 
Programme focusing on G8 commitments to Africa and programmes in reaching out 
to the public domain through constant engagement with academic institutions and 
stakeholders (DIRCO, 2010: 66-132). These activities were mainly done in 
partnerships with a number of companies within corporate South Africa.  
 
DIRCO’s Operation Centre produced daily news bulletins informing all missions of 
relevant news in South Africa and produced regional reports to keep head office and 
missions informed about important events in various regions of the world (DIRCO, 
2011b: 66). The department maintained a 24-hour Operations Centre which assisted 
The Presidency, the Ministry, DIRCO and the South African public and served as an 
early-warning centre for political principals, reporting on major incidents or crises and 
international events.  
 
To ensure accurate historical recording, documentation and dissemination of South 
Africa’s international relations engagements, the department continued with both 
audiovisual and photographic coverage of engagements of the President, Deputy 
President and principals and distributed these to both local and international print 
and audiovisual media (DIRCO, 2011b: 66).  
 
The Public Diplomacy Branch prepared thematic and topical speeches for strategic 
national, continental and international events for principals, including for the annual 
State of the Nation Address, the Budget Vote, Ministerial Public Outreach 
programmes and other high-level visits and conferences. The Branch continued with 
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the management of the department’s official website - www.dirco.gov.za - and 
intranet and integrating the Department’s website, intranet and Foreign Mission 
websites and other information sources to form a highly interactive and informative 
web portal (DIRCO, 2011b: 66).  
 
DIRCO is involved in an array of public diplomacy activities. Marketing projects are 
embarked on to popularise DIRCO to stakeholders locally and abroad (DIRCO, 
2011b: 66). DIRCO also takes part in conferences, shows and exhibitions to build 
and project a positive image of South Africa globally. Marketing and branding 
activities such as DIRCO’s outreach campaigns are customised to reach out to the 
public sphere through engagement with academic institutions and stakeholders.  
 
DIRCO’s Operation Centre keeps the department informed about important events in 
various regions around the world (DIRCO, 2011b: 66). The Public Diplomacy Branch 
prepares speeches for strategic events. The Branch also manages the Department’s 
official website.  
 
With regard to its media focus, DIRCO reports that to keep the public and 
departmental stakeholders informed, media engagements were undertaken during 
2009/10 and ongoing media liaison and communication support to the ministry and 
department was provided (DIRCO, 2011b: 66). This was done through sectoral 
briefings led by Deputy Directors-General and pre-event media awareness 
campaigns (undertaken to generate publicity prior to events or visits).  
 
In addition to assisting South African missions abroad with country promotional 
requests and publicity material needs, the Public Diplomacy Branch continued to 
provide media and communications support during Cabinet lekgotlas and when 
heads of missions to South Africa provided their letters of credence to the President 
(DIRCO, 2011b: 66).49 
 
In the Annual Report 2006/07 of the DFA, it paid particular attention to the Public 
Diplomacy Branch’s media liaison functions (DFA, 2008: 220). It is explained that 
                                                 
49 Lekgotla means a meeting called by government to discuss strategy planning. The term is a loan 
word from Sesotho, meaning “court”. 
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South Africa’s involvement and leadership in different continental and international 
fora demanded that it be placed at the centre of communications efforts by the 
department assisting the country to gain prominence, adding that it would ensure 
that the entire African continent continued to feature in a positive light in global 
affairs. 
 
The Operations Centre produced the following, indicating its focus on the media to 
enable the department to react to what is reflected in media sources: 
 
• Daily News Highlight reports were compiled from articles in the daily media and 
transmitted electronically to all head office staff; 
• Daily News Bulletin reports were compiled through the assessment and 
selection of news stories covered in South African newspapers and websites 
and distributed to all end users, including missions abroad; 
• Weekend News Bulletin reports were compiled by after-hours staff on weekends 
and public holidays through assessment and selection of news stories covered 
in South African newspapers and websites and distributed to principals after 
hours; and 
• Regional media reports and reviews for Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australasia 
and Europe were compiled from international media news sources and 
distributed to the respective missions and Branches (DFA, 2008: 221). 
 
The 24-hour Operations Centre also acted as an early-warning centre for principals 
reporting on major incidents or crises and international events (DFA, 2008: 222). 
This included the compilation of about two-hourly International News Scans by 
monitoring the media after hours. The International News Scans gave principals 
updates on political, diplomatic and economic developments around the world; major 
government changes or cabinet reshuffles abroad; and the opinions of world leaders 
and developments in the UN, AU, SADC and other multilateral organisations.  
 
The Operations Centre also provided continuous logistical support to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, especially on official visits 
abroad and attending international conferences and summits (DFA, 2008: 222). 
157 
 
 
The department undertook media research, analysis and speechwriting (DFA, 2008: 
222). The Department, through its Media Liaison Unit provided ongoing media liaison 
and communication support services to principals during incoming and outgoing 
visits. These included arranging for media opportunities for the principals during the 
execution of their duties at home and abroad while accompanying them.  
 
Information on official outgoing visits by The Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs were released to the media to inform the nation and world at large about 
South Africa’s endeavours internationally and enhanced the country’s stature 
internationally (DFA, 2008: 222). The department‘s Media Liaison Unit organised 
media briefings and press conferences, through the timeous dissemination of 
information to the media pro-actively and in real time.  
 
Reports to the Government Communicators Forums; Ministerial Liaison Forums; pre-
Cabinet meetings; Communication Co-ordinating Committee; and the  International 
Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster on activities of the department were 
submitted and discussed, and largely informed other departments of the 
department’s strategic approach to issues of international importance (DFA, 2008: 
222). 
 
DIRCO’s Public Diplomacy Branch concentrates explicitly on developing South 
Africa’s and Africa’s standing both nationally and internationally. It describes its 
function as attending communication commitments with national and international 
stakeholders, media liaison and the support of South Africa’s image, policies and 
programmes internationally (DFA, 2008: 222). As it focuses on developing South 
Africa’s reputation both at home and internationally, DIRCO does not distinguish 
between public diplomacy and public affairs. The IMC is the custodian of BrandSA, 
to help build a positive and forceful brand image for South Africa.  
 
8.3. Nation branding  
 
Even states with well-established identities need to guarantee that the position they 
occupy stays attractive to a consumer public spoilt for choice (Freemantle, 2007: 7). 
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To be distinguished from the competition, vigorous marketing strategies need to be 
followed, which should result in an exclusive national brand identity which sets the 
country apart and gives it a competitive edge.  
 
8.3.1. Place branding  
 
Place branding is the process by which commercial branding strategies are applied 
to the development and marketing of places, be it cities, regions, nations or 
continents (Freemantle, 2007:8). The intent would be to achieve one or more of the 
following objectives, namely to enhance the place’s exports; protect its domestic 
business from foreign competition; attract or retain factors of development; and 
generally position it for advantage domestically and internationally in economic, 
political and social terms. 
 
Sceptics to the idea of “nation branding” punt the superior dignity of a nation due to 
its substance and depth, suggesting that it is disrespectful to the historical and 
cultural identity of the state (Freemantle, 2007:8-9). Nation branding supporters 
assert that it is the poor practice of nation branding, rather than the concept itself that 
might be problematic. It is not a new trend as nations have long made resolute 
attempts to emphasise their relative strengths to gain greater regional and 
international status and credibility.  
 
There are differences between marketing and branding: branding is the result of 
marketing consistency (Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 4). A successful brand 
encapsulates an expectation based on a record of characteristics that reflects one or 
more aspirational values. Whereas these characteristics may include beliefs and 
idiosyncrasies, these need to be expressed consistently. If branding is introverted, 
focusing on the nature of the brand, marketing is extroverted and is related to the 
way in which branding is achieved.  
 
Marketing asks the ‘how’ question, while branding relates to the ‘what’ (the product) 
question. A brand represents the manifestation of a set of aspirational values that 
are the result of distinct marketing strategies. Marketing is geared towards 
generating greater profit from a product, but branding goes beyond this, seeking to 
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add an emotional dimension with which people can identify on a more personal level 
(Freemantle, 2007:9). This is particularly true of the internal goals of nation branding 
as the state seeks to enhance pride and association with its cultural identity. The 
goals of nation branding are also more diverse and can seek to encourage foreign 
direct investment, support exports or any enterprise a nation may undertake.  
 
Nation branding is complex, because selling a country is subject to a multiplicity of 
unpredictable events, perceptions and events (Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 4). 
Country branding is inherently a political process, given the extent to which various 
stakeholders (civil society, business, labour and consumers) react to the marketing 
process, which may in turn reshape the process.  
 
Analytical components that influence the construction of a country brand include: 
 
• The impact of foreign policy in reinforcing or undermining marketing 
strategies: Although discrete foreign-policy decisions are likely to be ruled by 
higher priority considerations, and may overrule marketing considerations, 
successful branding would be inconceivable without overall foreign policy 
goals and strategies being consistent with marketing efforts; 
• The role of culture as an expression of national identity: Culture is central to 
the development and acquisition of cognitive and emotional attachment to 
countries as brands. It is the embodiment of the national psyche and the 
projection of national image. Culture attracts because it sets apart. Culture 
provides an easily accessible base of ‘value-add’ to promote a country’s “net 
asset value”, although a rich cultural life does not necessarily translate into 
creative marketing strategies. Unless a state can build its culture to a powerful 
brand in the minds of its worldwide audience it faces a daunting and costly 
process of constantly re-establishing its right to be noticed and remembered.  
• The first two components shape the next, which is marketing strategies: 
“Marketing power” refers to a dual process. Internally, it relates to attempts by 
the state and corporate elites to shore-up legitimacy, reinforce a sense of 
national identity, and placate constituencies adversely affected by 
internationalisation of domestic issues due to globalisation and the resulting 
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political tensions. Externally, it relates to the way in which the state seeks to 
heighten its global attraction by drawing on its distinctiveness. 
• There also needs to be an awareness of a state’s core competencies that can 
be flexibly deployed: Brand identities need to be aware of possible 
incongruence between brand projection and brand perception. The state 
needs to be positioned to ensure that perceived weaknesses are addressed 
while emphasising comparative advantages to respond strategically to new 
opportunities and threats (Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 4-5).  
 
8.3.2. International Marketing Council 
 
The IMC of South Africa is the custodian of Brand South Africa (BrandSA), to help 
create a positive and compelling brand image for South Africa (DFA, 2008). The 
primary objective of BrandSA is to develop and implement a pro-active marketing 
and communication strategy for South Africa and to promote South Africa. 
BrandSA’s role is to create a positive, unified image of South Africa; one that builds 
pride, promotes investment and tourism and helps new enterprises and job creation. 
 
The organisation operates on four key platforms:  
 
• raising awareness internationally of all that South Africa has to offer investors;  
• operating missions abroad promoting investment and export industries;  
• mobilising influential South Africans as well as members of the media abroad; 
and  
• boosting local pride and patriotism through various campaigns (DFA, 2008). 
 
8.4. Democracy and public diplomacy 
 
There has long been a debate about whether in a democratic state it is acceptable 
for foreign and defence policies to be delegated almost wholly to a small elite on the 
grounds that dealings with other states require secrecy, continuity, experience and 
personal contact (Hill, 2003: 42-43). Striking a balance between democracy and 
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efficiency is a lofty ideal, and few democracies have workable procedures for 
accountability in foreign policy that come near to those that apply in domestic areas.  
 
Foreign policy may be “for the people” but is still largely made on their behalf by 
cognoscenti who complain about having their hands tied by public opinion, though 
there is little evidence of this in practice (Hill, 2003: 42-43). There is, however, an 
awakening interest in international relations and the interconnections between 
domestic and foreign affairs are more widely understood.  
 
Domestic politics produces pressures for more democracy in foreign policy, but this 
does not mean that ‘efficiency’ is any less valued. However, even among the 
relatively small elites that follow foreign affairs, there are varying expectations of 
what a successful foreign policy should entail (Hill, 2003: 42-43).  
 
Diplomacy describes the conduct of international relations through the interaction of 
official representatives of governments or groups. It encompasses a broad range of 
activities and approaches to exchanging information and negotiating agreements 
which vary widely according to the actors and situations involved (Collins, Packer & 
Bernadotteakademien, undated: 12).  
 
Diplomacy is an important aspect of foreign policy and an effective means of 
attaining the objectives of foreign policy (Dahl, undated). The foreign policy of a state 
is the substance of foreign relations, and diplomacy is the process by which such a 
policy is carried out. Foreign policy is an ‘end’ and diplomacy is a ‘means’ for 
achieving the objectives laid down in the foreign policy. Diplomacy is therefore an 
instrument to implement foreign policy. 
 
By its classic nature diplomacy is mainly quiet or silent (Landsberg. 2004: 10). It 
would not be “public”, much less “megaphone” diplomacy, nor is it “secret”, but rather 
defined by confidentiality and discretion (Collins Packer & Bernadotteakademien, 
undated: 12). In contrast to “public diplomacy”, ostensibly intended for domestic 
constituencies, and “megaphone diplomacy”, meant to call international attention 
(and presumably pressure) to address a given situation, the aim would be to create 
conditions in which parties feel comfortable to act, in particular allowing parties to 
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evaluate positions and interests, to weigh options and consider independent and 
impartial advice. 
 
Public diplomacy on the other hand is a more transparent means by which a 
sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries to inform and 
influence audiences abroad with the intention of promoting the national interest and 
advancing foreign policy goals (USC, 2012). It is still an instrument of foreign policy 
implementation. In most instances this is done using the media. Parallel to this are 
public affairs, which refer to a government’s activities and programs designed to 
communicate policy messages to its own domestic audiences (CPD, 2011). 
 
Access to information is essential to the health of democracy. It ensures that citizens 
make responsible, informed choices rather than acting out of ignorance or 
misinformation. Information serves a “checking function” by ensuring that elected 
representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of those who 
elected them (CDG, 1999: 3). 
 
In some societies, an antagonistic relationship between the media and government 
represents a vital and healthy element of fully functioning democracies (CDG, 1999: 
3). The role of the press to disseminate information as a way of mediating between 
the state and all facets of civil society is critical. A media sector supportive of 
democracy would be one that has a degree of editorial independence, is financially 
viable, has diverse and plural voices and serves the public interest. The public 
interest is defined as representing a plurality of voices, both through a greater 
number of outlets and through the diversity of views and voices reflected within one 
outlet. 
 
The perception has taken hold since the introduction of the PIB, which became the 
PSIB, that the government is targeting the media with the proposed legislation to 
weaken its watchdog role. Squabbles between government and the ruling party on 
the one hand, and stakeholders and opposition parties on the other hand, eventually 
even led to a dispute between government and the ruling party, as government 
objected to amendments proposed by the ANC, in response to sustained criticism of 
the Bill and threats to take it on constitutional review (Times Live, 13/6/2012). The 
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Department of State Security rejected proposals by the ruling party to give greater 
protection to whistle-blowers, to remove all minimum prison sentences from the Bill 
and to narrow the definition of national security.  
 
Criticising government’s approach to public diplomacy, the DA (2010) said that public 
diplomacy also meant challenges and solutions did not come from states alone, but 
that non-state actors could also contribute. This was evolution – from a hard-power 
to a soft-power approach. It was the only way to close the gap between domestic 
and foreign policy. In the modern world order countries had become brands that 
should be marketable in a global competitive economy, hence the need to influence 
the private sector to instill investor confidence and nation building. 
 
Political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi (Polity, 2011) observed that South African foreign 
policy as played out on the global stage, specifically in decisions made by the UNSC, 
lacked the institutional capacity to enforce directives. He said South Africa failed in 
its public diplomacy in that the general public was left wondering about certain policy 
issues advocated by the country in the UNSC. He cited DIRCO’s communication 
infrastructure and processes as being particularly problematic. 
 
In an argument with Eve Fairbanks of the Institute of Current World Affairs on her 
claim that South Africa’s foreign policy lacked “sufficient moral content”, Eusebius 
McKaiser of the University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Ethics insisted that “a 
dearth of morality” was not one of South Africa’s foreign policy weaknesses, though 
it certainly had “massive foreign-policy weaknesses”. He listed these as: poor public 
diplomacy, inconsistent and unpredictable moves on the world stage, and political 
and technical skills deficits within the international relations department (Foreign 
Policy, March/April 2012).  
 
Commentators argue that non-state actors should also contribute to the solution of 
public diplomacy challenges (Foreign Policy, March/April 2012). This would mean 
evolution from a hard-power to a soft-power approach and close the gap between 
domestic and foreign policy. Countries had become brands that should be 
marketable in a global competitive economy, hence the need to influence the private 
sector to instill investor confidence and nation building. South Africa failed in its 
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public diplomacy in that the general public was left wondering about certain policy 
issues advocated by the country.  
 
8.5. Examples of South African public diplomacy 
Whereas the Dalai Lama visa dispute might be described as “bad public diplomacy”, 
the use of sport diplomacy by South Africa can be described as good diplomacy. 
Sport under apartheid was conducted in accordance with the principle of “separate 
development”, giving rise to international organisations such as the UN and OAU 
agitating for an international sports boycott against South Africa. The loss of sporting 
links played a significant part in the pressure brought down on the apartheid 
government. The rebranding of the triumphant 1995 Springbok World Cup team, 
showing national unity in support of the team, can be said to have made for “good 
pubic diplomacy”. The images broadcast to the world during the Rugby World Cup 
formed the world’s idea of the new South Africa. This re-engaged the world in terms 
of commitment, not just on sporting levels, but political and economic too. The public 
diplomacy created by hosting the Rugby World Cup contributed to the return of 
foreign investment and reinforcement of trade and other economic links that had 
been ruined through the policies of apartheid and the ensuing boycotts and 
embargoes. 
9. Identity interests and norms underlying South Africa’s foreign policy and 
public diplomacy 
 
The identity, interests and norms underlying South African foreign policy is 
assessed, as well as the use of public diplomacy as a supporting tool.  
 
At one level of analysis public diplomacy is an instrument of statecraft 
distinguishable from other instruments (Gregory, 2005). At another level, it cuts 
across all political, economic and military instruments of statecraft and is essential to 
their use and success. Public diplomacy can be analysed for its relevance to policies 
and for its significance in moving from intent to action.  
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Van Wyk (2004: 105) writes about South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, 
explains the constructivist approach (that state identities are constructed and not 
made) and quotes Friedrich Kratochwil contending that words often make the world. 
Constructivism focuses on the power of ideas in defining actions and interactions; 
the importance of identity in defining what actors want; the cyclical relationship 
between an actor’s interests, identities and behaviour; and the social context in 
which the actor exists.  
 
Wendt (1999: 1) refers to two basic tenets of Constructivism, namely that the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas, rather 
than material forces; and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. 
 
A 1996 Foreign Policy Discussion Document of the DFA identified problems such as 
the lack of a South African identity that is evident in foreign-policy decisions; 
uncertainty over the values that apply/should apply in South Africa's foreign policy; 
and the lack of clearly defined national interests (Henwood, 1997).  
 
 
9.1. Identity 
 
Berg (2009: 9) gives an explanation of identity, quoting Wendt, who described it as 
relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations of self. Our 
understanding of identity rests on three premises. Firstly, identity is not essential but 
socially constructed in the process of describing and conceptualising it. Secondly, 
identity is rational in the sense that the self is defined through relationships to various 
“significant others”. Finally, identity has a narrative discursive structure of which 
memory and history are essential ingredients.  
 
Foreign policy, while serving the national interests in the international system, also 
aids in creating and re-constructing the national collective identity. This is true for all 
states. Telhami and Barnett (2002: 7) noted that identity appears at different places 
in the causal chain. It can be an ideological device to justify self-interested politics, it 
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can be part of the cultural terrain and thus conditions the possible and the actual, or 
it can provide a direct link to a discrete foreign policy preference or outcome.  
 
The 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy states that in terms of South 
Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two 
central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity (DIRCO, 2011b). 
South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and 
therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s 
stability, unity and prosperity. 
 
According to goals set out in the White Paper, South Africa should endeavour to 
shape and strengthen its national identity; cultivate its national pride and patriotism; 
address the injustices of its past, including those of race and gender; bridge the 
divides in society to ensure social cohesion and stability; and grow the economy for 
the development and upliftment of its people (DIRCO, 2011b). 
 
The White Paper also describes South Africa as a multifaceted, multicultural and 
multiracial country that embraces the concept of ubuntu as a way of defining who we 
are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of ubuntu means “humanity” and is 
reflected in the idea that South Africans affirm their humanity when they affirm the 
humanity of others. It has played a major role in the forging of a South African 
national consciousness and in the process of its democratic transformation and 
nation-building (DIRCO, 2011b).  
 
Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading 
role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the 
eradication of poverty and underdevelopment (DIRCO, 2011a). South Africa’s unique 
approach to global issues has found expression in the concept of ubuntu. These 
concepts inform South Africa’s particular approach to diplomacy and shape its vision 
of a better world for all.  
 
This philosophy translates into an approach to international relations that respects all 
nations, peoples and cultures. It recognises that it is in the national interest to 
promote and support the positive development of others. Similarly, national security 
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would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a universal goal, 
based on the principle of Batho Pele (“putting people first”) (DIRCO, 2011a). In the 
modern world of globalisation, a constant element has to be our common humanity. 
South Africa therefore champions collaboration, cooperation and building 
partnerships over conflict. This recognition of our interconnectedness and 
interdependency and the infusion of ubuntu into the South African identity, shapes its 
foreign policy.  
 
South Africa therefore accords central importance to the immediate African 
neighbourhood and continent; working with countries of the South to address shared 
challenges of underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice; 
cooperating with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for 
a better world; and strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation, to 
reflect the diversity of nations, and ensure its centrality in global governance 
(DIRCO, 2011a). 
 
According to the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, South Africa’s 
international relations work must inter alia endeavour to shape and strengthen its 
national identity, and the department and its diplomatic missions abroad should carry 
out its mandate by conducting public diplomacy (DIRCO, 2010: 3.9). 
 
In the controversy about the government’s refusal of a visa to the Dalai, those 
supporting the Dalai Lama’s visit seem to have a different sense of South Africa’s 
identity to the South African government.  
 
Civil society and the media expect the infusion of ubuntu into the South African 
identity to shape its foreign policy and to inform South Africa’s approach to 
diplomacy. They have an anticipation that this philosophy should translate into an 
approach to international relations that respects people – as professed by the 
government.  
 
What the government holds up as policy and civil society expects appear to be in 
line. The problem, however, lies at the level of execution. Government does not 
seem to be convinced that it is in the best material interest of the country to follow 
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through on pursuing these lofty ideals at the risk of offending a powerful partner such 
as China, though it would publicly still claim its commitment to these principles. Civil 
society, on the other hand, sees this as weakness and a sign that government had 
abandoned these values.  
 
9.2. National interest 
 
According to Holsti (1977: 138 – 139), the term “national interest” has been used (or 
abused) as a device for analysing a nation’s objectives. The vagueness of the 
concept is seen as its main shortcoming. Seabury (1963: 86) suggested that the idea 
of national interest may refer to some ideal set of purposes which a nation should 
seek to realise in the conduct of its foreign relations. This might be referred to as a 
normative civic concept of national interest. A second meaning might be called 
descriptive and in this sense the national interest may be regarded as the purposes 
the nation, through its leadership, appears to pursue persistently over time.  
 
Davidson (2009: 128 - 129) concurs that the notion of national interest is deemed 
‘problematic’. Realists want a foreign policy that accords with what is seen as a fact 
of human nature over the long run; that people act according to their interests and 
levels of power. Thus political leaders addressing foreign policy will act according to 
national interest regardless of ideology, religion or the nature of their government. 
This is because when rational, their behaviour is dictated by the structural nature of 
the essentially lawless international relations system. National leaders run into 
trouble when they confuse the desirable with the possible. Realists are also 
suspicious of the demand that universal moral principles be applied to the actions of 
states.  
 
Regarding the issue of the national interest, many questions arise, not least the 
accusation that it is an old-fashioned concept used obsessively during the Cold War 
era to promote questionable ideologies, conceal poor policies or justify unethical 
behaviour (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). Krasner (1978) uses the term to refer to the 
preferences of a nation’s leaders, or the goals sought by the state. Such 
preferences, or set of objectives, must be related to general societal goals, persist 
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over time and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the 
term.  
 
The key insight from the constructivist paradigm concerns the role of identity and 
focuses attention on the relationship between the concepts “identity”, “interest” and 
“threat” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). Weldes (1999) argues that identity is constructed 
and reconstructed in relation to others. Threats are the insecurities faced by 
particular identities. Some threat perceptions are a direct function of identity - they 
follow from the nature of a particular identity. Other threat perceptions are a function 
of interpretation of actions or events made possible through the “security imaginary”.  
 
Van Nieuwkerk (2004) continues explaining that interests - those “national interests” 
or ‘preferences’ articulated by decision makers - are also two-fold: they can be a 
logical function of the identity itself, or a function of specific threats constructed in 
relation to the identity. The three concepts are thus mutually constituted: it is in 
relation to identities, or identities and threat perceptions, that interests are identified.  
 
Van Nieuwkerk (2004) argues that it appears that states tend to pursue two kinds of 
policy preferences to operationalise their perceived/constructed national interest: 
material (that is, economic well-being) or ideological. National security can mean the 
pursuit of freedom from threat. In South Africa, foreign policy and national interests 
could be debated much more vigorously, but in practice there is almost no debate on 
these issues.  
 
Given the country’s economic profile, public policies focusing on the human security 
agenda (poverty eradication, job creation, economic growth, personal security) 
should constitute the core of South Africa’s national interest (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). 
This poses the question whether it means that its foreign policy should, therefore, 
mostly be about trade and investment. What about the pursuit of other values? 
 
The 2008 DFA Discussion Document suggests that South Africa should deal with 
African partners as equals “and avoid all hegemonic ambitions”, adding that “a 
narrow, short-term approach aimed at promoting self-interest must be avoided” 
(South African Government Information, 2008). It is further noted that South Africa is 
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guided by its own strategic national interest where relations with third countries are 
concerned, and this is done in a non-confrontational, non-ideological and rational 
manner. 
 
Moeletsi Mbeki (2002) argues that there has been too little debate about what the 
broad national interest is and the ways and means to pursue it. He states that the 
overarching driver of much of South Africa's foreign engagement has been the fight 
against global inequity and African marginalisation. South Africa's global and 
continental engagement is built on the ideological premise that the West and 
particularly the US carries a huge burden of responsibility for the imbalances in the 
international system. Therefore, this should be countered wherever possible. 
 
Mbeki (2002) is further of the opinion that when South Africa's often competing 
foreign policy objectives clash (for example, the promotion of good governance and 
democracy versus solidarity with the Global South or with African national-liberation 
leaders), its ideological commitment to reverse global power imbalances or to “cock 
a snook” at the West, seem to trump the rest. He suggests an alternative foreign 
policy, saying that in today's world of global interdependence, the national interest (to 
make a better life for all and to create more jobs, more prosperity and less poverty) is 
about the pursuit of economic interests at the regional and international level. This 
has to be achieved in a globalised competitive world. With that in mind, Mr Mbeki 
(2002) argues that South Africa's foreign policy should have the following elements: 
 
• South Africa's global standing (as with all countries) has to be carefully 
nurtured;  
• Government should encourage an open, ongoing dialogue and debate among 
various sectors of society on the nexus between foreign engagement and 
national imperatives, followed by a clear articulation to citizens of what this 
national interest is and how foreign relations are vehicles for achieving this; 
• Foreign policy should be more focused on where it can have maximum impact 
and where national interests have the most at stake. The ability to prioritise is 
an essential component of any foreign policy engagement, even more so for a 
country of South Africa's size and limited resources; 
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• South Africa should build stronger bilateral partnerships (both with key 
Western countries and developing countries) that allow it to advance its 
agendas, not forsaking the ability to build bridges across opposing views; and 
• It should also know when to “play hardball” - not only with the North, but also 
with the developing world - when its fundamental interests, core values and 
continental vision are being undermined. 
 
An analysis of the principles and objectives of the foreign policy of the then 
Government of National Unity (GNU) leads to the conclusion that it reflects the 
foreign policy of any “normal” state (Henwood, 1997). It was also noticeable that 
these principles were contained in the basic foreign policy aims of most states and 
that it implied an emphasis on the national and security interests of the own state as 
fundamental policy principles. The focus on regional cooperation and peaceful co-
existence was also “a normal part” of the foreign policy of any state.  
 
Public diplomacy can be seen to support the most vital interests of nations (Melissen 
2005: 9). Public diplomacy is even described as the process by which direct relations 
with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests of and extend the 
values of those being represented (Melissen, 2005: 11). Modern public diplomacy is 
a two-way street (Melissen, 2005: 18). Though the practising diplomat will always 
have his own country’s interests and foreign policy goals in mind, it will also listen to 
what people have to say. It is not one-way messaging.  
 
Public diplomacy has been widely seen as the transparent means by which a 
sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing 
and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national 
interest and advancing its foreign policy goals (CPD, 2012). 
 
Considering a practical example from abroad, the mission of American public 
diplomacy is described as supporting the achievement of US foreign policy goals and 
objectives, advancing national interests, and enhancing national security by 
informing and influencing foreign publics, and by expanding and strengthening the 
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relationship between the people and government of the US and citizens of the rest of 
the world (US Department of State, 2012). 
 
The Public Diplomacy Section of the South African Embassy in Washington (South 
Africa Embassy Washington DC, undated) again defines its purpose in terms of the 
promotion, protection and enhancement of South Africa's national interest.  
 
9.3. Values 
 
A distinction can be made, according to Lucarelli (2006), between values, images of 
the world and principles. Values can be defined as notions laden with absolute (non-
instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give to 
our world. General examples of values are summarised in The Charter for 
Fundamental Rights and include dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity and justice. 
Values are not necessarily of a moral type and almost any notion can be claimed to 
be a value in a given community.  
 
Images of the world or world views are based on experiences and cultural traditions 
of the relationships between the physical and social world (Lucarelli, 2006). Images 
of the world provide the cognitive framework within which values are defined and 
translated into principles and political action.  
 
Principles are normative propositions that translate values into general 
“constitutional” standards for policy action (Lucarelli, 2006). In terms of the actions 
we are seeking to explain, our focus on principles allows us to encompass loosely 
constituted ideals and potentially instrumentalist policies.  
 
Values are not automatically translated into principles or principles into policies. 
Henwood (1997) refers to the development of South Africa's foreign policy since April 
1994, and notes the emphasis on democracy, justice and human rights, which 
brought a new dimension to the declared foreign policy, namely that of morality. This 
posed important challenges for South Africa, as it could lead to conflict between 
perceived interests and the “right” decision, and had implications for the allocation of 
resources for essential foreign-policy goals (national interests), as opposed to 
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morally justifiable objectives that may, in the long run, negatively influence the 
material position of the own state.  
 
Rittberger (2001: 121) notes that norms can be invoked by actors within and outside 
states and be expressed by either of them as expressions of appropriate behaviour 
addressed to a state’s foreign policy decision makers. Especially prominent norms, 
such as the protection of human rights or the promotion of free trade, are widely 
shared both within states and at the level of international society.  
 
Discussing an example of interest versus norms, it is noted that the South African 
Government decided to develop diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China, instead of maintaining such with the Republic of China (or Taiwan) 
(Henwood, 1997). The new diplomatic partner contravened all the principles 
underlying the foreign policy of South Africa. It is not democratic, had one of the 
worst human rights records in the world and had no significant investments in South 
Africa. The reasons for the decision to develop diplomatic relations in this instance 
could be found in the national interests of South Africa.  
 
It is suggested that it is naive to imagine that South Africa can have a selfless foreign 
policy based solely on human rights (HSF, 1996). The promotion of national interest 
is the heart of every country's foreign policy – it could be argued that it is any 
government's moral duty to its citizens to promote that interest. So it would not be 
surprising if South Africa wished to modify a purist human rights stand to stay on 
side with states with whom its trade, investment or defence links are particularly 
strong. 
 
According to Gregory (2005: 7), the well-established purpose of public diplomacy 
includes actions in support of values. Countries that are likely to be more attractive in 
international relations are those whose culture and ideas are closer to prevailing 
international norms and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and 
policies (Nye, 2004: 61).  
 
Khadiagala (2001: 177) argues that South Africa is suffering from an identity crisis in 
its external relations. It can carry on its communication on equal terms to articulate 
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the needs, concerns and fears of the developing world, while conversely interpreting 
the concerns and fears of the developed world. As this could be seen to be all things 
to all countries, the challenge is to formulate a coherent, defensible, principled 
foreign policy, though not with a dogmatic obsession with morality and at the 
expense of self-interest, but harmonising these. 
 
Khadiagala (2001: 177) uses Zimbabwe as an example and says there should be a 
balance between quiet and public diplomacy; between recognising the legitimacy of 
the land issue and the real grievances of the opposition; between engagement and 
punitive distance. South Africa was expected to take a leading role in defence of 
democratic values, but “quiet diplomacy” underscored South Africa’s willingness to 
overtly challenge the norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of SADC 
members and African states as a whole. Forsaking the issue of human rights and 
democracy in South Africa’s foreign policy amounted to a denial of the core elements 
of its national identity.  
 
On the other hand, when South Africa does pursue an ethical foreign policy, its moral 
posture comes over preachy (Khadiagala, 2001: 177). It is argued that South Africa 
lacks the will and capacity to deploy economic and military instruments to induce 
states to conform to the strictures of the African Renaissance, leaving it to look like a 
well-intentioned missionary, instead of a regional power.  
 
There is a continuing debate about the focus and direction of foreign policy that 
reflects a tension of interaction between pragmatists who wish to fix South Africa’s 
aspirations to the limitations of internal socio-economic conditions, and idealists who 
take a normative stance with concerns of justice, human rights and democracy at the 
centre of foreign policy debate (Khadiagala, 2001: 178). However, these need not be 
mutually exclusive and can be merged in South Africa’s foreign-policy objectives.  
  
Human rights concerns in South Africa’s foreign policy should not only be considered 
‘constitutional’ in the national sense (from South Africa’s Constitution), but also 
‘international’ (from international human rights instruments) (Titus 2009: 8). When 
South Africa is engaging on human rights at international forums, it is not so much in 
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terms of its Constitution, but to what degree the country is giving effect to its 
international commitments (Titus 2009: 9).  
 
Public concern over South Africa’s approach to human rights in its foreign policy 
stemmed from the position the country assumed on the crisis in Zimbabwe and 
positions it took as a member of the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights 
Council (Titus 2009: 11). The decision to twice deny a visa to the Dalai Lama is 
consistent with this trend. Analysts suggested that human rights were no longer a 
prominent consideration for South Africa’s foreign policy (Titus 2009: 11). However, 
as far as the South African government was concerned, the status quo on human 
rights and foreign policy was unmistakably established and human rights remained 
the accepted “light that guides our foreign affairs” (Titus 2009: 11-12). As with other 
claims of a shift in its human rights approach, the government through the ruling 
party insisted that the 2009 refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama did not mark the 
undermining of human rights. They thought this country was “more sensitive to 
human rights than many” (Cape Argus, 27/3/2009). 
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) expressed concern for the place occupied by human 
rights considerations in the country’s foreign policy (Titus 2009: 12). It was noted that 
supporters of human rights watched in elation as apartheid ended in South Africa, 
but many were dismayed as the country’s foreign policy later often aligned with 
global enemies of human rights.  HRW also emphasised the swing of post-apartheid 
South Africa towards arguments in favour of the defence of sovereignty. This is 
favoured by violators of human rights, and is a central challenge to the 
institutionalisation of human rights in foreign policy (Titus 2009: 12). 
 
Human rights do not focus on the promotion of a country’s material interests (Titus 
2009: 15). The promotion of human rights can even be in conflict with a country’s 
material interests. Countries that wish to promote human rights in other countries 
therefore consistently find themselves balancing interests and determining priorities. 
(Titus 2009: 15). In the case of South Africa denying the Dalai Lama a visa, 
presumably under pressure from China, it is clearly in conflict with its own ideational 
interest, as its domestic constituency is clearly in favour of granting him a visa based 
on human rights considerations. The government, however, considers it to be in the 
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country’s material interest not to grant the visa, as trade and other relations with 
China might be harmed.  
 
However, the Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) comes out in defence of interests 
over human rights in South Africa’s foreign policy pursuits:  
 
It is naive to imagine that South Africa can have a selfless foreign policy 
based solely on human rights. The promotion of national interest is the 
inevitable and entirely proper heart of every country's foreign policy – indeed 
… it is any government's moral duty to its citizens to promote that interest. So 
it would not be surprising if South Africa wished to modify a purist human 
rights stand to stay on side with states with whom its trade, investment or 
defence links are particularly strong (HSF, 1996). 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
Examining South African foreign policy, diplomacy and public diplomacy, particularly 
since 1994, it becomes apparent that with its transition to democracy, South Africa 
went through an extraordinary transformation. While there was a limited role for 
public diplomacy in the more secretive, low-key, mostly bilateral South African 
diplomacy before the political transition, there was a more significant place for it in 
the diplomacy of the post-political transition South Africa, which was more open.  
 
South Africa’s foreign relations are based on the following values: the promotion of 
human rights and democracy; justice and international law; internationally agreed-
upon mechanisms for conflict resolution; African interests; and economic 
development through regional and international cooperation. Like all other states 
South Africa at times has to weigh adhering to these values against matters of 
national interest. South Africa's foreign policy is also guided by four pillars: the 
African agenda; South-South cooperation; North-South dialogue; multilateral and 
economic diplomacy; and bilateral relations with individual countries.  
 
DIRCO’s Public Diplomacy Branch focuses on developing the standing of South 
Africa and Africa at home and internationally. It promotes an understanding, both 
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domestically and internationally, of South Africa’s role and position in international 
relations and supports South Africa’s image, policies and programmes at 
international level.  
 
There seems to be agreement that South Africa’s foreign-policy strategies allowed it 
to “punch above its weight” as a middle-ranking power in Africa, influencing world 
affairs in ways typically associated with much greater powers.  
 
The 1994 general election marked the end of decades of struggle – both 
domestically and internationally – leading to the end of apartheid. Since its founding 
in 1912, the ANC has been dedicated to a non-racial South Africa. When it came into 
power this was translated into a vision of South Africa where human rights were 
respected and this orientation was expanded to the international realm by 
incorporating human rights as a key driver of its foreign policy (Borer & Mills, 2009:3-
5).  
 
South Africa’s identity and its perceptions of its interests were therefore domestically 
generated, based on its history and its new understanding of itself. There seemed to 
be a very strong constructivist account of South Africa’s stated policies. However, 
despite pronouncements in favour of a human-rights-based foreign policy, South 
Africa has in fact pursued traditionally-defined interests, even at the expense of its 
declared principles. 
 
Moving on, the focus shifts from foreign policy and diplomacy issues to the 
relationship between the South African Government and the media through a 
discussion of the refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2009.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE REFUSAL OF A VISA TO THE DALAI LAMA IN 2009  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There was wide media coverage, mostly critical, of the decision of the South African 
Government not to grant a visa to the 14th Dalai Lama to attend a peace conference 
linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup scheduled to be held in Johannesburg in March 
2009. The same was true of the government’s handling of his later visa application to 
attend the 80th birthday celebrations of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu in Cape 
Town in 2011.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to track the media’s coverage of these two decisions 
and the government’s handling of the situation as reflected in media reportage of the 
issue. This chapter considers previous visits to South Africa by the Dalai Lama and 
concentrates on media coverage of the government’s refusal of a visa in 2009. This 
includes the voices of the South African and Chinese governments, conference 
organisers, civil society, Tibetans, political parties and analysts as covered by the 
media.  
 
2. Previous visits to South Africa by the Dalai Lama and its significance 
 
The Dalai Lama has visited South Africa on three previous occasions. In 1996, 
President Mandela, despite intense pressure from the Chinese, not only allowed the 
Dalai Lama to visit South Africa, but agreed to meet with him (Saks, 2011). 
Mandela’s decision coincided with time when his government had to decide on 
whether it would maintain relations with Taiwan or establish new relations with 
China.  
 
At the time, South Africa opted for a “Two China’s” policy which, due to Chinese 
pressure was changed to favour China only. However, while allowing the Dalai Lama 
to visit South Africa, President Mbeki would not agree to a one-on-one meeting with 
him during visits in 1999 and 2004 (Phayl.com, 2004).  
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Guy Lieberman, a South African campaigner for Tibetan national rights, was involved 
in arranging the meeting between the Dalai Lama and President Mandela in 1996. 
The Dalai Lama’s impressions of President Mandela reportedly went something like 
this: 
 
In preparing to meet with Nelson Mandela, I considered that his reputation 
was in fact the largest in the world. There is no-one greater living on the 
planet at this time. And in only his case, did I find the person larger than the 
reputation (Saks, 2011).  
 
In 1999, the Dalai Lama was allowed to attend the Parliament of the World’s 
Religions (PWR) in Cape Town.50 A row reportedly broke out after President Thabo 
Mbeki agreed to see the Dalai Lama separately again. The Chinese Government 
apparently protested and President Mbeki cancelled the meeting. President Mbeki’s 
aide, Parks Mankahlana, said that the Dalai Lama was only one of a host of religious 
leaders who wanted to meet President Mbeki and that PWR organisers had agreed 
that a representative group, including the Dalai Lama, would meet the President (iol, 
2/12/1999).  
 
Brahma Das, executive director of the Council for World Tibet Day, told a session of 
the PWR that the publicity over President Mbeki's decision had, however, had the 
effect of making more South Africans aware of the Tibet issue (iol 2/12/1999). 
Brahma Das said the real reason was that President Mbeki had made a firm decision 
not to meet the Dalai Lama one-on-one. It was reported that there had been 
‘speculation’ that President Mbeki had bowed to Chinese pressure not to meet the 
Tibetan, though this was denied by his office (iol, 2/12/1999).  
 
A cartoon (see Figure 3) by Zapiro published in the Sunday Times (28/11/1999) 
depicts former President Thabo Mbeki running with China behind him on a cart with 
a list of trade promises dangling like a carrot in front of him, leaving the Dalai Lama 
                                                 
50 The PWR was created to cultivate harmony among the world's religious and spiritual communities, 
and foster their engagement with the world and its guiding institutions in order to achieve a just, 
peaceful and sustainable world (PWR, 2013). 
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behind holding his hand out to greet the President. It is representative of media 
sentiment and like a bad omen of future visits in hind sight (Zapiro, 1999).51 
 
Figure 5: Dalai Lama and South Africa's Trade Relations with China 
  
Source: Sunday Times, 28/11/1999 
 
The Dalai Lama did not meet President Thabo Mbeki on his visit to South Africa in 
2004 at all (Phayul.com, 2004). The organisers of the visit, the African Cultural 
Heritage Trust, did not ask for a meeting, to avoid a repetition of the controversy 
when he visited in 1999. Despite this, the Dalai Lama met with Zulu King Goodwill 
Zwelithini and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. 
 
Whereas the Dalai Lama was in South Africa on previous occasions during visits 
coordinated by activist for Tibetan freedom, Guy Lieberman, to attend the PWR and 
at the invitation of the African Cultural Heritage Trust, the invitation in 2009 was to 
                                                 
51 Zapiro is the pseudonym of South African cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro. 
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speak at a 2010 World Cup-organised peace conference in Johannesburg. The Dalai 
Lama had been invited by his three fellow South African Nobel Peace Prize 
Laureates, former Presidents Nelson Mandela and FW De Klerk52, and Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu (iol, 24/3/2009). Former President Motlanthe had reportedly 
also written a letter to support the conference, used by the three South African Nobel 
Laureates to invite the Dalai Lama (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). The line-up 
would also include the Nobel Peace Prize committee from Norway, the UN Peace 
Ambassador, actress Charlize Theron and actor Morgan Freeman, who was cast in 
the role of Mandela in Invictus, a film about the International Rugby Board’s (IRB) 
World Cup in 1995, as co-hosts.  
 
The opening preamble to a press release on the 2009 South Africa Peace 
Conference that was to be held at Constitution Hill in Johannesburg, read: “From 
Robben Island and dusty township pitches to the Soccer World Cup in a Rainbow 
Nation” (goal.com, 2009). The conference, of which South African Premier Soccer 
League (PSL) Executive Chairman, Irvin Khoza, was to have been the Chief Patron, 
would focus on a number of issues relating to peace and harmony and the role 
soccer had played in achieving this.  
 
Khoza said he hoped that the conference, could put a huge focus on the country, not 
only as a host of the 2010 World Cup, but also the role the event and soccer had 
played and could play in peace and harmony in the country, the continent of Africa 
and the entire world (goal.com 2009). South Africa – the Good News (sagoodnews, 
2009) dubbed the event “the world's first Peace Conference” and reported that it 
would focus on racism, xenophobia and the power of soccer in generating peace and 
harmony. 
 
It was reported that the decision to ban the Dalai Lama was made after intelligence 
reports indicated that he had planned to use the visit as a launching pad for his 
“return to Tibet” campaign (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). This would have 
caused problems because he would have had to share a stage with President 
Motlanthe, who would have made the opening address at the 2010 peace 
                                                 
52 FW de Klerk served as South African President from 1989 until 1994.  
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conference. The government had feared that this would put it on a collision course 
with the Chinese, who had invested more than R60 billion in South Africa. However, 
organisations sympathetic to the spiritual leader denied planning to hijack the 
programme to highlight the Tibetan cause (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
The anniversary of the 1959 uprising and establishment of a Tibetan government-in-
exile in India, as well as anti-Chinese riots in the Tibetan capital Lhasa in 2008, also 
heightened sensitivities about the issue of China's occupation of Tibet (Vancouver 
Sun, 25/3/2009). ANC president Jacob Zuma (in March 2009) backed the 
government's stance on denying the Dalai Lama a visa to visit South Africa, arguing 
that the government "must have considered a number of issues" in taking its 
decision (praag.co.uk, 2009).53  
 
At that stage the ANC’s presidential candidate, Zuma said governments took 
decisions which were informed "by the nature of their relations with other countries" 
(praag.co.uk, 2009). He continued explaining that the government was not saying 
that the Dalai Lama could not come to South Africa, but the month of March, was “a 
serious month between the Dalai Lama and China in a very specific way”.54 Zuma 
added that there were a number of countries who refused the Dalai Lama entry in 
March every year. South Africa was not the first country to take this kind of action. 
Problems arose between France and China because of the Dalai Lama and France 
eventually had to apologise. 
 
The event to be attended by the Dalai Lama in 1999 was thus of a much higher 
magnitude than the previous events attended in South Africa by the Dalai Lama, 
both by the nature of the event itself and the timing in terms of relations between 
Tibet and China.  
 
3. The 2009 invitation to the Dalai Lama 
 
The 2009 visit to South Africa would be the fourth to South Africa by the Dalai Lama.  
                                                 
53 Jacob Zuma has been ANC President since December 2007. He was inaugurated as South Africa’s 
President in June 2009. 
54 March 2009 marked the 50th anniversary of a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule, which 
led to the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile in India. 
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The invitation was extended by South African Nobel Peace Laureates to attend a 
peace conference linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup Tournament (goal.com, 2009).  
 
3.1. Invitation and purpose of the visit 
 
In 2008, a delegation from South Africa, led by Nelson Mandela’s grandson, Chief 
Mandla Mandela, visited Oslo, Norway, to officially hand over an invitation to attend 
the peace conference to the Nobel Peace Committee (goal.com, 2009). The 
invitation was signed by President Kgalema Motlanthe and the three living South 
African Laureates, Archbishop Emeritus, Desmond Tutu, former Presidents FW de 
Klerk and Nelson Mandela. The Nobel Committee accepted the invitation to the 
Peace Conference in what would be the Committee’s first ever official visit to an 
event outside Norway.  
 
Following three previous visits to South Africa, South Africa’s surviving Nobel Peace 
Laureates, former Presidents Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk, and Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, invited fellow Laureate, the Dalai Lama, to attend the conference to 
discuss ways of using football to fight racism and xenophobia ahead of the 2010 
World Cup in South Africa (Mail & Guardian, 27/9/2009). President Motlanthe had 
also written a letter to support the conference, used by the three South African Nobel 
laureates to invite the Dalai Lama (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
The peace conference was an initiative of the 2010 Local Organising Committee 
(LOC) of the FIFA World Cup. Conference Chief Patron and LOC Chairman Irvin 
Khoza said soccer played a huge role in bringing unity to South Africa (sagoodnews, 
2009). The conference was endorsed by the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee 
and would see Nobel Laureates from each continent gather in South Africa for their 
first official visit to an event outside Norway.  
 
It was indicated that confirmed participants included the Dalai Lama and Martti 
Ahtisaari (the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize winner), as well as South Africa's three 
Laureates. The conference gala dinner would be co-hosted by Charlize Theron and 
Morgan Freeman. Khoza said the LOC was “honoured and privileged to host an 
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event of this magnitude and calibre of people involved". Laureates attending the 
conference would conclude their visit by attending the Nelson Mandela Challenge 
match at the re-opening of the Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenburg where Bafana 
Bafana, the South African national soccer team, would host Norway (sagoodnews, 
2009). 
  
It was also reported in the media that the Dalai Lama was invited to speak at the 
peace conference along with South Africa’s (living) Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, 
former Presidents Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk, who won jointly in 1993, and 
Anglican Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, who won in 1984 (Pretoria News 
Weekend, 21/3/2009). The conference focus on racism, xenophobia and the power 
of soccer in generating peace was mentioned too.  
 
3.2. The decision to refuse a visa 
 
As judged from the perspective given in initial media coverage, there was confusion 
about whether the government had in fact strictly taken a decision not to grant the 
Dalai Lama a visa and if so, the reasons for the decision.   
 
As the first news broke alleging a government “ban on a visit to South Africa by the 
Dalai Lama” it was noted that DFA spokesperson, Ronnie Mamoepa, had denied the 
government was blocking the invitation to the Dalai Lama, insisting that, "no 
invitation had been extended to the Dalai Lama" (iol, 22/3/2009). Asked if South 
Africa had withheld an invitation under pressure from China, he said that South 
Africa made “its own sovereign, independent decisions” based on what it deemed to 
be in the best interests of the country. The media indicated that the Dalai Lama was 
invited to speak at the conference, however, in a letter sent to the three South 
African Nobel Laureates, he apologised for not being able to attend, saying he had 
been “asked to postpone the trip”.  
 
Presidential spokesperson Thabo Masebe reportedly admitted South Africa had 
refused the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the international peace conference in 
Johannesburg, saying it was not in South Africa's interest for him to attend. He said if 
the Dalai Lama attended the conference, the focus would shift away from the 2010 
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World Cup (CNN, 2009). Cabinet spokesperson Themba Maseko reiterated this 
stance saying the government did not want sporting events, particularly 2010, to be 
used as a platform to advance political causes (Sowetanlive, 2009).  
 
In what the Sowetan interpreted as “the clearest indication yet that South Africa 
bowed to pressure from China” to deny the Tibetan religious leader a visa, Maseko 
said that “a choice was made that our interests were better served if we don't 
jeopardise our bilateral relations with China (Sowetanlive, 2009)." 
 
ANC president Jacob Zuma backed the government's stance on denying the Dalai 
Lama a visa to visit South Africa, arguing that the government "must have 
considered a number of issues" in taking its decision (praag.co.uk, 2009). He said 
governments took decisions which were informed "by the nature of their relations 
with other countries (praag.co.uk, 2009)". He made it clear that the government did 
not say that the Dalai Lama could not come to South Africa ever, but March, was “a 
serious month between the Dalai Lama and China”. (praag.co.uk, 2009). 
 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel said denying the Dalai Lama a visa to enter South 
Africa was "a matter of relations between states" (Xinhau, 2009). The Dalai Lama 
could not be allowed to raise global issues on South African soil that would affect the 
country's standing. He claimed that the reason why the Dalai Lama wanted to be in 
South Africa was to make a big global political statement about the 'secession' of 
Tibet from China. Manuel said he was sure the Dalai Lama would be welcome to 
come at any other time, but that he should not be allowed to raise global issues that 
would impact on the standing of South Africa. 
 
Organisers initially said that the peace conference would go ahead with or without 
the Dalai Lama (Cape Argus, 23/3/2009). Other committee members of the Nobel 
Peace Committee planned to withdraw if the Dalai Lama was not granted a visa, the 
committee’s Director, Geir Lundestad, said. Later, Altaaf Kazi, General Manager of 
Communications at the Premier Soccer League (PSL), confirmed that the 
conference had been postponed. Ian MacFarlane, of the South African Friends of 
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Tibet (SAFT)55, hailed the decision to postpone the conference as a “victory for 
ubuntu and democracy in South Africa and worldwide” (Cape Argus, 24/3/2009). He 
said that thousands of South Africans and others had expressed their outrage 
against the government’s decision to withhold a visa to the Dalai Lama, in an online 
petition run by his organisation (Cape Argus, 24/3/2009). 
 
4. Media coverage of explanations and responses to the South African 
Government’s 2009 refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama 
 
Not all media coverage of all statements by all stakeholders in the dispute about the 
refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama can possibly be considered for monitoring and 
analysis. A certain media set had to be decided upon for optimum assessment 
considering the purpose of the analysis and the time constraints. The media sources 
used are restricted to the Independent News & Media. The limited choice of media is 
done on the basis of “reducing rectangles” (see Figure 4). Of everything taking place 
at a given moment, only a certain portion is noticed. Of all that is noticed, only a 
certain segment is recorded by the media as a whole. Of all that is recorded by the 
media, only a certain fraction can be monitored. Of what is monitored, only a certain 
share can be analysed.  
 
Independent Media was chosen as their flagship paper, The Star, is published in 
Gauteng. Gauteng is the most densely populated province in the country and hosts 
the seat of government. It is also the power-hub of the economy and is therefore the 
richest and most influential area in the country. Government itself would therefore 
pay most attention to these sources in considering its reaction to media reporting.  
 
The Gauteng-published The Star, the Pretoria News, the Sunday Independent and 
iol are the main sources of information. The Pretoria News specifically regularly 
carries coverage on South African foreign relations and policy. Where possible and 
where a relevant differing or enriching view was found in any of the Independent 
publications from another province, these were also included in the study. Attention  
                                                 
55 The SAFT raises awareness of the Tibetan situation in South Africa and supports the Dalai Lama in 
his calls for international pressure on the People's Republic of China to engage in meaningful 
dialogue with his representatives to resolve the situation in Tibet (SAFT, 2013). 
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Figure 6: Reducing rectangles in media analysis 
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was given to news reports and feature articles, as well as editorials. Media coverage 
on the course of the dispute about the refusal of the government to grant the Dalai 
Lama a visa to visit South Africa, is done on the basis of different voices to present 
the varying views displayed in the media. 
 
4.1. South African Government sources on the matter 
 
The media speculated from the outset that the South African Government seemed to 
have “bowed to pressure from China” not to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa. 
This inference came from Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Sunday Independent, 
22/3/2009), the Dalai Lama (The Mercury, 1/4/2009), the SAFT (Cape Argus, 
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2/4/2009), and the Tibet Society of South Africa (TSSA) (Sunday Independent, 
29/3/2009).56 
 
The Chinese Embassy in Pretoria admitted to appealing to the South African 
Government not to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa. They warned that it would 
harm bilateral relations and explained that it was a particularly inopportune time for 
the Dalai Lama to be visiting South Africa. It was the 60th anniversary of what 
Tibetans regarded as “China’s military invasion of Tibet”, but which the Chinese 
Government described as its “liberation of Tibetans from feudal serfdom” (Pretoria 
News Weekend, 21/3/2009). It was also the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s 
flight from Tibet into exile in India and the first anniversary of serious political unrest 
in Tibet.  
 
The Chinese Embassy in Pretoria further indicated that for South Africa to allow the 
Dalai Lama into the country at that time would greatly harm South African-Chinese 
relations (The Star, 23/3/2009). Despite South Africa’s denial that China influenced 
its decision to bar the Dalai Lama from entering South Africa, China also expressed 
appreciation for countries that “rejected” the Dalai Lama, saying all countries should 
respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “oppose Tibetan 
independence” (The Star, 25/3/2009). 
 
Ronnie Mamoepa, DFA spokesperson, insisted that “no invitation had been 
extended to the Dalai Lama” (Sunday Independent, 22/3/2009). When it was put to 
him that the Tibetan office in Pretoria had applied for a visa for the Dalai Lama on 4 
March 2009, Mamoepa said: “Visas are issued by Home Affairs and not by us.” 
Asked if South Africa had withheld an invitation to the Dalai Lama under pressure 
from China, he said: “This place is called the Republic of South Africa and not China 
and thus makes its own sovereign independent decisions based on what it deems to 
be in the best interests of the country” (Sunday Independent, 22/3/2009).  
 
Mamoepa said the government had decided it was not in South Africa’s interest to 
invite the Dalai Lama, but rejected suggestions that it had denied him entry under 
                                                 
56 The TSSA promotes awareness of Tibet, specifically focused on Tibetan culture, faith, environment 
and history (TSSA 2012).   
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pressure from China. He declined to elaborate, but the media claimed the decision 
had been linked to China’s establishment of an office in Johannesburg to disburse a 
R50 billion Africa investment fund (Pretoria News, 23/3/2009). Mamoepa said he had 
“not been advised of any intention to review” the Dalai Lama’s visa application (Cape 
Argus, 23/3/2009). He dismissed suggestions that the decision not to grant a visa to 
the Dalai Lama was taken by “his boss” (Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma): “It was a decision taken by Government” (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
Mamoepa refused to deny the existence of intelligence reports on the issue and said 
the government was aware that the spiritual leader would have addressed other 
functions had he been allowed entry: “The conference was about how football could 
be used (to advance) peace and conflict resolution. The Dalai Lama would divert the 
attention of the country and the world (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).” Mamoepa 
said he was welcome to visit South Africa, but ‘not now’ (Sunday Independent, 
29/3/2009). Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma also defended the 
government’s position (The Star, 27/3/2009).  
 
Thabo Masebe, President Kgalema Motlanthe’s spokesperson, said the President 
did not want the Dalai Lama in the country because the Tibetan spiritual leader 
would “divert attention” from the country’s 2010 FIFA World Cup celebrations. He 
said the decision was not personal (Pretoria News, 24/3/2009):  
 
The South African Government has nothing against the Dalai Lama. We have 
in fact on a few previous occasions hosted him in the country.  
 
Masebe added that Pretoria had not been pressured by the Chinese Government: 
“We do have excellent relations with China and these relations have produced 
increased trade and investment, but this did not influence our decision (Pretoria 
News, 24/3/2009).” Asked why The Presidency became embroiled in a decision to 
grant visas, which was normally an administrative call by Home Affairs, he cited 
protocol issues (Pretoria News, 24/3/2009):  
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When the Dalai Lama travels to South Africa, our government affords him the 
status above that of an ordinary visitor. So, his entry in South Africa is 
normally facilitated through diplomatic channels.  
 
Masebe reiterated the government’s stance that the Dalai Lama’s visit to the country 
was not in the best interests of the country: “Obviously, you cannot remove Tibet 
from him.” Asked if South Africa had consulted China before making the decision, he 
said: “This was a decision taken by the South African Government alone” (Pretoria 
News, 25/3/2009). Masebe also stated that the visit was “not in the interests of South 
Africa at this stage”. He said the conference to which the Dalai Lama was invited had 
been cancelled: “So the issue of the Dalai Lama, therefore, is no longer relevant” 
(Daily News, 26/3/2009).  
 
Government spokesperson, Themba Maseko, said South Africa did not want the 
2010 FIFA World Cup or the peace conference to be used to advance the causes of 
various political organisations, as this would divert attention from these events (The 
Mercury, 26/3/2009). Maseko added that the government was also faced with the 
choice between allowing the Dalai Lama access and damaging relations with China: 
“We believe that if you have to compare the interests of a peace conference as 
opposed to our economic concerns and our bilateral relations, our interests will be 
better served by making sure we do not jeopardise our relations with China (The 
Mercury, 26/3/2009)”. 
 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel said the Dalai Lama could not be allowed to raise 
global issues on South African soil that would affect the country’s standing. He said 
not allowing the Dalai Lama into South Africa was “a matter of relations between 
states”:  
 
To say anything against the Dalai Lama is, in some quarters, equivalent to 
trying to shoot Bambi … Let us put our cards on the table. Who is the Dalai 
Lama? … Is he just the spiritual leader of the Buddhists in Tibet, or is he the 
one who, on March 28, 1969 established a government-in-exile, in the same 
way as Taiwan was established, to counter the reality of a single China? 
(Cape Argus, 27/3/2009) 
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Manuel also said Tibet’s history had to be looked at, because the Lamas had been 
“feudal overlords” in that country:  
 
The reason why the Dalai Lama wants to be here … is to make a big global 
political statement about the secession of Tibet from China and he wants to 
make it on the free soil of South Africa. I am sure he is welcome to come at 
any other time, but we should not allow him to raise global issues that will 
impact on the standing of South Africa (Cape Argus, 27/3/2009). 
 
A unnamed diplomatic official “who understands the government decision-making 
process” said that it was Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s 
decision, although one “based on a well-established Government foreign policy 
agreed a long time ago by Cabinet” (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). 
 
It was also reported that the decision to ban the Dalai Lama was made after 
intelligence reports indicated that he had planned to use the visit as a launching pad 
for his “return to Tibet” campaign (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). According to 
Government sources, the Dalai Lama’s supporters had planned to stage protests 
against the Chinese Government – causing a diplomatic headache for South Africa 
with the Chinese (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
The Dalai Lama would apparently have used the platform to highlight the 50th 
anniversary of a failed Tibetan uprising against China. This would have caused 
problems because he would have had to share a stage with President Motlanthe, 
who would have made the opening address at the 2010 peace conference. The 
official said that the situation was further complicated by the fact that President 
Motlanthe had written a letter to support the conference, used by the three South 
African Nobel Laureates to invite the Dalai Lama (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
The government had feared that this would put it on a collision course with the 
Chinese, who had invested more than R60 billion in South Africa. However, 
organisations sympathetic to the spiritual leader denied planning to hijack the 
programme to highlight the Tibetan cause (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
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With allegations immediately being flaunted that the Government was “bowing to 
pressure” from China and the Chinese embassy in Pretoria admitting to warning the 
South African Government that it would harm bilateral relations if they allowed the 
Dalai Lama into South Africa, the South African Government was instantly on the 
defence in its response, saying South Africa made its own sovereign independent 
decisions based on what it deemed to be in the best interests of the country. These 
interests were defined in terms of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, arguing that the Dalai 
Lama would divert the attention of the country and the world.  
 
Government repeatedly denied it had been pressured by the Chinese Government, 
but conceded that faced with the choice between allowing the Dalai Lama access 
and damaging relations with China, interests would be better served by making sure 
relations with China were not jeopardised. Government’s bias in favour of China 
surfaced in the angry speech by Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, questioning the 
Dalai Lama’s bona fides in wanting to visit South Africa. This was supported by 
newspapers quoting intelligence reports indicating that he had planned to use the 
visit as a launching pad for his “return to Tibet” campaign. 
 
4.2. Statements by conference organisers 
 
Qunu Chief (traditional leader in the Eastern Cape) Mandla Mandela said that his 
grandfather had been “excited” to know there would be someone of the calibre of the 
Dalai Lama attending the conference (The Mercury, 24/3/2009). He added that 
although he had not spoken with his grandfather, he was convinced that he 
supported the decision of Archbishop Tutu and former President De Klerk to boycott 
the event (Pretoria News, 25/3/2009).  
 
Chief Mandela said he had been told by then President Motlanthe’s spokesperson 
that pressure from China had caused the spat: “It seems that China is exerting 
pressure that they should not issue a visa to the Dalai Lama to come to South Africa, 
but they would not say why” (The Mercury, 24/3/2009). Chief Mandela also lashed 
out at the government for treating the Tibetan leader as if he was persona non grata 
in the country: “It is a sad day for South Africa … and for Africa (because) we are a 
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nation that is renowned for our efforts for peace in countries like Burundi and Sudan” 
(The Star, 25/3/2009). 
 
4.3. Dissent in government ranks 
 
Certain government representatives broke away from the official stance on the 
decision not to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama. Health Minister Barbara Hogan 
criticised the government’s decision to ban the Dalai Lama from attending the Peace 
Conference and urged the government to apologise to its citizens.57 Hogan 
observed: 
 
The very fact this government has refused entry to the Dalai Lama is an 
example of a government (that) is dismissive of human rights. I believe (the 
government) needs to apologise to the citizens of this country, because it is in 
your name that this great man, who has struggled for the rights of his country, 
has been denied access (The Star, 25/3/2009).  
 
Presidential spokesperson Thabo Masebe indicated that the government would not 
do that. The head of the South African Friends of Tibet, Ian MacFarlane, welcomed 
Minister Hogan’s remarks. “We applaud (her) honesty and moral stand in this matter 
and call for other government ministers of conscience to come out on the world 
stage in support of her (The Mercury, 26/3/2009)”. In what was described as “an 
unprecedented attack”, ANC National Executive Member, Enoch Godongwana, said 
Ms Hogan was pandering to the gallery with her attack on the government over its 
refusal to allow the Dalai Lama into the country:  
 
The honourable thing for her is to resign if she believes that this government 
is not committed to the culture of human rights. She must be called to account 
for her conduct. Barbara Hogan is part of the government and … my 
understanding of the constitution is that they are collectively responsible for 
the decisions they make. I find it strange that she has decided to take the 
                                                 
57 Barbara Hogan was South Africa’s Minister of Health from 2008 to 2009 when she was appointed 
Minister of Public Enterprises. She was dropped from Cabinet in a 2010 reshuffle.  
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platform in public … without the courtesy of consulting her colleagues (The 
Mercury, 26/3/2009).  
 
ANC spokeswoman Jessie Duarte was surprised by Hogan’s defiance: “Normally, 
members of Cabinet follow Cabinet decisions or the statement made by the 
President (The Mercury, 26/3/2009)”. The Minister’s position received support from 
civil society as the HSF said Ms Hogan’s “principled stance” should be supported, 
but condemned the government’s decision regarding the Dalai Lama:  
 
The notion of a minister having a different view from the Cabinet on a matter 
is not unprecedented, nor is it unacceptable for that opinion to be voiced 
publicly. Any censure or other steps that may be taken against Hogan will be 
deeply unfortunate (Cape Argus, 26/3/2009).  
 
The media reported that Minister Hogan was “harshly rebuked” by the government 
for her public defiance of President Motlanthe’s stance to refuse the Dalai Lama a 
visa (The Mercury, 26/3/2009). Government spokesman Themba Maseko described 
her statement as “open defiance”: 
  
The position on the Dalai Lama is an official position of the government. It is 
unfortunate she went on a public platform to attack a decision of this 
government when she is part of that collective. I think that it is something that 
will have to be addressed in the near future by this government. How do 
ministers conduct themselves in instances when they do not agree with the 
position of government? The way government functions is that it is not for a 
minister to go to a public platform and openly attack and disagree with a 
government position (The Mercury, 26/3/2009).  
 
The DA also supported Minister Hogan’s stance. The DA leader and the party’s 
spokesperson on foreign affairs, Tony Leon, said the party was “heartened” by the 
Health Minister’s “pro-human rights stance” (The Mercury, 26/3/2009). The Congress 
of the People (COPE) presidential candidate, Mvume Dandala, called on the ANC to 
clarify its stance on the matter. He accused the ruling party of compromising its 
values in exchange for money from China (The Mercury, 26/3/2009). 
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The split in Government over the decision to bar the Dalai Lama was reportedly 
widening as claims of Cabinet backing for the move were denied and ministerial 
opposition to the ban strengthened (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). It was 
reportedly revealed that the decision to prevent the Tibetan spiritual leader from 
entering the country was taken by Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and 
not the Cabinet, as claimed by her and other government figures. Another unnamed 
Cabinet Minister was claimed to have privately declared his opposition to the 
decision as expressed by Health Minister Barbara Hogan. The senior Minister 
notified the Foreign Affairs Ministry that he did not agree with the decision to prevent 
the Dalai Lama from attending the peace conference.  
 
Though the move to prevent the exiled Tibetan leader from attending the peace 
conference was not a Cabinet decision, Themba Maseko, government 
spokesperson, created that impression when he claimed that Hogan had defied a 
“collective” decision: “Cabinet’s position is that we do not want the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup to be used as a platform to advance the political causes of various groups.” 
Maseko later reportedly “changed his tune”: “It is a government decision, not a 
Cabinet decision. Decisions of visas do not require Cabinet approval … a 
department takes a decision and it becomes a government decision (Sunday 
Independent, 29/3/2009)”.  
 
As Minister Hogan apologised to Cabinet for publicly criticising government’s stance, 
opposition parties accused the ANC of applying pressure on her (Daily News, 
17/4/2009). Themba Maseko told a media briefing that Hogan had been questioned 
by her Cabinet colleagues about her public criticism of her own government. DA 
leader Helen Zille said she was disappointed that Ms Hogan, who had received huge 
public support for her courageous stance, had apologised: “I am sure she was put 
under pressure.”  
 
COPE also blamed the ruling party for “silencing” Minister Hogan: “COPE condemns 
this action to silence Hogan, under the guise of party discipline.” Independent 
Democrats (ID) leader, Patricia de Lille, said Minister Hogan’s change of tune did not 
take away the fact that government still owed the nation an explanation: “If Barbara 
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Hogan made an about turn it does not remedy the situation at all (Daily News, 
17/4/2009).” IFP General Secretary, Musa Zondi, blamed Minister Hogan’s lack of 
experience in the executive, particularly when it came to decisions taken: “Once 
government has taken a decision you are supposed to abide by it. She was 
apologising for breach of procedures and not on substantive issues.” United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) leader, Bantu Holomisa, believed the Minister should 
have stood her ground and should not have bowed to pressure: “She stood up and 
the whole country stood behind her (Daily News, 17/4/2009)”. 
 
In the wake of the announcement of the new Cabinet after the 2009 election it was 
considered encouraging that Health Minister Barbara Hogan, appeared likely to keep 
her portfolio “for the time being” (The Star, 20/4/2009). The Star (20/4/2009) also 
opined that Hogan had shown her to be someone able to listen to, and consider, 
other people’s points of view, rather than being a slave to ideology and should stay. 
Lowe Morna, Executive Director of Gender Links, described the retention of Minister 
Hogan as a welcome sign that ministers of her calibre had a place in the new 
dispensation (Cape Times, 12/5/2009). 58 
 
Parliament later confirmed that Minister Hogan had resigned (Daily News, 
2/11/2010). What was described as her “shock decision” to end her parliamentary 
career of 16 years came a day after she was axed from the Cabinet in one of the 
most extensive executive shake-ups South Africa had seen. The media argued that 
Hogan was handed “a poisoned chalice” by President Jacob Zuma, when moved to 
head up the Public Enterprises Ministry, which had been run down and beset with 
corruption during the previous administration (Daily News, 2/11/2010). Her departure 
had baffled the opposition, who saw her as a “leading light of transparency and 
accountability” in the executive. 
 
4.4. Criticism from the ranks of the Constitutional Court 
 
The Constitutional Court is South Africa's highest court on constitutional matters. Its 
jurisdiction is restricted to constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions 
                                                 
58 Gender Links is an NGO promoting gender equality and justice across Southern Africa (Gender 
Links, undated). 
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on constitutional matters. Constitutional Court Justice Kate O’Regan supported 
Minister Hogan’s position: “It is a matter of dismay that human rights do not seem to 
enter into the picture of some foreign affairs decisions that are made” (Cape Argus, 
26/3/2009).  
 
The media reported that Constitutional Law expert and academic Pierre de Vos said 
it was “unwise” for a Constitutional Court judge to publicly criticise the government’s 
executive decisions: “Judges must be careful when commenting on political issues of 
the day” (Daily News, 30/3/2009). De Vos said O’Regan was unlikely to get into 
trouble over her comments as “it was not an impeachable offence”.  
 
The Black Lawyers’ Association (BLA) described O’Regan’s actions as 
“mischievous” and urged her to stay out of government decisions (Daily News, 
30/3/2009).59 At a BLA meeting in Cape Town, there was a sentiment that a 
complaint of misconduct should be submitted to the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC).60 BLA Deputy President Sithembele Mgxaji was quoted saying: “It falls 
beyond the issues that judges need to concern themselves. It is purely a political 
issue to deny a visa.” A legal source within BLA said the comments compromised 
O’Regan, as the issue could still come before the Constitutional Court. The judge 
also drew severe criticism from Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: 
  
It is not for judges to decide on foreign policy. They do not run the government 
and they do not run foreign policy (Daily News, 30/3/2009). 
 
The JSC was asked to investigate Justice O’Regan (Daily News, 8/4/2009). Trade 
Union Amicus South Africa lodged a complaint with the commission, saying 
O’Regan’s comments were “scandalous (and) vexatious” and brought the judiciary 
into disrepute. Amicus’ general secretary Vincent Phillips said that it did not bode 
well for the constitutional order if judges were seen to be biased in regard to the 
executive (Daily News, 8/4/2009). 
                                                 
59 The BLA is a voluntary association of black lawyers in South Africa. It co-exists with statutory 
bodies governing the legal profession (BLA, 2012). 
60 The JSC was established in terms of the Constitution and selects fit and proper people for 
appointment as judges and investigates complaints about judicial officers. It also advises government 
on matters relating to the judiciary or the administration of justice (GCIS, 2010/11: 356). 
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4.5. Chinese Government statements 
 
The Chinese Embassy in Pretoria indicated that they had appealed to the South 
African Government not to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa as it would harm 
bilateral relations. They explained that it was a particularly inopportune time for the 
Dalai Lama to be visiting South Africa, as it was the 60th anniversary of what 
Tibetans regarded as “China’s military invasion of Tibet”, but which the Chinese 
Government described as its “liberation of Tibetans from feudal serfdom” (Pretoria 
News Weekend, 21/3/2009).  
 
It was furthermore the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s flight from Tibet into exile 
in India and the first anniversary of serious political unrest in Tibet. The Chinese 
Embassy in Pretoria also suggested that for South Africa to allow the Dalai Lama 
into the country at that time would “greatly harm” South African-Chinese relations 
(The Star, 23/3/2009).  
 
China expressed appreciation for countries that rejected the Dalai Lama. Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang said: “All countries should respect China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity … and oppose Tibetan independence” (Pretoria 
News, 25/3/2009). China’s ministerial counsellor at the embassy in Pretoria, Dai 
Bing, was quoted as saying that his government had urged South Africa to ban the 
visit or risk damaging bilateral relations.  
 
4.6. Statements by members of civil society 
 
Archbishop Emeritus Tutu said he was upset at the refusal of the visa and had 
written to then President Motlanthe asking him for an explanation:  
 
If His Holiness’ visa is refused, then I would not take part in the upcoming 
2010 FIFA World Cup-related peace conference. I will condemn government’s 
behaviour as disgraceful in line with our country’s abysmal record at the 
UNSC. We are shamelessly succumbing to Chinese pressure (Sunday 
Independent, 22/3/2009).  
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Archbishop Tutu slammed both Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and the ANC 
government for their handling of the Dalai Lama issue. He said if China was owed 
anything, it was as a party, not as a country. If they wanted to invest here, it was 
because they believed there were benefits in doing so. Referring to international 
media coverage of the matter he said: “We are dirt … people are disappointed 
(Sunday Independent, 22/3/2009).”  
 
Archbishop Tutu said that the Dalai Lama had been trying “for donkey’s years” to say 
that they did not want separation from China. All they wanted was autonomy to be 
able to live their lives as Tibetans. He added that the Dalai Lama was someone who 
won the Nobel Peace Prize. He was given the Congressional Medal of Honour in the 
US. He asked if Mr Manuel still wanted to know who the Dalai Lama was. 
Archbishop Tutu saluted Health Minister Barbara Hogan who spoke out against the 
ban (Pretoria News Weekend, 28/3/2009). 
 
Dave Steward, spokesperson for the FW de Klerk Foundation said former President 
FW de Klerk had expressed concern to the President and Foreign Affairs Ministry 
and had aligned himself with the position expressed by Archbishop Tutu not to 
participate in the event if the visa was not granted (Sunday Independent, 
22/3/2009)61. Steward warned that this would not be a good thing for South Africa 
and the FIFA World Cup (Sunday Independent, 22/3/2009). De Klerk argued that the 
decision to refuse the visa made a mockery of the whole purpose of the peace 
conference. He said South Africa was a sovereign constitutional democracy and 
should not allow other countries to dictate to it regarding who it should and should 
not admit to its territory – regardless of the power and influence of that country (The 
Mercury, 24/3/2009). 
 
4.7. Statements by Tibetans and aligned organisations 
 
Archbishop Tutu disclosed the Dalai Lama’s own feelings about South Africa’s  
                                                 
61 The FW de Klerk Foundation promotes the presidential heritage of former President FW de Klerk by 
upholding the Constitution and the national accord; working for harmonious relations in multicultural 
societies; promoting the peaceful and negotiated resolution of disputes; and mobilisation of resources 
for disabled and underprivileged children (FW de Klerk Foundation, 2010). 
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decision to stop his visit as contained in a letter to him (Pretoria News Weekend, 
28/3/2009). The Dalai Lama said the South African Government’s decision was 
another manifestation of one of the fundamental challenges to world peace as a 
whole: namely, a lack of understanding and mutual respect. He believed that 
religious, social and political leaders throughout the world had a responsibility to 
ensure that principles triumph over the obsession with money and power. The Dalai 
Lama said the decision by the government to refuse him a visa was the result of 
Chinese diplomatic pressure – but it backfired by generating a storm of publicity (The 
Mercury, 1/4/2009). 
 
The Dalai Lama’s representative in South Africa, Sonam Tenzing, explained that the 
Dalai Lama had applied for a visa on 4 March 2009, but that South Africa’s High 
Commissioner in India, where the Dalai Lama had applied for his visa, had asked 
him to postpone the visit (The Star, 23/3/2009). Referring to the fact that South Africa 
snubbed the spiritual leader by denying him a visa, Tenzing noted that “the ANC, 
more than most, should know about oppression”. He noted that he could not pinpoint 
why “one burgundy and orange-robed monk”, could be such a dominant threat for 
“the fiery Asian super-nation” and the reason the ANC government “kowtowed like a 
whimpering eunuch” (Pretoria News Weekend, 28/3/2009). 
 
The SAFT, the South African chapter of a worldwide network of Friends of Tibet 
support groups, said that the barring of the Dalai Lama from the peace conference 
made a mockery of the intentions of the conference (Sunday Independent, 
22/3/2009). They appealed to the conference organisers, the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
LOC, to postpone the proceedings until the Dalai Lama received travel documents.  
 
They expressed dismay at the withholding of travel documents, saying that South 
Africa had bowed to pressure from one of the world’s most oppressive nations. The 
head of the SAFT, Ian MacFarlane, said the fact that the advertisement confirming 
the Dalai Lama’s attendance at the conference was posted on ANC websites – and 
remained there – confirmed their belief that the Chinese suddenly intervened to 
impose their will on the South African Government (The Star, 25/3/2009).  
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The TSSA, a Tibet support group which focuses of creating an awareness of Tibet, 
said it was a sad day in the history of South Africa as a man of peace, internationally 
recognised for his selfless efforts to promote harmony, was prevented from attending 
a peace conference in South Africa (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009). It was 
described as ironic that the South African Government had bowed to the pressure of 
the People’s Republic of China, in the “best interests of the country” (Sunday 
Independent, 29/3/2009). The hope was expressed that the local and international 
community would express their shock and total dissatisfaction at the way he had 
been treated (Sunday Independent, 29/3/2009).  
 
Chris Kudla of the TSSA said that the Dalai Lama was invited and did not solicit an 
invitation, nor select the date of the peace conference. He noted that the South 
African Government was aware of the invitation and described the scrambled 
excuses and reasons given by government as “ludicrous, embarrassing and 
frightening”. He remarked that eventually the government admitted that the Dalai 
Lama was barred because of links with the Chinese (The Mercury, 31/3/2009). 
 
4.8. Statements by political parties 
 
The government’s opposition to the Dalai Lama’s visit drew heavy criticism from 
political parties, including COPE and the FF Plus, but was supported by the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), which accused critics of acting “in the interests of 
imperialism” (Cape Argus, 24/3/2009).  
 
4.8.1. Democratic Alliance 
 
DA foreign affairs spokesperson and former leader Tony Leon said any decision to  
bar the Dalai Lama would embarrass former President Nelson Mandela, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu and former President FW de Klerk, who extended the invitation to 
him (Cape Argus, 23/3/2009). He slammed the decision not to allow the Dalai Lama 
into South Africa as “a massive own goal” against the country in the run-up to the 
World Cup: “Whatever the motivation … a policy or decision only needs to be 
measured by the results and the results of this decision clearly have to be against 
our best national and international interests” (Daily News, 26/3/2009). The DA’s 
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spokesperson Ryan Coetzee said there was no reason to deny the Dalai Lama a 
visa: “South Africa’s foreign policy has lost its moral compass” (The Star, 27/3/2009). 
 
4.8.2. African National Congress 
 
Head of the ANC’s foreign affairs sub-committee Ebrahim Ebrahim said the ANC and 
the South African Government did not want to compromise its relationship with China 
by allowing the Dalai Lama a public platform: 
  
The government did the right thing because for the first time our trade 
relationship with China is positive … We cannot say that he is forever 
excluded, but we value very much our political and economic relationship with 
China (The Mercury, 26/3/2009).  
 
ANC President Jacob Zuma defended the government’s decision to refuse the Dalai 
Lama entry into the country amid condemnation and calls by prominent South 
Africans to reverse the decision. Zuma said South Africa had not neglected its role of 
upholding human rights by denying the Dalai Lama a visa to attend a peace 
conference due to pressure from China (Cape Argus, 27/3/2009). He said the 
government would, at times, take decisions that put the interest of relations with 
other countries first and South Africa had not been the first country to bow to 
Chinese pressure on the issue of the Dalai Lama: “You will recall that in the 
Olympics, this issue of the Dalai Lama made France clash with China” (Cape Argus, 
27/3/2009).  
 
It is explained that in 2010 China postponed an economic summit with France, after 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama at a gathering of Nobel Prize 
recipients in Poland. China also boycotted French products in the build-up to the 
Beijing Olympics, after the Olympic torch relay was disrupted on the way to Paris, 
when pro-Tibet demonstrators protested against China’s record of human rights 
violations in Tibet. Zuma called for more consultation on any similar controversial 
issue that may arise in the future: “I do not think it marks the undermining of human 
rights. I think this country is more sensitive to human rights than many” (Cape Argus, 
27/3/2009). 
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Zuma insisted that the government preferred to be safe rather than sorry in deciding 
against granting the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the peace conference in South 
Africa. Zuma, who said he could not speak for government, did not rule out a future 
visit by the Dalai Lama: 
  
The government took a decision which I am sure they will explain ... they did 
not say the Dalai Lama could not come to South Africa ... they are saying 
March … is a serious month between the Dalai Lama and China in a very 
specific way (The Star, 1/4/2009). 
 
Former ANC MP Ela Gandhi, granddaughter of passive resistance proponent 
Mahatma Gandhi, called on the government to issue the Dalai Lama with a visa (The 
Star, 27/3/2009). She joined Minister Hogan in condemning the government’s 
actions, saying there was a misconception among many people that what the 
Chinese said about their occupation of Tibet was true. The Chinese said they had 
been liberating Tibet from feudalism: “If there is sincerity in what China is saying, 
then why were they still in Tibet 60 years after liberating it? Why are so many 
Tibetans in exile? Why are Tibetans not free in their own country, to be able to rule 
themselves?” (The Star, 27/3/2009). 
 
4.8.3. South African Communist Party 
 
ANC national executive committee member and SACP general secretary Blade 
Nzimande said that most Western countries refused the Dalai Lama entry in March 
because of the failed Tibetan uprising against the Chinese rule of 50 years, “It is an 
internationally recognised diplomatic protocol. This has nothing to do with human 
rights” (The Mercury, 26/3/2009). 
 
4.8.4. Congress of the People 
 
COPE spokesperson Phillip Dexter said the decision was meant to please China: 
“What this has shown is that South Africa’s foreign policy is determined by the 
highest bidder” (The Star, 27/3/2009). 
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4.8.5. Independent Democrats 
 
Lance Greyling of the ID said the Dalai Lama had every right to be in South Africa, 
as he had been to many other countries to talk about human rights issues (The Star, 
27/3/2009). 
 
5. Media reaction 
 
The Weekend Argus (22/3/2009) commented in an editorial that the fact that South 
Africa had closed its door to the Dalai Lama, who, the world over, commanded 
immense respect, was a disgrace. It argued that South Africa’s “spinelessness on 
the international stage” was embarrassing and that the world, like South Africans, 
had become accustomed to the government’s “extraordinary hypocrisy” in foreign 
relations – politicians pay much lip-service to morality, yet through the years have 
allowed short-sighted expediency to govern foreign affairs policy. It concluded that 
the government believed that sticking to the spirit of the constitution and abiding by a 
commitment to international human rights was less in South Africa’s interests than 
“kowtowing to dictators and big brothers”. 
 
The Daily News (24/3/2009) editorialised that one of the reasons proffered by the 
government for its refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visitor’s visa to South Africa was 
that his visit would divert attention from the focus of the conference he was asked to 
attend, to Tibet. It suggested that government officials would have realised that the 
snub they were defending was creating more publicity than allowing the Dalai Lama 
at the conference. It argued that barring the Dalai Lama had everything to do with 
what decision-makers perceived to be the best interests of the country, rather than 
distraction.  
 
Relations with China, punctuated with the establishment of an office to disburse a 
US$5 billion Africa investment fund, were clearly paramount in their thinking. The 
paper noted that the disappointing decision denied the South African constitution, 
surrendering high principle to expediency (Daily News 24/3/2009). 
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Columnist and former newspaper editor Max du Preez suggested that South Africa 
needed a strong and practical tool to express the view of the people, like rolling 
mass action (Daily News, 26/3/2009). He argued that the presidential 
spokesperson’s explanation that the Dalai Lama was declared unwelcome, because 
he would draw attention away from the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, was “an insult 
to every South African with an IQ higher than nine”. He suggested that there would 
soon be proof enough that the ANC decided to ban him because of all the Chinese 
money that went into the party’s coffers. 
 
Ann Crotty, now Business Report editor-at-large, noted that the Chinese 
Government was hoping to pressure as many as possible of its trading partners into 
abandoning contact with the Dalai Lama (Cape Times, 26/3/2009). Thus, in this 
“hugely embarrassing” permit refusal decision, South Africa helped the Chinese 
Government avoid having to engage with the Dalai Lama to reach a workable 
solution around the issue of Tibetan autonomy.  
 
She suggested that increasingly, it seemed the world could be divided into those 
countries that were succumbing to this pressure from China and those that were not, 
with South Africa falling into the former category (Cape Times, 26/3/2009). She 
argued that by refusing to grant the Dalai Lama a visa, the government had sent a 
loud and clear message to the Chinese Government that it could determine whatever 
aspect of our national policies that it felt it needed to.  
 
It is speculated whether the government was offered general trade and investment-
related inducements - or was there some specific inducement offered to the ANC? 
She insisted it would be nice, especially ahead of a general election, to know what 
price was put on the country’s independence and concluded that by kowtowing, the 
government had served nobody’s interests – except perhaps a small group within the 
ANC (Cape Times, 26/3/2009). 
 
The Pretoria News (28/3/2009) suggested that “the civic edifice” took an 
uncomfortable knock amid the Dalai Lama debacle. It argued that although the 
denial of a visa to His Holiness rapidly escalated into an international issue, it spilled 
into “ideological difference, freedom of speech and cash incentives in South Africa”. 
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It noted that as the government eventually acknowledged that it did not want to 
jeopardise bilateral relations with South Africa’s biggest trading partner, China, 
“dreams of the struggle” were first conjured up against foes.  
 
Those defending the decision were said to be betraying South Africa’s history and 
democracy (Pretoria News, 28/3/2009). Those who disagreed openly, like Health 
Minister Barbara Hogan, were all but accused of treason. Questions were posed 
about funding for ANC election campaigns from sources with questionable human 
rights records, later demanding payoffs in dubious foreign-policy backing.  
 
The Pretoria News (30/3/2009) also commented that South African Government 
officials finally acknowledged that the real reason they denied the Dalai Lama a visa 
was China, when Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma said: “Let us be honest” – it was 
also about avoiding putting South Africa on a “collision course” with China. It was 
suggested she had in mind the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) – a 
major gathering consisting of Chinese President Hu Jintao and the presidents of 
most of the 48 out of 53 African countries that have diplomatic relations with China, 
rather than Taiwan (Pretoria News, 30/3/2009).  
 
Much aid, trade and investment was promised to Africa there, and considerable 
Chinese investment flowed into South Africa specifically. The paper explained that in 
the declaration at the end of that summit, African participants signed on to the one-
China policy, the sine qua non of diplomatic relations with China. That meant 
accepting that Taiwan was a renegade province of China that must eventually return 
to the mother country and was not a sovereign country in its own right.  
 
Beijing’s apparent growing sensitivity about the Dalai Lama implied that the policy 
had now been surreptitiously extended to Tibet. Finance Minister Trevor Manuel 
helped to reinforce that impression when he said that by creating a Tibetan 
government in exile, the Dalai Lama had challenged the one-China policy (Pretoria 
News, 30/3/2009). It is stated that China believed that part of the respect they 
accorded to Africa was not to impose conditions on their aid, as Western nations did. 
The great irony was that by enforcing this “no-meet-the-Dalai Lama policy” at the risk 
of losing aid, Beijing was being far more conditional than any Western nation would 
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dare to be. A Western diplomat is quoted: “If we former colonials had tried that, we 
would have been hounded off the continent.” 
 
The Star argued (2/4/2009) that Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
had escaped most criticism around the “disastrous ban” on the Dalai Lama to come 
to South Africa, though it was her decision – apparently her decision only, because 
the Cabinet were only informed of it after the fact. The ANC, Jacob Zuma and 
caretaker President Kgalema Motlanthe took most of the flak.  
 
The newspaper referred to a press statement announcing that a Memorandum of 
Understanding had been signed on 26 March 2009, on Sino-South African 
cooperation on pebble bed nuclear technology (The Star, 2/4/2009). It comes to the 
following conclusion, “A coincidence? … in the end these cynical, unethical foreign-
policy decisions infect our body politic and poison our whole system”. 
 
Media opinion is also visibly illustrated in newspaper cartoons. A cartoon by Zapiro 
(see Figure 5) is most representative of cartoons on the 2009 dispute and is 
discussed here though it was published in the Sunday Times (5/4/2009) and not in 
one of the Independent News & Media papers.  
 
The cartoon is based on a classic cartoon by Edmund Linley Sambourne's "The 
Rhodes Colossus" originally published in 1892 in the Punch magazine. A 
comparison is made between the colonial times of Cecil John Rhodes and what is 
deemed Chinese neo-colonialism. China is depicted pulling the puppet strings of 
South African foreign policy with respect to the Dalai Lama visa withdrawal.  
 
The original cartoon in the Punch magazine depicted Rhodes striding Africa 
commenting on his plans to extend an electrical telegraph line from Cape Town to 
Cairo (Punch, 1892). The original striding Colossus of Rhodes, in turn, was imagined 
in a 16th century engraving by Martin Heemskerck, as part of his series of the Seven 
Wonders of the World, according to which the harbour-spanning pose of the statue 
on the Island of Rhodes was, established (UN Museum, 2011).  
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Figure 7: The Rhodes Colossus - 118 years later 
 
 
 
Source: Sunday Times, 5/4/2009 
 
6. Reaction of analysts and other commentators  
 
Wide-ranging comments by media analysts and other commentators were reported 
by the media. Political scientist and media analyst Adam Habib commented: “I think 
the refusal of a visa is outrageous and, frankly, stupid if they were attempting to 
avoid a controversy, but they have created one” (The Star, 25/3/2009). 
 
Lack of consensus on what constituted our national interests created the need for a 
new, smarter diplomacy, wrote Siphamandla Zondi, Executive Director of the 
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), a South African foreign policy think tank (The 
Mercury, 29/3/2010). The IGD and DIRCO co-hosted a round-table discussion on 
how the balance between the pursuit of values like human rights and the projection 
of national interests in South Africa's international relations could be achieved.  
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On the one hand, there was growing concern in some quarters that South Africa was 
disengaging from a human rights-based foreign policy in favour of an ideologically 
driven pursuit for transformation of power relations globally (The Mercury, 
29/3/2010). For instance the Dalai Lama controversy suggested that values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution had been abandoned to protect South 
Africa's trade links with China.  
 
On the other hand, there had been calls for South Africa to adopt a more mercantilist 
foreign policy by ensuring that it generated commercial returns from its value-driven 
peace diplomacy in Africa and elsewhere (The Mercury, 29/3/2010). There was 
agreement that there was not necessarily a conflict between the pursuit of values 
and national interests; rather, values were often intangible forms of national 
interests. The Constitution enjoined the government to pursue a balanced foreign 
policy, both value-based and interest-driven. It was accepted, though, that lack of 
consensus on what constituted our national interests bedevilled this balancing act.  
 
Lebogang Mokwena, researcher at the think tank, the Centre for Policy Studies 
(CPS), commented that we had seen religion, politics and sport clash regarding the 
government’s decision to deny the Dalai Lama a visa to the peace conference ahead 
of the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Pretoria News, 31/3/2009). She noted that the decision 
to keep the Dalai Lama out of the South African sporting haven had less to do with a 
return on World Cup investment than it did with our country’s political economy. By 
rights, we should be autonomous yet “we bow to a dragon with a fiery smile”. She 
expressed the hope that in time, Africa’s leaders would “snap out of their trance and 
become fully fledged politicians who have enough confidence in their own country to 
proudly state their autonomy”. 
 
The Star (26/3/2009) quoted Jay Naidoo, Non-Executive Chairperson of the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and a former member of President 
Mandela’s Cabinet, posing the question as to whether we had ‘outsourced’ our 
foreign policy. He stated that the denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama was another in a 
series of diplomatic bungles tarnishing South Africa’s human rights record 
internationally. He remarked that the government’s decision not to grant the Dalai 
Lama a visa was interpreted by many as ‘bullying’ by the government of China. He 
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suggested that the right thing to do was to apologise to the nation, and allow our 
iconic ‘elders’ to do what they believed was right. He noted that South Africa’s Nobel 
Laureates were recognised globally, because they stood for social justice: “Who are 
we to question their integrity? ”  (The Star, 26/3/2009)  
 
7. Inkatha Freedom Party court challenge of the decision 
 
IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi brought an urgent court application to order the 
government to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama “in the nearest future” to enable him to 
attend another peace conference (Pretoria News Weekend, 28/3/2009). In his 
affidavit before the Cape Town High Court, Chief Buthelezi said if the decision was 
not rescinded, it would silence and censor the Dalai Lama’s religious and political 
message and violate the constitutional rights of all South Africans to political action, 
religious freedom, freedom of thought and expression and dignity.  
 
 Chief Buthelezi cited the ‘unlawful’ political motives for barring the Dalai Lama as 
“the ruling party’s relationship with China and its related political fundraising”, its 
dislike of the Dalai Lama and his foreseeable religious and political messages to 
South Africans, his struggle for the autonomy of Tibet and his meetings and prayers 
with South Africans (Pretoria News Weekend, 28/3/2009). He noted that he and the 
IFP supported the Dalai Lama’s struggle for the political autonomy of Tibet.  
 
Chief Buthelezi’s adviser, Mario Oriani-Ambrosini, said the party had evidence that 
the South African High Commission in India had refused to accept a visa application 
from the Dalai Lama: “It is outrageous that the government is taking a position that it 
did not process the visa because the Dalai Lama did not apply” (The Mercury, 
1/4/2009). Lawyers for the government argued that the Dalai Lama had not applied 
for a visa and that the government therefore could not be forced to grant him one 
(The Mercury, 1/4/2009).  
 
Home Affairs Director-General, Mavuso Msimang, claimed the Dalai Lama had not 
applied for a visa to attend the conference and there was no evidence he wanted to 
enter the country any time soon. Mr Themba Mgabe, a Home Affairs official based at 
the South African High Commission in India, said in his affidavit that he had met a 
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representative of the Dalai Lama, but that the leader had decided to put a hold on 
applying for a visa, pending talks over the postponement of the conference (Cape 
Argus, 1/4/2009). 
 
Chief Buthelezi said the reputation of South Africa and the government depended on 
the Western Cape High Court ruling on his urgent application to compel the 
government to grant the Dalai Lama a visa (Cape Times, 2/4/2009). He challenged 
the assertion of Msimang, that his application was “flawed”. Chief Buthelezi said it 
was significant that Msimang had failed to advance any reason why the Dalai Lama 
was not permitted to enter South Africa. He added that the suggestion that the Dalai 
Lama had not applied for a visa needed to be rejected. He said the Cabinet had 
admitted that it had barred the Dalai Lama. The onus had shifted to the government 
to show why its conduct was justifiable.  
 
Chief Buthelezi insisted that judicial cognisance should be taken of this matter 
having tarnished the domestic and international image of the country and its 
government (Cape Times, 2/4/2009). He quoted Archbishop Tutu saying it was the 
government’s “worst decision ever” and said that a tardy or indecisive judicial 
response would concretise such negative perception, thereby irreparably damaging 
the national image. 
 
Fresh efforts were later launched to give the Dalai Lama an opportunity to visit South 
Africa (Cape Argus, 2/4/2009). The SAFT was to arrange an alternative peace 
conference following the government’s refusal to allow the Tibetan leader into the 
country and the postponement of the initial conference as a result. This emerged in 
papers SAFT filed as part of the urgent application lodged in court to order the 
government to provide the Dalai Lama with a visa.  
 
The SAFT was included in the application as amicus curiae (friend of the court). The 
SAFT’s co-founder, Mr Ian Duncan MacFarlane, said in an affidavit that the 
association had an interest in the case and believed the Dalai Lama’s visit would 
benefit South Africans. He said China had consistently used its influence to isolate 
the Dalai Lama internationally. The inescapable inference was that the incident was 
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as a result of pressure from the Chinese Government, or anxiety not to compromise 
relations with China (Cape Argus, 2/4/2009). 
 
8. Continued coverage after the issue disappeared from the headlines 
 
Further media references to the government’s decision to refuse the Dalai Lama a 
visa were noted long after the issue disappeared from the headlines.  
 
8.1. Inauguration guest list 
 
President Jacob Zuma’s inauguration as the country’s fourth post-apartheid 
president generated controversy as unions, political parties and civil rights groups 
were furious over the inclusion of unpopular leaders on the guest list (Daily News, 
8/5/2009). COSATU, the SACP and civil rights group AfriForum, criticised the 
government for inviting Swaziland’s King Mswati III and Zimbabwe’s President 
Robert Mugabe to the inauguration.  
 
Government insisted there were no grounds to exclude either leader from the 
festivities (Daily News, 8/5/2009). Presidency spokesman Thabo Masebe said 
although government respected people’s dissenting views, the invitations would 
stand. AfriForum Chief Executive Kallie Kriel said inviting Mugabe was ‘distasteful’ 
because the Zimbabwean leader was guilty of crimes against humanity: “We want to 
send a strong message because government has invited Mugabe and has refused 
the Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, an invite”.  
 
The Pretoria News (24/4/2009) noted that it had been “a bad season for human 
rights” in South Africa, with the Dalai Lama being refused a visa to meet his fellow 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in Johannesburg and “all those votes” by South 
Africa’s Ambassador to the UN, Dumisani Kumalo, against human rights resolutions 
on the UNSC. So it was “very heartening” to discover that South Africa was going to 
strike a few blows for human rights, democracy and the rule of law by disinviting at 
least five leaders from the inauguration of the next president in Pretoria on 9 May 
2009 (Pretoria News, 24/4/2009).  
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Most encouraging of all was that one of those would be Sudan’s President Omar el-
Bashir. The other four disinvited leaders were those of Mauritania, Madagascar, 
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, because, as Foreign Affairs Director-General Ayanda 
Ntsaluba announced, they were “under sanctions” – judged to be under AU 
suspension as member governments which had come to power by unconstitutional 
means, in effect coups (Pretoria News, 24/4/2009).  
 
8.2. Buddha Day 
 
Addressing Buddha Day celebrations, also referred to as Vesak Day, when the 
Buddha and his Enlightenment is recalled, at the Shree Ranganathar Temple Hall in 
Greenwood Park, Durban, executive member of the KwaZulu-Natal Buddhist Forum, 
Jerald Vedan, expressed disappointment at the controversial banning of the Dalai 
Lama’s visit to South Africa, but added, “It also resulted in extensive international 
publicity for Tibetan culture which would have cost millions of rands” (Daily News, 
11/5/2009). 
 
8.3. Zuma administration 
 
As the new administration of President Jacob Zuma took over in mid-2009, newly 
appointed DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reiterated that the country’s 
foreign policy would remain unchanged, while stressing that the Dalai Lama was now 
free to visit (The Star, 15/5/2009). Commenting on the refusal to grant the Dalai 
Lama a visa, she said: “Though we did not communicate clearly at first what had 
transpired, this country discriminates against no one, and the Dalai Lama is more 
than free (to visit)”.  
 
It was noted that better communication of what appeared to be unpopular foreign- 
policy decisions, and finding a carrot to dangle in influencing Africa’s big men to 
democratise, were top priorities of the DIRCO Minister (Sunday Independent, 
17/5/2009). She admitted that the seemingly strange decisions – for not supporting a 
resolution against Burma’s military regime, Zimbabwe and the banning of the Dalai 
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Lama – could have been communicated better: “Maybe we underestimated the noise 
that was (going) to come with the decisions.” 62  
  
Soon afterwards The Star (29/5/2009) commented that the Zuma administration had 
quickly distinguished itself from the Mbeki administration in defending human rights 
abroad. It was noted that whereas Mr Mbeki’s government had voted against a 
resolution at the UNSC condemning the human rights abuses of the Myanmar 
(Burma) military junta, by contrast Ebrahim Ebrahim, the new Deputy DIRCO 
Minister, called in Myanmar’s ambassador-designate to South Africa and sharply 
rebuked him for his government’s arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.  
 
Ebrahim’s Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, also drew positive comment for her 
statement that the Dalai Lama was welcome to visit South Africa – in apparent 
contrast with the Motlanthe administration which denied him a visa to visit in March 
2009 for a meeting with fellow Nobel Peace Prize winners (The Star, 29/5/2009). It 
was remarked that this, however, was not such a clear break with the past, because 
the Motlanthe government did say it did not want the Dalai Lama to visit particularly 
in March 2009, because that was a sensitive month to China.  
 
The Sunday Independent (7/6/2009) quoted Ebrahim Ebrahim indicating that human 
rights were a priority and there were some perceptions that needed correcting. It was 
noted that South Africa’s vote as a non-permanent member of the UNSC against the 
UNSC’s failed draft resolution condemning human rights abuses in Burma in January 
2007 had damning effects on the country’s human rights record, as had the 
government’s refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visa. Ebrahim explained:  
 
We had refused the Dalai Lama a visa in March. This March marked the 50th 
anniversary of the Tibetan people’s peaceful uprising against China … China, 
is an important trade partner and South Africa may look at expanding IBSA to 
include China … We believe in the one-China policy and have even broken off 
relations with Taiwan in observance of this. 
                                                 
62 Burma’s name was changed to Myanmar by the military junta, however the opposition parties, the 
exile groups, most ethnic groups, the US and Western nations continue to call the country Burma 
(Eurasia Review, 2012). 
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Nonetheless, Ebrahim said, “We are looking at all our policies in all the international 
organisations and look at how best we can position ourselves. I feel we should make 
a strong stand on human rights issues” (Sunday Independent , 7/6/2009). 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Considering the government reception of the Dalai Lama over successive visits to 
South Africa since the Mandela administration, attitudes have clearly hardened 
towards him with each visit. In 1996 former President Nelson Mandela agreed to 
meet with him. In 1999 the Dalai Lama was allowed to attend the PWR in Cape 
Town, but President Mbeki would only meet with a representative group, including 
the Dalai Lama, and not meet him one-on-one. The Dalai Lama did not meet 
President Mbeki on his visit to South Africa in 2004 at all. By 2009 the situation was 
reached that President Motlanthe’s administration would not even issue a visa for the 
Dalai Lama to visit the country anymore.  
 
The government justified its refusal of a visa in terms of South Africa’s “best interest”. 
Those criticising the decision quoted the government’s commitment to upholding 
human rights. There was very little support for government’s stance. This argument 
about the trade-off between human rights on the one hand and interests on the other 
is evident in the reaction from almost all commentators. The promotion of human 
rights, democracy, justice and peace in South Africa’s international policy received a 
lot of emphasis in the period immediately after the end of apartheid, whereas interest 
had probably never been properly defined or profiled. This might have created an 
expectation of a pursuit of moral objectives over interests at all times.  
 
Outrage almost immediately greeted the government’s 2009 ban on a visit by the 
Dalai Lama. The decision of the South African Government was interpreted as an 
indication that it bowed to pressure from China not to allow the Dalai Lama into 
South Africa, especially after the Chinese embassy in Pretoria admitted to appealing 
to the South African Government not to allow the Dalai Lama into the country; 
warning that it would harm bilateral relations and sketching the historically 
inopportune timing of the visit. 
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The South African Government was instantly on the defence in its response, saying 
South Africa made its own sovereign independent decisions based on what it 
deemed to be in the best interests of the country. These interests were defined in 
terms of the 2010 World Cup, arguing that the Dalai Lama would divert the attention 
of the country and the world.  
 
Government repeatedly denied it had been pressured by the Chinese Government, 
but conceded that faced with the choice between allowing the Dalai Lama access 
and damaging relations with China, interests would be better served by making sure 
relations with China were not jeopardised. Government’s bias in favour of China 
surfaced in the uncharacteristically angry speech by Finance Minister Trevor Manuel.  
 
The ANC conceded that they and the South African Government did not want to 
compromise its political and economic relationship with China by allowing the Dalai 
Lama a public platform, but ANC President Jacob Zuma said South Africa had not 
neglected its role of upholding human rights in doing so.  
 
Media insisted that the fact that South Africa had closed its door to the Dalai Lama, 
who, the world over, commanded immense respect, was a ‘disgrace’. Politicians paid 
lip-service to morality, yet allowed short-sighted expediency to govern foreign policy. 
The explanation that the Dalai Lama would draw attention away from the 2010 FIFA 
Soccer World Cup was rejected and it was suggested that the ANC banned him 
because of all the Chinese money that went into the party’s coffers.  
 
Media analysts and commentators argued that by refusing to grant a visa to the 
Dalai Lama the government might have attempted to avoid a controversy, but 
instead created one.  
 
From a constructivist point of view it is significant that the government/ANC justified 
the decision not to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama in terms of South Africa’s best 
interest, but maintained that this did not compromise South Africa’s stand on human 
rights. The government clearly does not want to seem to be abandoning the 
normative principles it purports to base its foreign policy on. In constructivist terms 
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this is important as the government does seem to want to be discarding its idealist 
principles to pursue materialistic interests, though reality might be pushing it towards 
taking decisions based on such interests. Furthermore, the government was moved 
from its initial justification that it did not want the Dalai Lama to draw attention away 
from the 2010 World Cup to arguing that the country’s interests would be better 
served by making sure relations with China were not jeopardised.  
 
Though the media could not shift the government from its position of not granting the 
Dalai Lama a visa with its own arguments or the arguments of other stakeholders 
quoted, the government was moved to explain the decision in different terms.  
 
The next chapter discusses of the refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2011.   
218 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
NOT GRANTING A VISA TO THE DALAI LAMA IN 2011 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter concentrates on the issue of the South African government again not 
granting a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2011. This includes the media coverage of the 
voices of the South African and Chinese governments, the organisers of the planned 
visit, civil society, Tibetans, political parties, media itself, analysts and other 
commentators. The chapter also considers the IFP court challenge to the handling of 
the visa application, a survey of adult perceptions of the matter and a peace award 
to the Dalai Lama by the Mahatma Gandhi Development Trust.  
 
The same media sources have been used throughout the study for synergy and 
consistency. For the same reason, the categories have, as far as possible, also 
remained the same. In some cases similar issues have not come up, or the same 
voices have not been active. In such instances differences will be notable.  
 
2. The 2011 invitation to the Dalai Lama 
 
As early as the end of August 2011, the media started hinting that “another row” 
might be brewing in the light of an invitation by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu 
to the Dalai Lama to attend his 80th birthday party in Cape Town on 7 October 2011 
(Sunday Independent, 28/8/2011). The paper already suggested that the South 
African Government might be reluctant to grant the visa, for fear of offending the 
Chinese Government. Unnamed diplomatic sources were quoted saying the Dalai 
Lama had applied for a visa from the South African High Commission in New Delhi in 
June 2011 and his officials were told that political guidance was required from 
Pretoria on the application.  
 
Ronnie Mamoepa, now spokesperson for the Department of Home Affairs led by 
former Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, said that the Dalai Lama had not 
applied for a visa in New Delhi. The Dalai Lama’s officials indicated they would again 
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apply in New Delhi. The 2009 statement by DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane, saying the Dalai Lama was welcome to visit South Africa and describing 
what happened around the earlier decision as poor communication by the 
government, was quoted by the media (iol, 28/8/2011).  
 
3. Media coverage of government’s indecision in granting a visa to the 
Dalai Lama 
 
DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, admitted to having received the 
application saying it was under process (Pretoria News, 14/9/2011). This process 
would eventually just be delayed until it was too late for the Dalai Lama to consider 
attending the event anymore.   
 
3.1. South African Government sources 
 
Soon afterwards DIRCO said that a decision on the Dalai Lama’s visa application 
would not be made public, as it would be communicated to the applicant (Pretoria 
News, 3/10/2011). DIRCO spokesperson Clayson Monyela declined to comment on 
suggestions from diplomats in New Delhi that the decision would be made by DIRCO 
Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, herself. President Jacob Zuma indicated that he 
would have no hand in the decision: “I do not know what will be the final thing.” It 
was noted that the City Press quoted an unnamed diplomatic source as saying it was 
‘unlikely’ that the Dalai Lama would be granted a visa, because the government did 
not want to strain its ties with China (The Star, 4/10/2011).  
 
As the government failed to provide an answer about the status of the visa, the Dalai 
Lama eventually cancelled his application (The Star, 5/10/2011). Deputy President 
Kgalema Motlanthe reacted saying the government would have given the Dalai 
Lama a visa if he had not cancelled his application.  
  
The Star (7/10/2011) reported that the “buck-passing” over the failed visa application 
continued as Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma denied that the issuing 
thereof had ever been the responsibility of her Department or that her Department 
had referred the Dalai Lama to DIRCO, saying it had always been a DIRCO matter. 
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Clayson Monyela, was also quoted saying DIRCO was processing the visa 
according to normal procedures, after it had been referred to them by Home Affairs. 
He indicated that spokesperson for Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe had earlier 
said a letter from the Desmond Tutu Peace Trust about the matter would be passed 
to the Home Affairs Minister, as the Deputy President did not “issue visas” (The Star, 
7/10/2011).  
 
3.2. Statements by organisers of planned visit 
 
The Desmond Tutu Peace Centre (DTPC),63 aligned to the Desmond Tutu Peace 
Foundation, and the Office of Tibet64 issued a joint statement saying the government 
had been “profoundly disrespectful” towards the two Nobel Peace Laureates in its 
slow response to the application, adding that the government should have had the 
courage of its conviction to make a decision and that it would have been much more 
respectful to have received a negative answer than no answer at all (Sunday 
Tribune, 29/9/2011). 
 
The organisers of the Dalai Lama’s planned visit to South Africa, the DTPC, urged 
Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe to support his statement that the government 
was ready to give him a visa (The Mercury, 6/10/2011). The DTPC sent an open 
letter to Motlanthe urging him to announce ‘unequivocally’ to the nation that a visa 
would be granted to the Dalai Lama and he was free to travel to South Africa 
immediately (The Mercury, 6/10/2011). The Centre also asked the Dalai Lama to 
consider travelling to South Africa after all. The Deputy President’s spokesperson 
said that he had not yet received the letter, but he would probably refer it to the 
Minister of Home Affairs “as the deputy president does not issue visas (The Mercury, 
6/10/2011)”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 The DTPC is a resource for African and global peace movements, as well as people interested in 
contributing to a more equitable world order. The focus of its work is on peace, leadership training and 
sustainable development. The mission of the Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation is to support and 
promote the creation of a culture of peace throughout the world (Tutu Foundation, undated). 
64 Offices of Tibet are the official agencies of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration 
based in Dharamshala, India (Central Tibetan Administration, 2012). 
221 
 
3.3. Statements by members of civil society 
 
Following the decision of the Dalai Lama to withdraw his visa application once again, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu had harsh words for the government, saying the current 
government was ”disgraceful” and “worse than the apartheid government” (The Star, 
5/10/2011). He added: “We were expecting we would get a government that was 
sensitive to the sentiments of our constitution”. 
 
The government also came under pressure from rights activists and Tripartite 
Alliance ally COSATU to allow the Dalai Lama into the country. COSATU said that 
even though China was South Africa’s biggest trading partner, “we should not 
exchange our morality for dollars or yen” (Pretoria News, 4/10/2011). COSATU later 
condemned the government’s ‘clumsiness’ in handling the application, using 
bureaucratic red tape to block it (The Star, 7/10/2011).  
 
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) said that the government 
had an obligation to explain its actions and inactions in the application, voicing 
concern over unexplained delays (Pretoria News, 6/10/2011).65 The Commission 
added that failure to provide reasons for its handling of the matter raised serious 
concerns about discriminatory applications of its power, a lack of commitment to 
transparency and enabling freedom of speech in the country (Pretoria News, 
6/10/2011).  
 
The Mercury (10/10/2011) reported that an empty chair, a burning candle and 
framed picture of the Dalai Lama were placed symbolically on the stage to depict his 
absence at the Durban City Hall during the Mahatma Gandhi International Award for 
Reconciliation and Peace ceremony. The award was created in memory of Mahatma 
Gandhi in 2003, to mark the centenary of the newspaper, the Indian Opinion, which 
he published in South Africa (Gandhi Development Trust, undated). Sonam Tenzing, 
who was representing the Dalai Lama in Africa, received the award on his behalf. 
 
                                                 
65 The SAHRC is the national institution established to support constitutional democracy. It is 
committed to promote respect for, observance of and protection of human rights for everyone without 
fear or favour (SAHRC, undated). 
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Ela Gandhi, Chairperson of the Gandhi Development Trust (GDT) 66 and Mahatma 
Gandhi’s granddaughter, said that the South African Government was deeply divided 
on the Dalai Lama matter, because there were those who wanted him to visit the 
country, although they feared that it would sour economic ties with the Chinese 
Government. However, there were also those in government who did not respect him 
and they were the ones controlling the situation (The Mercury, 10/10/2011).  
 
Archbishop Tutu eventually asked the Dalai Lama to hold a public dialogue with him 
via a video link-up in what was described as “a second-best method of 
communicating” (iol, 5/10/2011). iol reported that the dialogue would be moderated 
by Mabel van Oranje, the Chief Executive Officer of The Elders, replacing the 
inaugural peace lecture the Dalai Lama had been scheduled to deliver at the 
University of the Western Cape, as part of Archbishop Tutu's 80th birthday 
celebrations.67  
 
3.4. Statements by Tibetans and aligned organisations 
 
In a video message to universities and organisations that invited him, the Dalai Lama 
said he had no choice but to withdraw his application for a visa to visit South Africa 
(iol, 7/10/2011). He added that the government of South Africa felt that it would be an 
inconvenience and with no sign or answer about his visit/visa, there was no other 
alternative but to withdraw. The video was posted on the website of the University of 
the Witwatersrand (www.wits.ac.za) where he was due to speak.  
 
The Daily News (13/10/2011) quoted Sonam Tenzing, representative of the Dalai 
Lama in South Africa, saying sovereign nations such as South Africa should never 
allow themselves to be intimidated or scared into making decisions. He added that 
South Africa had the right not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa, but failed to give a 
decision. He referred to the 2009 promise by DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane, after the Dalai Lama had been denied a visa, that he would be free to 
                                                 
66 The GDT promotes a culture of non-violence through a wide range of initiatives and is also the 
custodian of the Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Reconciliation and Peace (GDT, undated). 
67 Chaired by Kofi Annan, The Elders is an independent group of global leaders who work together for 
peace and human rights. They were brought together in 2007 by Nelson Mandela, who is not an 
active member of the group, but remains an Honorary Elder (Elders, 2013). 
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visit South Africa in the future. Tenzing said he “carried the quote around in his 
pocket” (Daily News, 13/10/2011). 
 
3.5. Statements by political parties 
 
DA foreign affairs spokesperson, Stevens Mokgalapa, said the DA supported the 
Dalai Lama’s application and saw him as a champion of human rights (iol, 
29/8/2011). He said that one would have hoped that the government had learnt from 
their mistakes and would rethink. Opposition leader, the DA’s Helen Zille, said that 
South Africa should not be blackmailed into defying its Constitution (Pretoria News, 
3/10/2011).  
 
Reacting to the statement by Deputy President Motlanthe saying the government 
would have given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had not cancelled his application, 
COPE accused the government of “blatant dishonesty” (Pretoria News, 5/10/2011). 
They said that the government was set to trample underfoot the rights of citizens to 
freedom of association by picking and choosing who citizens might have as friends 
and associates, citing it as proof that the Constitution was in danger from the ruling 
party.  
 
Further criticism came from the UDM saying it was a sad day in South Africa, where 
a nation, who knows the suffering of domination and cruelty, turned a blind eye to 
oppression elsewhere in the world (Pretoria News, 5/10/2011). They said that the 
government could deny outside pressure (from China) to deny the Dalai Lama 
access to South Africa “as much as they like – the impression they give is to the 
contrary”. 
 
4. Media reaction 
 
From the outset some media corporations argued that South Africa would have to 
decide between its commitments to human rights and its desire not to offend its 
Chinese trading partners and cautioned that “our conscience could not be on sale” 
(Pretoria News, 30/8/2011).  
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The Daily News (25/9/2011) wanted to know why the government took almost a 
month to decide whether an international figure of peace should be allowed into the 
country. The paper asked whether the curious delay in granting the Dalai Lama a 
visa was “timidness” in the face of not wanting to anger China, or whether there was 
an unseen diplomatic tussle going on as China lobbied to forbid him access to South 
Africa. It referred to President Jacob Zuma’s 2009 explanation as ANC President, 
when the Dalai Lama was refused entry, saying the real problem then was that the 
visit would have coincided with the 50th anniversary of him fleeing into exile in India. 
It was noted that the government had then not ruled out a visit on another occasion 
and challenged the President to grant the visa (Daily News, 25/9/2011). 
 
The Pretoria News (6/10/2011) quoted from DIRCO’s Draft White Paper on Foreign 
Policy published in 2011, saying that as a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial 
country, South Africa embraced the concept of ubuntu as a way of defining who we 
were and how we related to others. The paper explained that according to DIRCO, 
the philosophy of ubuntu meant humanity and was reflected in the idea that we 
affirmed our humanity when we affirmed the humanity of others.  
 
These words were scrutinised in the light of the handling of the visa application by 
the Dalai Lama, saying that South Africa had not chosen to affirm the humanity of 
the Tibetan people, presumably because Tibet had nothing to offer South Africa. It 
argued that China would not stop investing or trading with South Africa if we allowed 
the Dalai Lama to visit the country, but suggested that cash might have been 
secured for the ANC, which could be cut off without affecting the Chinese economy 
(Pretoria News, 6/10/2011).  
The Cape Times (5/10/2011) commented that it seemed that all pretence at finding a 
balance between practical and principled considerations in South African foreign 
policy had been abandoned. The paper added that the South African Government’s 
disingenuous responses to questions on the Dalai Lama’s visa served as the 
“flimsiest of fig leaves”: the truth was that it chose not to offend China, which 
regarded the Dalai Lama as an enemy. This was beyond disappointing: it suggested 
a lack of moral fibre and ineptness in the foreign-policy arena. It quoted the Civil 
Society Coalition (CSC) campaigning for the Dalai Lama to be granted a visa, saying 
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South Africa’s approach had been exposed as “unaccountable, secretive and 
disrespectful”.68  
The Pretoria News (6/10/2011) accused the government of pursuing a “cynical 
strategy” over the planned visit to South Africa by the Dalai Lama, by delaying to 
grant a visa for so long that he had to cancel his visit, thus allowing the government 
to claim it never came under any pressure from China to prevent him from visiting 
and would have given him a visa, had he not cancelled. The paper commented that 
this was very implausible.  
 
According to the Daily News (6/10/2011) officials could finesse it as much as they 
would, but no amount of explanation or argument would counter the impression of a 
government that caved in to China’s wishes and sacrificed its fierce independence in 
the process. The government sought to look unhurried and strong in considering the 
Tibetan spiritual leader’s application for a visa. Instead it showed weakness and an 
inability to deal with tricky situations. It was distasteful to know from this episode that 
while the government had previously stood firm on principle, it had a price.  
 
The Star (14/10/2011) described the way the government handled the Dalai Lama’s 
planned visit to South Africa as “very clumsy”. The paper referred to an explanation 
by President Jacob Zuma saying no one in government was saying why he did not 
get a visa, because it was a state secret. It stated that the Dalai Lama visa affair 
should therefore probably be regarded as a forerunner of how the PSIB would 
operate once it came into effect.  
 
It indicated that the President implied that it was not in South Africa’s national 
interest to disclose why the Dalai Lama was barred entry, but implicitly provided the 
answer saying that China had agreed to help South Africa add value to its raw 
materials, while South Africa fully backed the one-China policy, which addressed 
“the question of the territorial sovereignty of China as the sole and legitimate 
representative of all the people of that country” (The Star, 14/10/2011). Essentially it 
                                                 
68 The CSC consisted specifically of signatories committed to the course of letting the Dalai Lama into 
South Africa: Western Cape Religious Leaders Forum; Buddhist Practitioner Group RSA; SAFT; 
Ndifuna Ukwazi; South African Peace Alliance; Cape Town Interfaith Initiative; and Reclaim Camissa 
Trust (Ndifuna Ukwazi 2011). 
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said that allowing the Dalai Lama to visit South Africa would have jeopardised 
Beijing’s undertaking to help South Africa economically.  
 
Again in 2011, Zapiro (2011) provided the quintessential examples of cartooning on 
the matter (see Figure 6). He depicts the Dalai Lama visiting a guru sitting on a 
mountain displaying a sign that he could be asked anything (implying that he knows 
the answer to everything), except how to get a South African visa, if the Chinese do 
not wish to. A disappointed Dalai Lama is pictured looking on. It is thus again implied 
that China is prescribing to South Africa regarding its foreign-policy decisions.  
 
Figure 8: Dalai Lama requests visa to attend Desmond Tutu's 80th birthday 
celebrations 
 
 
 
Source: The Times (22/9/2011) 
 
A few days later, reference is made about the government’s general lack of urgency 
in dealing with matters, also referring to the visa for the Dalai Lama (Zapiro, 2011) 
(see Figure 7). Sitting in front of a huge banner of the Department of Transport 
227 
 
warning that “Speed Kills” President Zuma is depicted sitting with his feet on his desk 
with an outbox showing only a few completed tasks and a hugely piled up inbox with 
the visa for the Dalai Lama visible at the bottom and thus clearly not a priority.  
 
Figure 9: Speed kills! 
 
 
 
Source: Sunday Times (25/9/2011) 
5. Reaction of analysts and other commentators  
 
Advocate Shami Kholong, a policy and risk analyst, wrote that the government’s 
‘abortion’ of the Dalai Lama’s visit undermined a pillar of our constitution – the 
protection of human rights (The Star, 6/10/2011). He argued that the government’s 
indecision, incompetently tossing the application from one official to the other, was 
informed by a desire to please “new colonial master” China.  
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Solly Moeng, brand management consultant and social commentator, argued that 
the caring human rights-inspired and listening state that we thought we were 
nurturing was disappearing (The Star, 6/10/2011). He asked what price freedom-
loving South Africans had to pay for deals struck between China and the South 
African political elite and what more China would make our ruling party succumb to.  
 
6.  Inkatha Freedom Party court challenge of the handling of the application 
 
It was later reported that the government was going to have to defend its handling of 
the Dalai Lama’s visa application in court, as the IFP and COPE jointly lodged an 
application in the Western Cape High Court for a judicial review of how the matter 
was dealt with and for the government’s action – or inaction – on the matter to be 
declared invalid (The Star, 18/10/2011).  
 
As indicated before, the IFP also brought a court application in 2009 to have the 
government's decision not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa overturned. The Western 
Cape High Court threw out the case and the party then took it to the Constitutional 
Court, but it had not yet been heard. The new application would override the earlier 
one (News24, 18/10/2011). IFP MP Mario Oriani-Ambrosini said the government’s 
conduct, which his party believed had led to an “effective denial” of the visa, was 
both illegal and unconstitutional. He explained that COPE leader, Mosiuoa Lekota, 
and IFP leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, felt that condemnation was not enough and 
there had to be redress.  
 
Responding to the news that the IFP and COPE had lodged the legal challenge, the 
ANC slammed it as “astonishing silliness” and “political shallowness” (The Star, 
19/10/2011). In response, the ANC said that the IFP and COPE were aware of the 
frivolity of their legal challenge and had embarked on this action regardless, for the 
sake of scoring a few political points and cheap publicity.  
 
The ANC argued that the parties should have used parliamentary channels to hold 
the executive accountable for the decisions it took and said the notion that the 
government had violated the Constitution on the matter was “misguided” and could 
not be backed up by facts. The ANC added that such “spurious court actions” wasted 
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the courts’ time. The IFP and COPE had also asked the court for a declaratory order 
which they hoped would pave the way for the Dalai Lama to receive a visa to attend 
a prayer meeting to be hosted by IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi in Durban in 
March 2012 (The Star, 19/10/2011).  
 
A senior unnamed South African official later reportedly admitted that the Dalai Lama 
was prevented from attending Archbishop Tutu's 80th birthday celebrations to 
preserve vital trade ties with China (iol, 7/12/2011). Home Affairs Director-General 
Mkuseli Apleni said in a court affidavit quoted by The Post (7/12/2011) that his 
advice to his minister on the Tibetan spiritual leader's visa application was not to 
jeopardise ties with Beijing: “In giving advice ... regarding the application for a visa by 
the Dalai Lama, I had recourse to our trade relations with China.”  
 
The “backlash” for France and Australia “provided some learning to the government 
and the sensitivities that were attendant” to allowing the visit by the Dalai Lama, 
whom China considers “a dangerous separatist”. Apleni insisted that the Home 
Affairs Minister had not acted “under the dictates of China,” but “further took into 
account the fact that the Deputy President had just conducted a successful visit to 
China” (iol, 7/12/2011). The country also felt indebted to China for orchestrating 
South Africa's invitation to join BRICS. 
 
Judge Elizabeth Baartman dismissed with costs the application brought by the IFP 
and COPE on whether it was constitutional for the government not to have granted a 
visa to the Dalai Lama (iol, 3/2/2012). The IFP said that the Western Cape High 
Court eventually dismissed the application on the Dalai Lama's visa as it was “too 
late to fix the past”. IFP MP Mario Oriani-Ambrosini said the Court held that it could 
do nothing to fix what was done in the past if that was wrongful and that nothing had 
yet been done in respect of the future which could enable the court to fix it before it 
happened. IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi had invited the Dalai Lama to visit him 
in 2012.  
 
Home Affairs Director-General Mkuseli Apleni said in an affidavit that the Dalai Lama 
had not submitted a visa application for a visit in 2012 and there was a possibility he 
would not be in a position to come to South Africa at that time: “This application and 
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the invitation of March 2012 are part of a political point-scoring exercise that 
constitutes a patent abuse of process by two seasoned politicians” (iol, 7/12/2011).  
 
Oriani-Ambrosini said the legal routes had thus far proven unsuccessful which was a 
grave indictment on the entire system of government which had not yet been able to 
find a mechanism to correct what everyone perceived as an injustice, ranging from 
the churches to the trade unions to the common people who, in their overwhelming 
majority, declared themselves in favour of the Dalai Lama coming to South Africa. 
Oriani-Ambrosini said they might consider appealing the judgment (iol, 3/2/2012). 
 
The IFP and COPE then filed an application for leave to appeal the judgment that 
dismissed a Dalai Lama visa suit (Daily News, 19/2/2012). IFP leader Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi and COPE leader Mosiuoa Lekota believed that the Western Cape High 
Court erred in its judgment. According to papers filed, the Court had assumed that 
“the only constitutional rights at play were those of the Dalai Lama, when the 
application was centrally to vindicate the constitutional rights of the applicants and 
public” (Daily News, 19/2/2012).  
 
The Court found that the issue was “moot” because the spiritual leader had 
withdrawn his visa and the event he had planned to attend had passed. The 
applicants argued that the application raised “important issues in the public interest” 
(Daily News, 19/2/2012). 
 
The IFP and COPE were granted leave to appeal against the judgment dismissing 
their bid to have the government's refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visa declared 
unlawful (iol, 19/3/2012). IFP spokesperson Mario Oriani-Ambrosini said the Western 
Cape High Court granted them leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
have the constitutionality of the government's “persistent denial” of a visa to the 
spiritual leader reviewed (iol, 19/3/2012). He said both parties were committed to 
pursue justice in this matter in which the government “acted against the will of the 
people” who, according to a survey, would want the Dalai Lama to come to South 
Africa (iol, 19/3/2012). 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal heard the application by the IFP and the COPE in 
November 2012 relating to whether it was unconstitutional and unlawful for Home 
Affairs to turn down a visa for the Dalai Lama (iol, 12/11/2012). iol (12/11/2012) 
quoted from an earlier IFP statement saying that because of its absurdity, the Dalai 
Lama case brought to the fore the extent to which the South African ruling class was 
beholden to the Chinese Government. The IFP also noted that the Government's 
lawyers had argued in their papers that the refusal to grant a visa was justified by the 
South African Government's intention not to displease the Chinese Government (iol, 
12/11/2012).  
 
As an unanimous judgement by a full bench found that former Home Affairs Minister 
Dlamini-Zuma had unreasonably delayed the decision on a visa application by the 
Dalai Lama, media predicted that the Dalai Lama could expect another invitation to 
come to South Africa (Pretoria News, 30/11/2012). Archbishop Tutu welcomed the 
ruling saying the finding reflected positively on the judiciary and the country (Pretoria 
News, 30/11/2012). IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi reacted asking why it was 
necessary to go all the way to one of the highest courts in the land to force the 
government to do what they should do. He wanted to know whether the government 
had “really lost the moral compass” (Pretoria News, 30/11/2012).    
 
COPE leader Mosiuoa Lekota said the rule of law had been upheld confirming the 
rights of all citizens to freedom of association (The Star, 30/11/2012). The DA’s 
Sandy Kalyan said South Africa’s name would now be vindicated abroad.  
 
The most comprehensive reaction from the government was noted in The New Age 
(30/11/2012) where Home Affairs spokesperson Ronnie Mamoepa was quoted 
saying Minister Naledi Pandor, successor to former Minister Dlamini-Zuma, would 
study the ruling and respond at a later stage.  He was, however, quick to point out 
that the right of the government to issue visas had not been challenged.  
 
Zapiro (2012) was swift to comment on this ruling with a cartoon (see Figure 8) 
depicting the Dalai Lama in a little car celebrating with a cheering Archbishop Tutu in 
the wings and former Minister Dlamini-Zuma as a dog ran over on the ground, 
quipping that his “karma” ran over the government’s “dogma” - a clever wordplay 
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linking all the positive sentiments associated with the word karma to the Dalai Lama 
and all that is negative connected with dogma to the Minister.  
 
Figure 10: South African Supreme Court of Appeal declares blocking of the 
Dalai Lama's visa illegal  
 
 
Source: Sunday Times (2/12/2012) 
 
7. Continued coverage after the issue disappeared from the headlines 
 
7.1. Taylor Nelson Sofres Survey  
 
Nearly half of urban adults believe that the Dalai Lama should be allowed to visit 
South Africa, a study by marketing company Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) claimed 
(Times Live, 6/12/2011). About 47 percent of adults polled in metropolitan areas at 
the end of October and early November 2012 felt he should be allowed to visit the 
country while a fifth (21 percent) disagreed. A third of metro adults gave a "do not 
know" response. Neil Higgs, the head of innovation at TNS South Africa, said that 
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amongst those giving an opinion there was a more than a two-to-one majority in 
favour of the Dalai Lama coming to South Africa. The study was conducted among 2 
000 metro adults into attitudes to various social and political issues in late October 
and early November 2011. The study has a margin of error of less than 2,5 per cent. 
He explained that for such issues, there was much less variation by race group than 
usual, with whites and Indians being the most in favour.  
 
People in Johannesburg and East London were the most positive. In Pretoria, 
however, 30 per cent felt he should not be allowed to visit (Times Live, 6/12/2011). 
Across the different religious groupings, 60 per cent of Muslims approved of the visit, 
56 per cent of Hindus and 48 per cent of Christians. The most negative, at 37 
percent, were those with no religion or those who were atheists or agnostics.  
 
7.2. Peace award to Dalai Lama in India 
 
The Dalai Lama was given the Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Peace and 
Reconciliation in January 2012 (The Mercury, 28/12/2011). Media sources explained 
again that the exiled Tibetan leader could not travel to South Africa to receive the 
award in October 2011, because the government failed to give him a visa in time.  
 
The Award was created in memory of Mahatma Gandhi by the Gandhi Development 
Trust in 2003. The Dalai Lama was chosen for being outspoken on a variety of 
issues. The Trust said the award was in recognition of his “humility and compassion” 
in raising issues of peace, conservation of the environment and human rights and in 
so doing constantly advocating non-violent means in true “Gandhian tradition” (The 
Mercury, 28/12/2011). The Gandhi Development Trust said Ela Gandhi, chairwoman 
of the trust and Mahatma Gandhi’s granddaughter, presented the award to the Dalai 
Lama at an international Buddhist gathering in India on 4 January 2012.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
While admitting that it received another application for a visa on invitation by 
Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu for the Dalai Lama to attend his 80th birthday 
party in 2011, DIRCO eventually just delayed the process until it was too late for the 
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Dalai Lama to consider attending the event anymore, never really actually taking a 
decision on the matter. 
   
As the news of the 2011 invitation broke the media immediately suggested that the 
South African Government might again be reluctant to grant the visa, for fear of 
offending the Chinese Government. The 2009 statement by DIRCO Minister, Maite 
Nkoana-Mashabane, saying the Dalai Lama was welcome to visit South Africa and 
describing what happened around the earlier decision as poor communication by the 
government, was quoted by the media and representatives of the Dalai Lama.  
 
When the Dalai Lama eventually cancelled his application as the government never 
provided an answer about the status of the visa in time for the visit, Deputy President 
Kgalema Motlanthe reacted saying the government would have given him a visa if he 
had not cancelled. This statement was met with scepticism, it was described it as 
‘dishonest’ and followed by requests for the government to go ahead and issue it.  
 
The government was slated for not having “the courage of its conviction” to make a 
decision and reprimanded that it would have been much more respectful to give a 
negative answer than no answer at all. In the court application by the IFP and COPE 
the government’s conduct was described as “effective denial” of the visa and seen 
as both illegal and unconstitutional. In its affidavit to court the government admitted 
that the Dalai Lama was prevented from visiting South Africa to preserve vital trade 
ties with China.   
 
Criticism of the government’s handling of the matter can be summarised as: not 
being sensitive to the sentiments of the constitution; exchanging morality for financial 
gain; a lack of commitment to transparency; allowing itself to be intimidated and even 
‘blackmailed’ by China; not affirming its professed philosophy of ubuntu in its 
handling of the issue; and abandoning all pretence at finding a balance between 
practical and principled considerations in South African foreign policy. 
 
The same arguments as in 2009 were made in criticism of the government, albeit 
termed differently. In essence, values (the Dalai seen as a champion of human 
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rights) are juxtaposed against interest (trade with China), which are in actual fact 
more painted as expedience.  
 
Instead of acting from lessons learnt from 2009, as the government in fact hinted at 
the time, the government froze as the 2011 situation occurred and simply would not 
take a decision despite pressure from the media, opposition and civil society. The 
outcome was, however the same. The communication was probably even worse in 
that the overall strategy was apparently to avoid making any illuminating statements 
on the matter, corresponding with the approach to simply not take a decision.  
 
The Dalai Lama was refused a visa by default and the criticism from all sides was 
phrased in the same terms and possibly even in sharper tones, accusing the 
government of putting interest before principle and bowing to pressure from China. 
The ruling by the Supreme Court of Appeal seemingly vindicated the sentiments of 
those criticising the government for its handling of the matter - especially its dithering 
in taking a decision.   
 
The same constructivist principles were evident from an analysis of the 2011 Dalai 
Lama invitation, as were observed from the 2009 invitation. As the government 
deferred taking a decision it never really had to justify not granting a visa to the Dalai 
Lama. It only confessed that the Dalai Lama was prevented from visiting South 
Africa to preserve vital trade ties with China in an affidavit to court. Again the media, 
civil society and opposition political parties could not shift the government from its 
position of not granting the Dalai Lama a visa. It took a court case to get the 
government to state its reasons for not granting a visa. 
 
The next chapter consists of an overall review and evaluation of this study.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On the premise of the constructivist theory that international reality is socially 
constructed and its assumption of rationality linking interests, norms and identity the 
policy outcome of the case study, in view of the role played by the main stake 
holders, can be evaluated.  
 
2. Research question, analytical framework and theoretical approach of 
study 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how media reporting framed foreign-
policy issues, especially in the South African context. The primary aim was to 
illustrate the relationship between the media and a country’s foreign policy, as 
conducted through public diplomacy, with specific reference to South Africa. The aim 
was not necessarily to prove or disprove the causal effect of media opinion on 
foreign policy, but to investigate how the media framed and analysed South African 
foreign policy and very specifically with regard to the matter investigated in the case 
study.  
 
The research question posed was: How do the South African media frame foreign 
policy and how do administrators react to this actuality? The discourse between the 
South African media and government with regard to South Africa’s foreign policy was 
illustrated in the matter of the South African Government not granting a visa to the 
14th Dalai Lama on two occasions, in 2009 and 2011, which served as a study case 
of the interchanges between the media and the government on the matter. 
 
The study predominantly accepted the constructivist approach as theoretical 
foundation in analysing the relationship between government entities and the media. 
It is thus assumed that international reality is cognitively and “socially constructed” to 
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give meaning to the material world. In accordance with the constructive approach 
international politics is seen as being shaped by influential ideas, collective values, 
culture and social identities.  
 
The method used in this study was to concentrate on a cautiously selected case 
study to examine the issue at hand. The case study selected offered an example 
where government decisions drew strong reaction from the media, there was 
significant media coverage from various angles to the story, there were statements 
from government in reaction to the publicity and there was a final conclusion to the 
matter to facilitate a complete analysis. There was thus enough evidence of an 
interaction between media coverage and government reaction to make the study 
viable.  
 
Constructivism was selected as the main theoretical approach from which to conduct 
this study, as the dealings between the government and the media in the above 
study might lead to a newly constructed foreign-policy stance. Issues of values are 
also repeatedly highlighted in arguments in the disputes in both instances when the 
Dalai Lama’s visa was not granted.  
 
3. Findings of research 
 
As judged from the perspective given in initial media coverage of the Dalai Lama 
dispute in 2009, there was confusion about whether the government had in fact 
strictly taken a decision not to grant him a visa, and if so, the reasons therefore.   
 
DFA denied that the government was blocking the invitation, insisting that no 
invitation had been extended to him and said South Africa made its own decisions 
based on the best interests of the country. However, the Chinese embassy in 
Pretoria admitted to appealing to the South African Government not to allow the 
Dalai Lama into South Africa, warning that it would harm bilateral relations. The 
embassy also explained that it was a particularly inopportune time for the Dalai Lama 
to be visiting South Africa as it was the 60th anniversary of what Tibetans regarded 
as China’s military invasion of Tibet, but which the Chinese Government described 
as its liberation of Tibetans from “feudal serfdom”. It is interesting to note the ANC’s 
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mention of this in its defence of the decision and the DFA saying he was welcome to 
visit South Africa, but “not now”.   
 
At the end of August 2011, the media started hinting that “another row” might be 
brewing in the light of the invitation by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu. The 
2009 statement by DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, saying the Dalai 
Lama was welcome to visit South Africa, was immediately recalled by the media. 
Home Affairs said that the Dalai Lama had not applied for a visa. However, Minister 
Nkoana-Mashabane admitted to having received the application saying it was under 
process.  
 
This process would eventually just be delayed until it was too late for the Dalai Lama 
to consider attending the event anymore. As the government failed to provide an 
answer about the status of the visa, the Dalai Lama finally cancelled his application. 
Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe reacted saying the government would have 
given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had not cancelled his application.  
 
3.1. Human rights and South African foreign policy 
 
The issue of human rights was prominent in the discourse between the government 
and the ANC on the one hand and the media, opposition political parties and civil 
society on the other. This was true both with regard to the 2009 and the 2011 
invitations to the Dalai Lama. It was the predominant normative argument for those 
insisting that the Dalai Lama should have been allowed to visit the country. For the 
most part this was justified in terms of the Constitution. There were no attempts to 
justify this in terms of any international obligations the country might have.  
 
From this research, it would seem as if ideas about values are mostly articulated by 
civil society leaders, political parties, academics and the media. Though the 
government would often express support for such ideas, even in policy documents, 
actual implementation does not necessarily follow in practice, as the harsh reality of 
interest may override its commitment to these values. 
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There was a strong voice criticising the government’s 2009 decision, accusing it of 
abandoning human rights principles under pressure from China for the sake of trade 
benefits. The Dalai Lama said religious, social and political leaders had a 
responsibility to ensure that principles triumph over the obsession with money and 
power. Health Minister Barbara Hogan accused the government of being ‘dismissive’ 
of human rights.  
 
Pro-Tibetans and opposition political parties applauded her “pro-human rights 
stance” in this matter, while the ANC urged her to resign if she believed the 
government was not committed to a culture of human rights. Constitutional Court 
Justice Kate O’Regan supported Minister Hogan’s position saying it was a matter of 
‘dismay’ that human rights did not seem to enter into the picture of some foreign 
affairs decisions. The DA said South Africa’s foreign policy had lost its ”moral 
compass”. Media argued that the government believed that sticking to the spirit of 
the constitution and abiding by a commitment to international human rights was less 
in South Africa’s interests than kowtowing to China.  
 
Analysts explained that there was not necessarily a conflict between the pursuit of 
values and national interests; rather, values were often intangible forms of national 
interests. The constitution enjoined the government to pursue a balanced foreign 
policy, both value-based and interest-driven. Lack of consensus on what constituted 
the national interests bedevilled this balancing act.  
 
Despite the very strong attack on the government’s foreign-policy human rights 
credentials, government did very little to defend itself in this respect, but chose to 
make it a national interest issue. The ANC merely maintained that this decision did 
not compromise South Africa’s stand on human rights. 
 
The human rights issue came up again in 2011. Archbishop Tutu had harsh words 
for the government, saying it was ‘disgraceful’ and “worse than the apartheid 
government” as it was not sensitive to the sentiments of the Constitution. The 
government also came under pressure from COSATU who said that even though 
China was South Africa’s biggest trading partner, “we should not exchange our 
morality for dollars or yen”. The SAHRC said that the government’s failure to provide 
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reasons for its handling of the matter raised serious concerns about discriminatory 
applications of its power, a lack of commitment to transparency and enabling 
freedom of speech in the country.  
 
Opposition political parties accused the government of trampling underfoot the rights 
of citizens to freedom of association by picking and choosing who citizens might 
associate with, citing it as proof that the Constitution was in danger from the ruling 
party. Media argued that the way the government handled the matter suggested a 
lack of moral fibre and ineptness in the foreign-policy arena. Analysts concurred that 
the government’s ‘abortion’ of the Dalai Lama’s visit undermined a pillar of the 
constitution – the protection of human rights. 
 
Again the government did not defend itself with regard to accusations on the issue of 
human rights, especially as it did not actually take a decision to refuse a visa. It was 
not very active in the media space during the 2011 dispute. 
 
3.2. National interest versus pressure from China 
 
The government introduced the angle of “South Africa’s interest” to the story in 2009. 
However, the media framed this as “bowing to pressure” from China. In 2011 the 
media predicted in advance that the government might not approve a visa to the 
Dalai Lama under Chinese pressure. 
 
As the government admitted South Africa had refused the Dalai Lama a visa to 
attend the conference, they explained it was “not in South Africa's interest” for him to 
attend, as the focus would shift away from the 2010 World Cup. The media 
suggested that barring the Dalai Lama had everything to do with what decision-
makers perceived to be “the best interests” of the country, rather than distraction. 
 
In what the media interpreted as an indication that South Africa ‘bowed’ to pressure 
from China, the government explained that the decision was made so as not to 
jeopardise bilateral relations with China. Government insisted that it was not in South 
Africa’s interest to invite the Dalai Lama, but rejected suggestions that it had denied 
him entry under pressure from China. TSSA described the government’s ‘scrambled’ 
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excuses as ‘ludicrous’ and noted that they eventually admitted that the Dalai Lama 
was barred because of links with the Chinese.  
 
The Dalai Lama also ascribed the decision by the government to refuse him a visa to 
Chinese diplomatic pressure, but said it ’backfired’ by generating a storm of publicity. 
Former President FW de Klerk argued that South Africa was a sovereign 
constitutional democracy and should not allow other countries to dictate to it 
regarding who it should and should not admit to its territory – regardless of the power 
and influence of that country. The DA said a policy only needed to be measured by 
the results and the results of this decision clearly had to be against South Africa’s 
best interests. The media linked the decision to China’s establishment of an office in 
Johannesburg to disburse a R50 billion Africa investment fund. Analysts noted that 
China was demanding much more from African states in enforcing its “no-meet-the-
Dalai Lama policy” than any Western nation would dare to.  
 
Whereas the government apparently attempted to deflect the attention from the 
human rights allegations by offering an explanation for its decision in terms of 
national interest, it was interpreted as bowing to pressure from China.  
 
In 2011, the representative of the Dalai Lama in South Africa said sovereign nations 
such as South Africa should never allow themselves to be intimidated into making 
decisions. Opposition political parties were quoted as saying that the government 
could deny outside pressure (from China) to deny the Dalai Lama access to South 
Africa as much as they like, the impression they gave was to the contrary.  
 
The media also insisted that no amount of argument would counter the impression of 
a government that “caved in” to China’s wishes and sacrificed its fierce 
independence in the process. Analysts argued that the government’s indecision, 
incompetently tossing the application from one official to the other, was informed by 
a desire to please “new colonial master” China.  
 
As in 2009, despite protestation from the government, the consensus was that the 
government gave in to pressure from China in not granting a visa to the Dalai Lama. 
It is noteworthy from the media set monitored that whereas the government did not 
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do much to contest the human rights angle to the story, it did, however, challenge 
the accusation that it took the decision under pressure from China.  
 
3.3. How Government adapted its professed stance on granting a visa to the 
Dalai Lama over time 
 
The government’s initial stance in 2009 was that no invitation had been extended to 
the Dalai Lama, but the insistence of the media and civil society forced them to 
acknowledge that a visa had in fact been denied to him, taking the line that 
government did not want the focus to be shifted from the 2010 World Cup.  
 
There was confusion about whether the government had in fact strictly taken a 
decision not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa in 2009, and if so, the reasons therefore.  
The government denied that it was blocking the invitation, insisting that no invitation 
had been extended to him and said South Africa made its own decisions based on 
the best interests of the country.  
 
As the media and conference organisers maintained that the Dalai Lama was invited 
to speak at the peace conference linked to the 2010 World Cup, the government 
admitted South Africa had refused the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the conference, 
saying it was not in South Africa's interest for him to attend, as the focus would shift 
away from the 2010 World Cup. TSSA described the reasons given by Government 
as ‘ludicrous’ and noted that they eventually admitted that the Dalai Lama was 
barred because of links with the Chinese. The government also said they did not 
want the event to be used as a platform to advance political causes.  
 
Another shift in stance can be detected in that government finally indicated that they 
did not want to jeopardise relations with China. Though government denied the 
suggestion, media interpreted this as bowing to pressure from China.  
 
The government explained that the decision was made not to jeopardise bilateral 
relations with China. They insisted that it was not in South Africa’s interest to invite 
the Dalai Lama, but rejected suggestions that they had denied him entry under 
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pressure from China. It is thus clear that the government was repeatedly pushed to 
adapt its stated public policy messages with regard to this story.  
 
As the prospect of another visit to South Africa by the Dalai Lama came up in 2011, 
the media and later the representative of the Dalai Lama in South Africa referred to 
the 2009 promise by the government that the Dalai Lama would be free to visit South 
Africa in the future. Media also referred to the 2009 ANC explanation that the real 
problem then was that the visit would have coincided with the 50th anniversary of the 
Dalai Lama fleeing into exile in India and challenged the President to grant the visa. 
In not granting the 2011 visa, the government clearly had to backtrack on these 
stated positions.  
 
As the 2011 visa story broke, Home Affairs denied that the Dalai Lama had applied 
for a visa. However, they soon afterwards admitted to having received the 
application, saying it was under process. This process would eventually just be 
delayed until it was too late for the Dalai Lama to consider attending the event 
anymore. As the government failed to provide an answer about the status of the visa, 
the Dalai Lama eventually cancelled his application. The Deputy President reacted 
saying the government would have given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had not 
cancelled his application. As the Deputy President was challenged to issue such a 
visa, his spokesperson merely stated that the Deputy President did not issue visas.  
 
As in 2009, the government was repeatedly pressured into adapting its public stance 
on the matter, though it might not necessarily have come down to an actual policy 
adjustment.  
 
3.4. Secrecy and foreign-policy decision-making 
 
With regard to the 2011 invitation to the Dalai Lama, media also related the decision 
to the proposed PSIB. Media referred to an explanation by President Jacob Zuma 
saying no one in government was saying why he did not get a visa, because it was a 
state secret. Media inferred that this should therefore probably be regarded as a 
forerunner of how the PSIB would operate once it came into effect.  
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From 2009 to 2011 media and analysts carried the argument that China would not 
stop investing or trading with South Africa if the Dalai Lama was allowed to visit the 
country. It was suggested that cash might have been secured for the ANC, which 
could be cut off without affecting the Chinese economy. The question was posed 
what price South Africans had to pay for deals struck between China and the South 
African political elite and what more China would make the ruling party succumb to.  
 
3.5. Diplomacy and public diplomacy as instruments of foreign policy  
 
Whether traditional diplomacy was used in the matter of the non-issuing of visas to 
the Dalai Lama can only be inferred from the media coverage investigated for the 
case study. If there was any contact at diplomatic level between the countries 
involved, specifically South Africa and China, it was probably in the form of ‘silent’ 
diplomatic exchanges.  
 
A media statement by the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria seems to imply that the 
Chinese Government had appealed to the South African Government not to issue 
such a visa in 2009. The South African Government seemed to want to refute such 
an interaction. Asked if South Africa had consulted China before taking the decision 
not to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama, the South African Government said it was a 
decision taken by the South African Government alone. Both countries did, however, 
clearly use public diplomacy to state their positions on the matter.  
 
Regarding the 2009 visa dispute, the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria, using public 
diplomacy, admitted through the media to using traditional diplomacy in appealing to 
the South African Government not to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa. They 
warned that it would harm bilateral relations and explained that it was a particularly 
inopportune time for the Dalai Lama to be visiting South Africa referring to the 50th 
anniversary of the Tibetan uprising.  
 
The Chinese Embassy further indicated that for South Africa to allow the Dalai Lama 
into the country would greatly harm South African-Chinese relations. China also 
expressed appreciation for countries that ‘rejected’ the Dalai Lama, saying all 
countries should respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “oppose 
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Tibetan independence”. Issuing this statement to the media was most probably 
aimed at influencing the communication environment and through this, the South 
African Government’s further handling of the matter.  
 
The South African Government was probably more reluctant to use the public 
diplomacy instrument, and was most likely only forced into putting its position on the 
matter in the public domain by the outcry from media and civil society against its 
disinclination to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama. Government was mostly prompted 
for information on the situation, first insisting that no invitation had been extended to 
the Dalai Lama; then stating that it had decided it was not in South Africa’s interest to 
invite the Dalai Lama, putting forward the argument that the Dalai Lama would divert 
the attention from the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the peace conference. Government 
eventually added that it was also faced with the choice of either allowing the Dalai 
Lama access or damaging relations with China, but rejected suggestions that it had 
denied him entry under pressure from China.  
 
The progressive divulgence of the government’s stance seems to prove that its hand 
might have been forced into acceding to handling this on a public diplomacy 
platform. It may much rather have used traditional ‘silent’ diplomacy techniques to 
address the issue, but the civil society and media sentiment on the matter was such 
that it had to state its case in public. 
 
The same reluctance to divulge information was evident around the 2011 visa 
dispute. The government initially said that the Dalai Lama had not applied for a visa 
in New Delhi, but soon afterwards admitted to having received the application, 
saying it was under process. Government later said that a decision on the application 
would not be made public, as it would be communicated to the applicant. As the 
government failed to provide an answer about the status of the visa, the Dalai Lama 
eventually cancelled his application. Government then claimed it would have given 
the Dalai Lama a visa if he had not cancelled his application.  
 
In 2011, the government was even more secretive about the process and eventually 
did not take a decision at all. The only statement on the issue really offered 
voluntarily was the unfortunate assertion that the visa would have been granted had 
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the Dalai Lama not cancelled his visit. It seems a valid observation from both events 
that government only went public on the matter under duress.  
 
3.6. Link between foreign policy, diplomacy and public diplomacy 
 
There were assertions that government had even before the Dalai Lama’s 2009 visa 
application accepted the principles of the one-China policy which addressed the 
question of the territorial sovereignty of China as the sole and legitimate 
representative of all the people of that country. The anniversary of the 1959 uprising 
and establishment of a Tibetan government-in-exile in India, as well as anti-Chinese 
riots in the Tibetan capital Lhasa in 2008, also heightened sensitivities about the 
issue of China's occupation of Tibet. The ANC explained that the government was 
not saying that the Dalai Lama could not come to South Africa, but the month of 
March was serious between the Dalai Lama and China “in a very specific way” in 
view of the aforementioned history. 
 
A statement by the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria implied activity at diplomatic level. 
It suggested that China had appealed to the South African Government not to allow 
the Dalai Lama into South Africa, as it would harm bilateral relations. They also 
explained that it was a particularly inopportune time for the Dalai Lama to be visiting 
South Africa. The Chinese Embassy was quoted as saying the Chinese Government 
had urged South Africa to ban the visit or risk damaging bilateral relations. The 
South African Government would not concede to such interaction.  
 
Through the South African Government’s public diplomacy communication it was 
argued that the government did not consider it in South Africa's interest for the Dalai 
Lama to attend the peace conference, as the focus would shift away from the 2010 
World Cup. It was also conceded that a choice was made that South African 
interests would be better served if bilateral relations with China were not jeopardised. 
  
As the new administration of President Jacob Zuma took over in mid-2009, it was 
reiterated that the country’s foreign policy would remain unchanged, while 
specifically emphasising that the Dalai Lama was now free to visit. This statement 
was soon quoted by the media and supporters of the Dalai Lama regarding the 2011 
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invitation. However, the government would not be moved to react to this by word or 
deed. 
 
No hint of diplomatic activity between South Africa and China is evident from 
communication from either country regarding the 2011 invitation to the Dalai Lama. 
Even regarding public diplomacy no communication from the Chinese Government 
was noticed in the media, and the South African Government was very reluctant to 
communicate on the matter as explained before, probably as a result of its 
unfortunate experience in 2009.  
 
The South African Government even indicated that a decision on the Dalai Lama’s 
visa application would not be made public, as it would be communicated to the 
applicant. As the government failed to provide an answer about the status of the 
visa, the Dalai Lama eventually cancelled his application. The government then 
made the opportunistic claim that it would have given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had 
not cancelled his application.   
 
Though the new administration expressly stated as part of a foreign-policy statement 
in 2009 that the Dalai Lama would be welcome in South Africa in future, this would 
not materialise in 2011. When reminded of this, the government chose to ignore the 
remark. Whereas there was a hint of diplomatic activity between South African and 
China in 2009, none was admitted to in 2011. The 2009 experience also made both 
countries shy to handle the 2011 situation enthusiastically on the public diplomacy 
platform.  
 
3.7. How the South African media frame foreign policy and how the 
government reacts to this actuality 
 
Media reacted with outrage to the government’s handling of the Dalai Lama’s visa 
applications both in 2009 and in 2011.  
 
The media described the fact that South Africa had in 2009 closed its door to the 
Dalai Lama, who, the world over, commanded immense respect, as “a disgrace”. 
South Africa’s “spinelessness on the international stage” was portrayed as 
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‘embarrassing’. It was argued that the world, like South Africans, had become 
accustomed to the government’s “extraordinary hypocrisy” in foreign relations – 
politicians paid lip-service to principles, yet thoughtless pragmatism governed foreign 
policy. 
 
 Regarding the argument that his visit would divert attention from the focus of the 
conference he was invited to attend, to Tibet, it was suggested that government 
officials would have realised that the snub they were defending was creating more 
publicity than allowing the Dalai Lama to attend the conference. There were also 
suggestions that there would soon be proof enough that the ANC decided to ban the 
Dalai Lama because of all the Chinese money that went into the party’s coffers. 
Media also argued that increasingly, the world could be divided into those countries 
that were succumbing to pressure from China and those that were not, with South 
Africa falling into the former category.  
 
Media referred to the “one-China policy”, that meant accepting that Taiwan was a 
renegade province of China that had to return to the mother country. China’s 
apparent mounting sensitivity about the Dalai Lama implied that the policy had been 
secretly extended to Tibet. Media noted that China proffered that part of the respect 
they accorded to Africa was not to impose conditions on their aid, as Western 
nations did. The paradox was that by enforcing this “no-meet-the-Dalai Lama policy” 
at the risk of losing aid, Beijing was being far more conditional than any Western 
nation would dare to be.  
 
In 2009 the government was keen to interact with the media in an attempt to put 
defendable arguments in the communication environment. Followed by an initial 
denial about extending an invitation to the Dalai Lama, the first firm line from the side 
of government was that it did not want the Dalai Lama in the country because he 
would “divert attention” from the country’s 2010 FIFA World Cup celebrations. This 
was coupled by denials that South Africa had been pressured by the Chinese 
Government. As the media rejected this line of argument the government later 
conceded that it was also faced with the choice between allowing the Dalai Lama 
access and damaging relations with China.  
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If possible, the media was even harsher in its criticism of the government’s handling 
of the 2011 invitation to the Dalai Lama. Media quoted statements from 2009 not 
ruling out future visits and challenged the government to grant the visa. DIRCO’s 
Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy published in 2011 was quoted, which embraced 
the concept of ubuntu, concluding that South Africa had not chosen to affirm the 
humanity of the Tibetan people, presumably because Tibet had nothing to offer 
South Africa.  
 
Media argued that China would not stop investing or trading with South Africa if 
South Africa allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the country, but suggested that cash 
might have been secured for the ANC, which could be cut off without affecting the 
Chinese economy. It was commented that it seemed that all pretence at finding a 
balance between practical and principled considerations in South African foreign 
policy had been abandoned.  
 
South Africa’s approach was described as “unaccountable, secretive and 
disrespectful”. The government was accused of pursuing a “cynical strategy” over 
the planned visit to South Africa by the Dalai Lama, by delaying to grant a visa for so 
long that he had to cancel his visit, thus allowing the government to claim it never 
came under any pressure from China to prevent him from visiting and would have 
given him a visa, had he not cancelled. This was seen as ‘implausible’.  
 
Media suggested that no amount of explanation would counter the impression of a 
government that caved in to China’s wishes and sacrificed its independence in the 
process. The government sought to look unhurried and strong in considering the 
Tibetan spiritual leader’s application for a visa. Instead it showed weakness and an 
inability to deal with tricky situations. An explanation by the President saying no one 
in government was saying why he did not get a visa, because it was a “state secret”, 
was seen as foreboding the Dalai Lama visa affair as a forerunner of how the PSIB 
would operate once it came into effect.  
 
Government’s approach to the media’s reaction was very different in 2011 in that 
they tried more to evade than to engage with media about the issue. After an initial 
knee-jerk reaction, similar to 2009, saying that the Dalai Lama had not applied for a 
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visa, the government admitted to having received the application indicating it was 
under process. It was also pointed out that a decision on the Dalai Lama’s visa 
application would not be made public, as it would be communicated to the applicant. 
As the government failed to provide an answer about the status of the visa, the Dalai 
Lama eventually cancelled his application.  
 
The Deputy President opportunistically reacted by saying the government would 
have given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had not cancelled his application. It seems 
that the government did not want to repeat the 2009 public debate about the visa 
application in 2011. The avoidance tactic did little to arrest the fury expressed in the 
media about the way the government handled the situation again. 
 
3.8. Civil society, foreign policy and diplomacy 
 
There are many actors involved in the foreign policy process: parliament, the media, 
civil society, political parties and the government (Van Nieukerk 96-99). Ideally, 
through the democratic process of consultation and seeking consensus, foreign 
policy can be improved. However, to be useful, these voices have to be taken 
seriously and their contribution included in the policy process. The challenge in 
foreign policy making is the synchronisation of all these actors in deciding and, 
ultimately, executing policy. While DIRCO carries the main responsibility for foreign 
policy decision-making and implementation, it is frequently in conflict with other 
actors. The dynamic apartheid civil society responded eagerly to the new 
government’s pledge that policy making would be more participatory. However, little 
came of that undertaking. Civil society actors often experience aggravation in making 
their voices heard.  
 
Despite the outcry by civil society, as reflected in the media, about the government 
twice not granting a visa to the Dalai Lama, government could not be moved from its 
position regarding this issue. 
 
With regard to the 2009 disagreement, civil society argued that government’s 
behaviour was disgraceful in line with the country’s abysmal record at the UNSC. 
South Africa was shamelessly succumbing to Chinese pressure. Referring to 
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international media coverage of the matter, South Africa was described as ‘dirt’. It 
was suggested that the decision to refuse the visa made a mockery of the whole 
purpose of the peace conference. South Africa was a sovereign constitutional 
democracy and should not allow other countries to dictate to it regarding who it 
should and should not admit to its territory – regardless of the power and influence of 
that country.  
 
Civil society’s comment on the 2011 dispute was that the current government was 
“disgraceful”, “worse than the apartheid government” and insensitive to the 
sentiments of the constitution. Even though China was South Africa’s biggest trading 
partner, “we should not exchange our morality for dollars or yen”. The government’s 
‘clumsiness’ in handling the application, using bureaucratic red tape to block it was 
condemned. Government had an obligation to explain its actions and inactions in the 
application. Failure to provide reasons for its handling of the matter raised serious 
concerns about discriminatory applications of its power, a lack of commitment to 
transparency and enabling freedom of speech in the country. 
 
Though they may have moved the government to rephrase the content of its public 
diplomacy messaging, none of these protestations managed to change 
government’s foreign-policy decision that it was more important not to damage 
relations with China than to go the suggested route of granting a visa to the Dalai 
Lama, which was held up as the pro-human rights alternative.  
 
3.9. South Africa’s relations with China 
 
Much was said in the communication environment about the relationship between 
South African and China around both the 2009 and the 2011 invitations to the Dalai 
Lama.  
 
With regard to the 2009 invitation, the March 2009 anniversary of the 1959 uprising 
and establishment of a Tibetan government-in-exile in India, as well as anti-Chinese 
riots in the Tibetan capital Lhasa in 2008, heightened sensitivities about the issue of 
China's occupation of Tibet. The media linked the decision not to grant a visa to the 
252 
 
Dalai Lama to China’s establishment of an office in Johannesburg to disburse a R50 
billion Africa investment fund.  
 
The South African Government insisted that it had not been pressured by China, but 
later conceded that if you have to compare allowing the Dalai Lama to attend a 
peace conference, to economic concerns and bilateral relations, interests would be 
better served by making sure relations with China were not jeopardised.  
 
The Chinese Embassy in Pretoria admitted to appealing to the South African 
Government not to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa as it would harm bilateral 
relations and also explained it was a particularly inopportune time for the Dalai Lama 
to be visiting South Africa. The Dalai Lama, SAFT and the media said the incident 
was as a result of pressure from the Chinese Government, or anxiety not to 
compromise relations with China.  
 
Media also suspected that the ANC decided to ban him because of “all the Chinese 
money” that went into the party’s coffers. FOCAC participants signed on to the one-
China policy, which meant accepting that Taiwan was a renegade province of China 
that must eventually return to the mother country. Beijing’s apparent growing 
sensitivity about the Dalai Lama implied that the policy had now been covertly 
extended to Tibet. China believed that part of the respect they accorded to Africa 
was not to impose conditions on their aid, as Western nations did. The irony was that 
by enforcing this “no-meet-the-Dalai Lama policy” at the risk of losing aid, Beijing 
was being more conditional than any Western nation would dare to be.  
 
The new 2009 administration said that China was an important trade partner and 
South Africa may look at expanding IBSA to include China. South Africa believed in 
the one-China policy and had even broken off relations with Taiwan in observance of 
this. 
 
The government avoided being drawn into a debate about the 2011 invitation to the 
Dalai Lama, but more or less the same arguments about the role of relations with 
China ensued in the public space. From the outset, the media and COSATU argued 
that South Africa would have to decide between its commitments to human rights 
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and its desire not to offend its Chinese trading partners and cautioned that “our 
conscience could not be on sale”.  
 
The question was posed as to whether the delay in granting the Dalai Lama a visa 
was ‘timidness’ in the face of not wanting to anger China, or whether there was an 
unseen diplomatic tussle going on as China lobbied to forbid him access to South 
Africa.  
 
The media again suggested that China would not stop investing or trading with South 
Africa if we allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the country, but inferred that cash might 
have been secured for the ANC, which could be cut off without affecting the Chinese 
economy. The media accused the government of pursuing a “cynical strategy” over 
the planned visit to South Africa by the Dalai Lama, by delaying to grant a visa for so 
long that he had to cancel his visit. This would allow the government to claim it never 
came under pressure from China to prevent him from visiting and would have given 
him a visa, had he not cancelled – which was implausible.  
 
The media said that no amount of explanation or argument would counter the 
impression of a government that caved in to China’s wishes and sacrificed its 
independence in the process. The President said it was not in South Africa’s national 
interest to disclose why the Dalai Lama was barred entry, but explained China had 
agreed to help South Africa add value to its raw materials, while South Africa fully 
backed the one-China policy. The media argued that essentially it said that allowing 
the Dalai Lama to visit South Africa would have jeopardised Beijing’s undertaking to 
help South Africa economically. The government also explained that they had not 
acted under the dictates of China, but the country felt indebted to China for 
orchestrating South Africa's invitation to join BRICS. 
 
In essence the 2009 and 2011 arguments were the same, most notably the assertion 
from the media that the government gave in to pressure from China not to allow the 
Dalai Lama to visit South Africa, while the government insisted that they did not act 
under strain from China, but merely in the best interest of South Africa. 
 
3.10. The position of the Dalai Lama 
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Though he was the person at the centre of the disputes not to grant him visas to visit 
South Africa in 2009 and 2011, the Dalai Lama was strangely enough not the focus 
of media coverage on the issue.  
 
The 2009 invitation to the Dalai Lama was in his capacity as Nobel Peace Prize 
Laureate. One of the major arguments against granting him a visa was in view of the 
anniversary of him establishing a Tibetan government-in-exile in India. The Dalai 
Lama argued that the South African Government’s decision was a manifestation of a 
lack of understanding and mutual respect.  
 
The TSSA pictured the Dalai Lama as a man of peace, internationally recognised for 
his selfless efforts to promote harmony, was prevented by South Africa from 
attending a peace conference here. Media also depicted him as someone who, the 
world over, commanded immense respect. In this “hugely embarrassing” permit 
refusal decision, South Africa helped the Chinese Government avoid having to 
engage with the Dalai Lama to reach a workable solution around the issue of Tibetan 
autonomy.  
 
The new administration reiterated later in 2009 that the Dalai Lama was now free to 
visit.  
 
The 2011 invitation to attend the 80th birthday party of Archbishop Desmond Tutu led 
to the media immediately quoting the 2009 statement by the government saying the 
Dalai Lama was welcome to visit South Africa. Several stakeholders said the 
government had been disrespectful towards the two Nobel Peace Laureates in its 
slow response to the application, adding that the government should have had the 
courage of its conviction to make a decision and that it would have been much more 
respectful to have received a negative answer than no answer at all. Opposition 
political parties supported the Dalai Lama’s application and saw him as a champion 
of human rights.  
 
In arguments in both 2009 and 2011, the Dalai Lama was held up as a man of 
peace; internationally recognised for his selfless efforts to promote harmony; 
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someone who, the world over, commanded immense respect; and a champion of 
human rights. This contributed to the outrage at the refusal to grant him a visa. On 
the side of the argument not to grant him a visa was his role in establishing a Tibetan 
government-in-exile in India and how this offended the Chinese Government in its 
pursuit of the one-China policy.  
 
3.11. Lessons learned from 2009 to 2011 
 
In 2009, as well as in 2011, there were public debates through the media about the 
way the government handled the invitations to the Dalai Lama and the related 
applications for visas for him. 
 
As indicated before, there was initially uncertainty about whether the government 
had in fact taken a decision not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa in 2009, and if so, 
what were the grounds for this decision. The DFA denied that the government was 
obstructing the invitation, maintaining that no invitation had been extended to him. As 
the media and conference organisers insisted that the Dalai Lama was invited to 
speak at the peace conference linked to the 2010 World Cup, The Presidency 
acknowledged South Africa had refused the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the 
conference, saying it was not in South Africa's interest for him to attend. 
 
The new administration of President Jacob Zuma emphasised that the Dalai Lama 
was now free to visit. However, apparently not learning much from the 
consequences of the initial denial about the 2009 visa application, the government 
followed much the same route when the news about the 2011 invitation broke in the 
media.  
 
Unnamed diplomatic sources were quoted saying the Dalai Lama had applied for a 
visa from the South African High Commission in New Delhi in June 2011, and his 
officials were told that “political guidance” was required from Pretoria on the 
application. However, Home Affairs said he had not applied for a visa in New Delhi. 
DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, soon afterward admitted to having 
received the application saying it was under process. This process would eventually 
just be delayed until it was too late for the Dalai Lama to attend the event.  
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As the government failed to provide an answer about the status of the visa, the Dalai 
Lama eventually cancelled his application. Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe 
reacted by saying the government would have given the Dalai Lama a visa if he had 
not cancelled his application. When the Deputy President was challenged to grant 
such a visa, his spokesperson had to explain that the Deputy President did not issue 
visas. 
 
The government faced an outcry from all fronts for its handling of particularly the 
2011 invitation.  
 
The only reaction from the South African Government to lessons learned from the 
2009 chorus of disapproval against not granting a visa to the Dalai Lama, was to 
avoid not actively taking a decision in 2011. The reaction to this way out may have 
been even more negative. 
 
The DTPC and the Office of Tibet said the government had been “profoundly 
disrespectful” towards the two Nobel Peace Laureates in its slow response to the 
application. They said the government should have had the courage of its conviction 
to make a decision. It would have been much more respectful to have received a 
negative answer than no answer at all.  
 
Opposition political parties accused the government of “blatant dishonesty”. With the 
2011 application opposition political parties argued that the government should have 
learnt from their mistakes. COSATU condemned the government’s ‘clumsiness’ in 
handling the application, using bureaucratic red tape to block it. The SAHRC said the 
government had an obligation to explain its actions and inactions in the application, 
voicing concern over unexplained delays.  
 
The media commented that the government sought to look unhurried and strong in 
considering the Dalai Lama’s application for a visa. Instead it showed weakness and 
an inability to deal with tricky situations. It accused the government of pursuing a 
“cynical strategy” by delaying to grant a visa for so long that the Dalai Lama had to 
cancel his visit. This allowed the government to claim it never came under any 
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pressure from China to refuse the Dalai Lama a visa, and would have given him a 
visa had he not cancelled. This was described as “very implausible”.  
 
In a case brought by the IFP and COPE the Supreme Court of Appeal found that 
former Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had unreasonably delayed 
the 2011 decision on a visa application by the Dalai Lama. Home Affairs pointed out 
that the right of the government to issue visas had not been challenged.  
 
The government thus repeated the mistake of 2009 denying receiving a visa 
application in 2011. It again had to admit that it was processing it, but this time 
avoided taking a decision by delaying to give an answer until it was too late for the 
Dalai Lama to attend the event he was invited to. This strategy was highly criticised 
as showing weakness and failure to deal with the situation.  
 
5. Contribution of study 
 
Media mostly framed the foreign-policy issue studied in normative terms. They did 
not buy into the national interest angle put forward by the government, but reframed 
it as bowing to pressure from China.  
 
The study found that the South African Government does take note of media 
coverage in conducting public diplomacy. Even if opinions expressed through the 
media do not actually change foreign policy, they do influence the content of public 
diplomacy messaging.  
 
The way the South African government conducts public diplomacy is probably 
closely linked to its paranoia about how the media reports about it. Instead of trying 
to foster better relations with the media and using the media as a partner to bring t its 
policy messages to its target audiences, government seems to be convinced that the 
media is its mortal enemy.  
 
In 2012 then GCIS CEO Jimmy Manyi told the media about the Rapid Response 
System at GCIS, which is in essence merely a government reputation management 
tool. However, Mr Manyi told the media that “we sit and we check who is saying what 
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about government” and "some of the responses will mean people must apologise to 
GCIS or to government” and “we will have to educate the media about issues it in 
fact got wrong” (SABC online 2012). This led to the media dubbing this a “Big 
Brother monitoring tool”.   
 
If there was more trust between the government and the media, the government 
could be more enthusiastic and open in the way it conducted public diplomacy. 
There would not be the perception that the government was mostly pushed towards 
the public diplomacy route rather than opting for it by choice.   
 
Media and those quoted in the media could not sway the government to change its 
position on granting a visa to the Dalai Lama, but the government was pushed to 
review the content of its messages or its approach to the issue as indicated above.  
With regard to the actors in the foreign policy landscape, the media, civil society and 
political parties were particularly active in the Dalai Lama visa dispute. The 
involvement of the government in the discourse was more under duress than by 
choice. Civil society and opposition political parties were very vocal in supporting the 
case of allowing the Dalai Lama to visit South Africa. They had an extremely willing 
partner in the media, which carried their messages and supported these with opinion 
of their own in editorials. With government adamant that this was not in the best 
interest of the country, despite the strong united moral stand of all the other actors, 
they could not move the government to their position. This is typical of the limited 
influence other actors have on foreign policy in general.  
 
After the 2009 invitation it seemed as if government may have been convinced to 
review the policy, with an undertaking that the Dalai Lama would be welcome in 
future. However, when faced with the 2011 invitation, it was clear that this was not 
the case.  
 
The study also makes it clear that the priorities of human rights and national interests 
cannot always be pursued in concord. This sentiment was expressed by analysts, 
but the government did not see its way clear to articulate this angle in public 
communication.  
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6. Recommendations for future research 
 
Similar studies could be pursued using media content analysis. Media content 
analysis seeks to describe with optimum objectivity, precision and generality, what is 
said on a given subject in or by the media. It includes an analysis of placement of 
stories, tone, prominence, messages, advocates, critics and journalists to track how 
media outlets cover various subjects, issues or themes. This, being more of a 
quantitative approach, could bring an entirely new perspective to the study. 
 
Another aspect that may need further investigation is the role of social media in 
public diplomacy in South Africa. International scholars have given significant 
attention to this aspect in recent years, but little has been written from a South 
African perspective.  
 
Scholars from the fields of communication, international relations and diplomatic 
studies should be encouraged to conduct multidisciplinary research on these topics 
to investigate how each of these disciplines complement each other. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This study investigated how media reporting framed foreign policy in the South 
African context. The discourse between the South African media and government 
regarding South Africa’s foreign policy was demonstrated in the matter of the South 
African Government not granting a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2009 and 2011 
respectively. This study, based on the premise of the constructivist theory that 
international reality is socially constructed, considered how foreign policy was 
influenced by this process, if at all.  
 
In the media monitored for this study, it was seen that media, opposition parties and 
civil society found the government lacking in upholding the constitutional value of 
human rights in both instances where the Dalai Lama was invited. The government 
also did not convincingly defend itself against this accusation. 
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The government explained its decision not to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama, both in 
2009 and in 2011, in terms of “South Africa’s best interest”. However, media, 
opposition parties and civil society saw this as an admission to “bowing to pressure” 
from China.  
 
From a constructivist point of view the government was repeatedly pushed to adapt 
its stated public policy messages regarding this story, though it might not necessarily 
have come down to an actual policy adjustment. Both in 2009 and in 2011, the 
government’s initial stance was that no invitation had been extended to the Dalai 
Lama; however, the insistence of the media and civil society forced the government 
to acknowledge that an application had at least been received.  
 
In 2009 the government first insisted that it did not want to grant the Dalai Lama a 
visa as his visit would divert attention from the 2010 World Cup. They then had to 
acknowledge that they did not want to jeopardise relations with China. When the 
Deputy President said the government would have given the Dalai Lama his 2011 
visa if he had not cancelled his application, his spokesperson had to explain that the 
Deputy President did not issue visas, when the Deputy President was challenged to 
grant such a visa. 
 
The biggest change in government approach may lie in the government choosing not 
to take a decision at all regarding the 2011 application, apparently to avoid a repeat 
of the media and public outcry encountered in 2009.  
 
Furthermore, during and in the aftermath of the 2009 incident the government 
indicated that the Dalai Lama would be free to visit in future. But by not taking a 
decision on issuing a visa in 2011, the government had to backtrack on these 
utterances.  
 
The media mostly framed the foreign-policy issue studied in normative terms. They 
did not buy in to the national-interest angle put forward by the government, but 
reframed it as bowing to pressure from China.  
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The government’s insistence not to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama triggered 
enormous attention. This cannot be explained in terms of interest, as South Africa 
has a minute Buddhist community and there is little to no trade relations with Tibet.  
It can only be understood in normative terms. What did trigger that much awareness 
was the stature of the man himself as a Nobel Peace Laureate; his invitation to be 
present at a peace conference with other Nobel Peace Laureates (including all 
surviving South African winners); and to attend the 80th birthday celebrations one of 
them. All those involved were much-admired men of peace. Especially the South 
African Laureates have a hugely sentimental following among their compatriots and 
are seen as men of vision who had saved their country from the perils of civil war 
and put it on a road to peace. This was juxtaposed against the poor human rights 
record of China to whose demands the government was seen to be bowing in 
denying the Dalai Lama entry to South Africa. The government was therefore 
perceived to be slighting men of peace in an attempt to pacify an ally with a very 
poor record in that regard.  
 
The study found that the government does take note of media coverage in 
conducting public diplomacy. Even if opinion expressed through the media does not 
actually change foreign policy, it does influence the content of public diplomacy 
messaging.  
 
The media and those quoted in the media could not sway the government to change 
its position on granting a visa to the Dalai Lama, but the government was pushed to 
review the content of its messages or its approach to the issue as indicated.  
 
After the 2009 invitation it even seemed as if government might have been 
convinced to review the policy, with an undertaking that the Dalai Lama would be 
welcome in future. However, when faced with the 2011 invitation, it was clear that 
this was not the case.  
 
The study also found that the priorities of human rights and national interests could 
not always be pursued in concord. This sentiment was expressed by analysts, but 
the government did not see its way clear to articulate this angle in public 
communication.  
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The foremost comment about the findings of this study must be that the media and 
the voices quoted in media sources might have to some degree adjusted the way the 
South African Government packaged its messages on the matter of issuing a visa to 
the Dalai Lama, but they could not manage to alter the government’s policy stance 
on the matter. This despite an indication in 2009 from the government that the Dalai 
Lama would in future be welcome in the country.   
 
These findings have certain implications for the nature of foreign policy making 
processes in South Africa. It is clear that though an issue such as the visa 
application by the Dalai Lama is taken up by civil society and driven by notable 
media coverage, with very strong opinion expressed, the government is not easily 
convinced to adopt a different stance. Presumably international stakeholders such as 
BRICS partner China has a much stronger influence than local media and civil 
society groups, as they exert much more influence. This determines the limitation of 
public diplomacy in the South African context. This is also tied up with the huge 
majority enjoyed by the ruling party and the sense that its voters would continue 
supporting them despite dissatisfaction and even open dissent within its own ranks. 
 
Every time the government is faced with the prospect of a visit by the Dalai Lama it 
has gone the way of denying receiving a visa application; then having to 
acknowledge that an application was received; indicating that it was under 
consideration (creating expectations that it might be approved); and finally either 
denying him a visa or not taking a decision at all (waiting so long to give an answer 
that a visit to attend the event the visa was intended for, was no longer feasible). 
Government might be under the impression that this procedure is convincing in 
creating the notion that the Dalai Lama’s visa application is handled like any other, 
thereby avoiding the impression that it was acting under pressure from China in 
denying him access. However, it creates ample opportunity for those in favour of a 
visit by the Dalai Lama to agitate around the matter and question the government’s 
motives should a visa not be granted.  
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In dealing with any potential future Dalai Lama visa applications, the government has 
to adjust the way it conducts public diplomacy around this issue. It should take a 
unyielding decision either for or against granting a visa and firmly communicate 
around this decision. A decision in favour of a visa would be positively received by 
the media, civil society and the wider international audience. It would, however, 
require the government to be convinced that China would see the mutual benefit of 
maintaining trade and other relations with the country, despite such a decision. A 
decision against would obviously set the government on a collision course with 
media and civil society again, but would give it a sense of security in as far as 
relations with China are concerned.  
 
Either way, the damaging rollercoaster ride of creating expectations and demands 
around access for the Dalai Lama every time there is an invitation extended to him to 
visit the country could be avoided.  
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